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Part  I 
DEVELOPMENT  OF EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
at the National Level 
I.  GOVERNMENTS AND  PARLIAMENTS 
Mr. W  aldheim.  Austrian Foreign Minister.  discusses Austria's 
association with the European Community 
Mr. Waldheim,  Austrian Foreign Minister,  paid an official visit to 
the Netherlands from 17  to 20 June.  He said that his Government did not want 
the EEC to hold talks first with the four applicant States and defer to a later date 
its discussions with countries such as Austria which were not interested in 
full membership. 
Austria expected the same treatment as other applicants,  he said, 
but wished to ·make it quite clear that it definitely intended to remain neutral. 
In reply to a question as to whether he thought that a European de-
fence conference would take place in the near future,  Mr.  Waldheim said that 
the possibility of holding such a  conference was now being explored and that 
only later on would it be known whether it could actually be held. 
In a communique the Netherlands stated that it fully understood 
Austria's position regarding European integration and that it would continue 
to support Austria. 
- 1-Mr. Waldheim said that Austria took a realistic view of the facts as 
regards its own bid for integration and it would take every step to make the 
necessary priority adjustments in the Austrian economy. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  19 and 21  June 1968) 
-2-Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia and the Common Market 
In an interview with the Prague paper Mr.  Oldrich Cernik,  Prime 
Minister of Czechoslovakia,  defined his country's relations with the member 
States of the European Community :  'Czechoslovakia respects the existence of 
the European Economic Community and wishes to establish favourable econo-
mic and commercial relations with all its member countries.  It also pro-
poses to intensify its relations with the member countries of COMECON,  its 
nearest neighbours.  COMECON is in fact a large and interesting market with 
good prospects.  We  wish to maintain relations based on equality with all the 
member countries of the Common Market and we are rather concerned at the 
possibility that the process of integration among these countries might create 
artificial barriers to contacts with us. ' 
In Mr. Cernik's opinion,  Czechoslovakia's relations with the Com-
mon Market could pave the way for a  fruitful  mutual exploitation of the advan-
tages offered by an international sharing of labour.  Such a  situation would be 
beneficial both to Czechoslovakia and to the consolidation of peace in Europe. 
The Prime Minister was in favour of improving his country's rela-
tions with the Federal Republic of Germany.  He pointed out,  however, that 
such relations could only be achieved if Western Germany acknowledged the 
present set-up,  which resulted from the second world war and if it recognized, 
in particular, present frontiers. 
(L'Echo de la Bourse,  13 June 1968) 
- 3-1.  France and the question of Spain's entry into the Common Market 
When Mr. Nungesser,  Secretary of State for Economic and Financial 
Affairs,  visited Madrid on 23  April,  the French Embassy published a commu-
niqu~ stating that France was 'particularly favourable' to Spain's request for 
association with the EEC.  This was in the interest of both countries and 
would have a favourable effect on the economic developmentofWesternEurope. 
Mr. Nungesser said before leaving that if France had recently op-
posed the request for membership made by a third country,  this had been be-
cause of specific problems and not as a matter of principle. 
(Le Mende,  25  April 1968) 
2.  European Affairs discussed in a debate at the National Assembly on 
scientific research 
On 7 May,  the Nat~onal Assembly opened a debate on scientific re-
search.  Mr. Maurice Schumann,  the then Minister for Scientific Research 
and Atomic and Space Questions,  made an introductory statement in which he 
dealt in particular with the brain drain: 'At Government level,  the best way 
of averting the brain drain is certainly to pursue the efforts made in connexion 
with scientific research and means of improving the working conditions  of re-
search workers. 
As observed by Mr. Couste,  our national effort can only assume its 
full significance within the framework of a European technological policy. 
On 31  October 1968,  the Ministers responsible for research in the 
European Economic Community adopted an important resolution.  They de-
cided that the possibilities of practical co-operation should be immediately 
developed in a number of fields or,  to be precise,  in seven essential sectors. 
Preparatory work was carried out in an excellent atmosphere. 
There are encouraging prospects and there is certainly room for assuming, 
-4-in the light of the work already carried out,  that the Europe of the Six could, 
in the near future,  develop a large data processing equipment. 
I shall only mention,  as proof of this,  the reports drawn up by the 
Brussels Commission,  that is,  the Community institution par excellence,  on 
Britain's application. 
This report aptly points out that,  in certain technical fields,  the Six 
would find it rather difficult to reach a world-wide scale without Britain's 
contribution.  The report lays down the principle which should really settle 
the point :  'If the Communities are to derive any profit from Britain's contri-
bution,  this will only be in so far as they themselves are capable of setting up 
a common policy in the field of science and technology.' 
We would find ourselves faced with a dangerous contradiction if  we 
put forward the problems of Britain's relations with the Community as a ·rea-
son for deferring the execution of the decisions taken in luxembourg.  It is 
only in so far as,  faithful to our undertakings, we shall go  on promoting the 
Community's economic growth through technological co-operation that,  as we 
now find,  we shall be able to discuss our common future usefully and in prac-
tical terms with Great Britain.  For its part,  France has said and proved that 
it was ready to do so. 
To what extent does this effect Euratom ?  May I remind you in this 
respect  that I suggested to our Euratom partners to consider,  with the sole 
object of reimbursing to the member States the amount of their subscriptions, 
a programme genuinely designed to achieve  Europe's independence in the field 
of energy. 1 
Mr. Jacques Duhamel (PDM)  drew two conclusions from Britain's 
refusal to take part in the construction of European satellites.  The first was 
that,  from a technological viewpoint, Britain's presence in the European 
Community would,  no doubt,  be decisive if Europe wished to bridge the ever-
growing gap that separates it from the United States.  In fact the gap was 
wider in 1968 than in 1945 when Europe had been practically destroyed by the 
war. 
It was not really possible to admit Britain into a technological Euro-
pe and to reject it from an economic Europe. 
-5-The idea of a technological Europe was suggested by Mr. Wilson 
even before his country's actual admission to the Common Market.  But the 
fact still remained that,  once the requirements for Britain's entry into the 
Common Market had been met,  there should be no doubt as to its final admis-
sion. 
Mr. Duhamel went on to say : 
'For Europe to be able to develop a common  research policy,  it 
must first achieve political union. 
There will come a time - and that time is approaching - when the 
Common Market will no longer be able to produce its full technical, economic 
and social effect unless it is the expression of a political union.  Otherwise the 
programmes will be chaotic and failures probably inevitable. ' 
Mr. Jacques Baumel (Gaullist) put forward a different view : 
'France's effort should be better understood and better supported for,  in fact, 
neither America nor Russia would find it in their interests to be faced with a 
European space power. 
Giving up space research and  development would not only mean a 
blow  to Europe's prestige or the end of a certain grandeur,  but it would in  fact 
mean that Europe would be open to broadcasts relayed by satellites and the 
invasion of our homes by pictures and ideas from the two super-powers. 
This makes it all the more to be regretted that Britain should have 
decided to give up the ELDO project and  that Italy should now be reluctant to 
pursue the ESRO project. 
What a contradiction for Britain to give up one of the major Euro-
pean projects of our age at the very moment when it wishes to create a Euro-
pean technological communityt 
What a contradiction for Britain's friends to allege that country's 
problems in support of a proposed adjournment which might slow down or even 
completely arrest the process of building a scientific Europel 
I believe that,  in so far as we promote European technological co-
ordination,  this will enable us to discuss later on our relations in that field 
with Britain. 
-6 -What a contradiction it is to pretend to aim at a political Europe and 
a political merger when,  in fact,  we must begin by making Europe where it 
can easily be achieved! 
Europe must neither accept the American monopoly nor the Russian-
American duopoly with regard to communication satellites. Europe and France 
must therefore endeavour to save in common their communication satellite 
project (Symphonie). 1 
The debate was resumed on 8 May.  Mr. de Lipkowski (Gaullist) 
asked : 'What has Europe done up till now?  1  Have its efforts been really satis-
factory?  If  not,  what should it do?  What has it done with regard to technolo-
gical co-operation with third countries,  in particular Britain?  How  could it 
reinforce this co-operation? 
'First,  a depressing fact :the Europe of the Six has only  woken up 
belatedly to the reality of these essential problems. 
It may be argued that research is a matter that falls mainly under 
the jurisdiction of Euratom or even the ECSC,  particularly with regard to 
some of its aspects.  But experience has shown how deplorable it had been that 
those who should have had an overall view of European problems- the EEC 
Commission in the first place - did not have that overall view with regard to 
scientific affairs. 
That technological co-operation with Britain is desirable,  I would 
gladly acknowledge and I shall discuss this again later on.  The fact remains 
that the question of Britain  1 s membership should in no way be used as a pre-
text  for delaying the Community effort which the Six must urgently make. The 
leeway is already far too wide for them to be able to afford further delays in 
introducing a Community research policy. 
To these political obstacles,  particularly the lack of political will, 
must be added a further legal obstacle. 
The ECSC's failure is a secret for no-one : after ten years of efforts 
it has not succeeded in establishing a common energy policy. 
What is the position with regard to Euratom?  I will say straight-
away that I am not against integration; I do not think that we should reject any 
form of integration. 
-7-After ten years,  the Treaty,  with regard to pure research, has not 
been respected. 
Thus in the vital field of booster generators we are witnessing com-
mon German,  Belgian and Dutch designs or,  on the other hand,  independent 
French designs,  but nothing within the framework of Euratom. 
Has Euratom at least promoted a genuine European policy ? 
The result of its scattered policy efforts has led the Commission  to 
practise the unfortunate "fair return policy". ' 
The President of the Federation of the Left,  Mr. Mitterrand,  then 
took the floor.  He said : 'I am one of those who believes in the force and in 
the dynamic nature of the European construction.  I feel it is a necessary ven-
ture if Europe is to resist the American and Russian super-powers.  It is es-
sential for France to become part of a much larger political,  economic and 
technical framework,  namely that grouping of which the Europe of the Six is 
the nucleus.  1 
Mr. Mitterrand went on to say :  'We wish to enlarge that Europe, 
geographically.  We wish to increase its powers.  We believe it is only the 
beginning of a great design.  But this design should not be completely ruined 
at the very outset. 
What is happening in fact?  On the one hand,  Britain is withdrawing 
its co-operation on space research with France and Germany.  On the other 
France is competing with the German-Belgian-Dutch "trio".  Italy invokes the 
"fair return" theory while the Netherlands is not far from entertaining similar 
ideas.  In short,  each of these countries,  encouraged by France's bad ex-
ampl~ wishes to derive the full benefit of its individual contribution.  This is 
bound to destroy the Community spirit. 
We are living in the wreckage of Europe.  A national spirit, border-
ing on nationalism,  seems to have prevailed. 
I fail to see what would now come out of the debates,  however inter-
esting these may be- of the European Parliament,  the Council of Europe,  the 
European Commission or the Council of Ministers.  Everything is coming 
apart.' 
-8-Addressing directly  Mr. Schumann,  Mr. Mitterrand added : 'You 
have no right to say that Britain is refusing to build Europe with you because 
it is not prepared to accept the particular procedure you wish to impose on it 
to the detriment of a gene  raJ policy.  Your argument flows from a clever 
dialectical approach,  but it is self-destructive. 
It is the choice of a political Community controlling its technical, 
commercial and economic components that would enable Europe to develop. ' 
To this Mr. Schumann replied : 'I am a European, too, Mr. Mitterrand 
and I am for the Europe that is being built.  If I may use the particular expres-
sion which you have introduced,  I would say that I,  too,  believe in the dynamic 
force of the European construction. 
Thus,  considering that a resolution as important as that of 31  Oc-
tober 1967 was voted unconditionally,  I cannot understand why there should 
now be any suspicion of the motives of the country that proposed it and carried 
it into effect and not of the countries which,  under various pretexts,  are pre-
venting its implementation. 
The Brussels Commission,  as I said,  was not only entitled but,  in 
fact,  obliged to make proposals of a political character for 196 9 and the en-
suing years.  We are still  waiting for these proposals, for since the merger 
of the Commissions,  nothing has been put forward. 1 
(National Assembly,  Parliamentary Debates of 7 and 8 May 1968) 
3.  Mr. Edgar Faure advocates giving the agricultural policy a,new 
emphasis 
Addressing ·the 50th Congress of the Agricultural Co-operation and 
Credit Organization in Grenoble on 7 May,  Mr. Edgar Faure outlined France's 
forthcoming agricultural policy. 
He  spoke first of the milk problem which was one of immediate intel"-
est.  He recalled that in an association everyone had to make concessions; his 
position in Brussels,  as President of the Council,  implied a European outlook. 
With disconcerting frankness,  Mr. Faure pointed out that what mattered was 
-9-to reach an agreement on the milk market.  He further stated that if someone 
had to wreck the building of Europe,  he would not be the one responsible. 
Another delicate issue was that of financing the agricultural Europe. 
To make those countries which were not responsible for surpluses pay for 
them was out of the question; the Six thus had to reconsider the problem of the 
apportionment key governing contributions.  To conclude,  he recalled that 
Europe represented an opportunity not only for agriculture but for the economy 
as a whole. 
(Le Figaro,  8 May 1968). 
4.  General de Gaulle's visit to Rumania 
On his arrival in Rumania  on  May  14,  General de Gaulle declared : 
1•  •  •  •  •  Today Europe is beginning to re-establish itself through the inde-
pendence of each one of its nations and through co-operation between all of 
them for peace and progress. 
What Rumania and France have to do together, to contribute towards 
this great European work,  and consequently this great world work,  these are 
the subject  of the talks we are going to have.  1 
For his part,  Mr. Ceausescu stated : '. • • • • the position of France 
in regard to a  whole series of essential international problems is highly ap-
preciated in Rumania as is your remarkable activity,  Mr. President,  in  work-
ing to ensure a wide measure of co-operation between countries,  to promote 
the principle of national sovereignty and independence in relations between 
States and to avert another world war'. 
At a luncheon offered by Mr. Ceausescu, General de Gaulle stated : 
'· •••• but the joint action of Rumania and France cannot be limited to an ex-
change of goods,  of knowledge and of experts, nor can it be limited to the 
reciprocation of cordial greetings between the two partners. 
If  these two countries are independent and therefore responsible both 
towards themselves and others,  then the age we live in requires that they make. 
a joint political effort,  the aim of which must,  because of their very nature, 
be the union of Europe. 
-10-The Third Reich's desire to dominate tore Europe apart,  leaving it 
terribly divided; and today every state in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals 
realizes this division is becoming daily more onerous,  daily more difficult to 
justify.  This is no doubt felt nowhere more strongly than in Paris,  but is this 
not also the case in Bucharest?  How can we allow a situation to persist in 
Europe - whose countries are so well endowed with reason and experience -
where many of these countries find themselves divided into two opposing 
blocs, where they have to conform to the political,  economic and military dic-
tates of an outside source and have to accept the permanent presence of foreign 
forces on their territory?  No,  here,  as in France,  the view is that this cold 
war,  this sequel to the Yalta agreement,  is unlikely to produce  anything but 
a sterile and artificial separation  (unless it becomes a fatal one)and that it is 
alien to the nature of Europe,  which throughout the centuries has ceaselessly 
tended towards unity and which today,  more clearly than ever,  sees the oppor-
tunity and the obligation to achieve this unity and that there are thus no longer 
any ideologies or hegemonies which have any value in comparison with the be-
nefits of an easing of tension,  of agreement and of co-operation between all of 
Europe's constituent states  • 
• • • • • What our continent expects from Bucharest,  Moscow and 
Paris,  as from Bonn,  Rome and all its other capitals,  is a great movement to 
unite Europe for peace and for progress. 
France,  Mr. President,  is determined to forge ahead towards this 
goal and is more than willing to do this side by side with Rumania.  It hopes 
that our meeting will  lead our two countries to tighten their political links. 
Indeed,  they have,  in their hard history,  often done so,  but this has 
only been to defend themselves.  This time both have together to help the 
whole of  Europe to build and to renew itself.' 
In Craiova,  General de Gaulle declared : '....  We have together 
to  build Europe - a Europe without an Iron Curtain in which every nation is 
master of its own destiny and all co-operate for progress and peace.  This is 
what Europe has been trying to do for a thousand years and this is what we 
have together to accomplish,  if indeed,  this is what you want. ' 
(Le Figaro,  17  May 1968; 
Le Monde,  15 and 16  May 1968) 
-11-Germany 
1.  Chancellor's and Minister's views on European policy 
On 2 April,  in the course of the second reading of the Federal 
budget for 1968,  Dr. Kiesinger made some references to  European policy. 
Many Americans- he said- saw in Bonn's European policy the possibility of 
an unfriendly attitude to Washington.  Moreover,  there existed in America 
some  confusion about the political attitude of Europeans.  He did not take 
these reports lightly.  The U.S. Government,  however,  had firmly assured 
him that these were not its own views. 
It had to be admitted that the European scene was a confused one. 
France was going it  alone.  The Federal Government had continued to culti-
vate Franco-German relations and to pursue a consistent poiicy under these 
difficult circumstances so as to avoid a crisis in the EEC.  He  knew no other 
way of overcoming the present stalemate.  'All we have done is to try to re-
concile conflicting opinions,  to soothe ruffled tempers and to clear up mis-
understandings.'  The Paris agreements on the 'arrangement'  with Great 
Britain were admittedly on the vague side,  but the Federal Government- in 
contrast to the French - had stressed its readiness to enter into negotiations 
with Great  Britain without delay. 
Mr. Strauss,  the Federal Finance  Minister,  speaking in Bonn on 
6 May 1968 before the Federal Chamber of Tax Agents,  said that the division 
of Europe could be healed without changing the political systems,  and that this 
was essential  if  Germany was to be reunited.  The countries of the West 
could possibly help their eastern neighbours to catch up in the industrial, 
technical and transport sectors.  This called,however,  for a measure of fi-
nancial flexibility - something the Federal Republic would not have if  high 
expenditure on consumer goods continued to be criticized as in the past.  A 
wider margin of expenditure for political ends would,  however,  extend the 
scope of  European policy.  The Federal Government - Mr. Strauss pointed 
out- was doing its utmost to improve relations with Eastern neighbours. 
Recent events in Czechoslovakia were an attempt to improve the economic 
situation of that country,  with its people's co-operation,  on more liberal 
lines. 
-12-Mr. Strauss made a strong plea for an enlargement of the European 
Communities and for British entry into the EEC.  Europe could not become 
united until it numbered Great  Britain among its active members.  The Com-
mon  Market  must be open ~o all who were willing and able to join it and sup-
ported the aim of political union.  The geographical boundaries of the Common 
Market and of the political union would not at first have to coincide. 
Mr. Strauss said that it would be intolerable for the countries of 
Europe to have to be protected militarily \>y  North America indefinitely.  For 
that matter,  this was also asking too much of the Americans themselves. 
On 9 June,  Mr. Strauss,  CSU  Chairman and Finance Minister, 
called,  in a speech  delivered to the Bavarian Youth Union,  for new European 
initiatives.  Haggling over every penny in the price of milk could no longer be 
regarded as an adequate contribution to European progress.  The moment for 
political action had now arrived.  Mr. Strauss urgently appealed to the Ger-
mans to assist their hard pressed friends to their utmost.  Europeans could 
no longer live tranquilly on the sheltered side of world politics.  Europe's re-
covery meant a great deal to Germany which had no wish to see its own house 
cave in.  The catchword 'detente  1  had led to a disastrous obscuring of objec-
tives. 
The people could no longer stomach exaggerated ideas of national 
sovereignty.  Europe had to come.  Mr. Strauss spoke out in favour of main-
taining the Atlantic Alliance - what was needed,  however,  was a redistribution 
of forces.  The European countries would be unable to  meet the challenge 
untill a broader-based Europe was created.  'The door must be left open to 
everyone but we cannot wait for the very last straggler. '  Whatever combi-
nation was finally adopted,  France could not be done without.  Concordance of 
German and French policies provided the foundation for Europe.  11 want to 
become a European so that I can remain a German. 
1 
Mr. Strauss felt that the  Germans ought to display a little more 
national dignity and continuity with the main stream of German history,  even 
in a larger Europe.  He  called for far-reaching internal reforms.  Ideas 
ought not to be blindly accepted merely because they had been regarded as 
faultless for a hundred years. 
On 20 June Mr. Strauss delivered a speech at a meeting of the 
'Welt-Raiffeisentag' (international agricultural credit co-operative) in which, 
without mentioning Great Britain directly,  he bluntly criticized the French 
attitude to European policy.  The European  States must realize that world 
political events compelled them to give their  passive role and to adopt an 
- 13-active one.  If the Europeans failed to establish a common approach and to 
take joint political action,  others who were not  of European origin would call 
the tune in Europe.  The EEC offered a splendid basis for a subsequent politi-
cal union.  It must,  however,  leave the door open to others,  and its member 
States must be prepared to pass  through and beyond economic union to a po-
litical community. 
Interview  with the Federal Economics Minister Schiller  ---------------------------------------------------
Following the recent political events in France,  Professor Schiller 
expacts a 'major review of European policy and consideration of common Euro-
pean  interests'. 
Interviewed on 31  May by the German Press Agency,  Professor 
Schiller said that the future would certainly see a certain shift in emphasis 
among the Six.  A review of European policy would be necessitated by the 
situation within  the EEC,  which was unsatisfactory not only because of 
France's differing attitude to British entry but also because the other four 
partners of France and of the Federal Republic by no means fully agreed over 
major issues,  and were indeed moving away from each other more and more. 
On 5 June Mr. Brandt,  the Federal Foreign Minister,  announced 
that the SPD would urge its coalition partner to carry out the Government 
programme. 
European policy would have to be  pursued more vigorously.  Th,e 
customs union would be completed,  as planned,  on 1 July.  Delays in other 
spheres of EEC policy were to be reckoned with since,  as Mr.  Brandt put it, 
new faces from London,  Paris,  and perhaps Rome,  were making their appear-
ance among the Foreign Ministers. 
On the last point Mr. Brandt added that EEC policy would have to be 
revitalized to ensure that modernization of farming was not held up and that 
unnecessary burdens were not placed  on the German consumer.  Mr. Brandt 
considered that an end should be put to the existing methods of financingagri-
culture. 
-14-In an article published on 1 June 1968  in the Yugoslavian journal 
'International Politics' Mr. Brandt dealt with 'the realities of political activi-
ty'.  On the question of integration policy he stated : 
'Europe is faced with considerable tasks.  Failure to achieve 
ampler and broader-based co-operation will threaten its  economic growth, 
the improvement of its scientific and technological capacity,  the utilization of 
its human and material resources,  the living standard of its peoples and its 
whole political future.  It is not only in terms of time that we are today closer 
to the year  2000 than to 1900.  The self-sufficient European nation-state be-
longs to the past.  If we are really in earnest about Europe,  we must show 
ourselves able to rise above a regional standpoint. 
What we have started out on in the West with the European Commu-
nities could serve as a model for a broader-based form of co-operation.  The 
benefits derived from the coming together of the Six have far outweighed the 
difficulties of adaptation.  Indeed, the results have greatly exceeded expecta-
tions.  Those countries which at first were highly nervous about exposure to 
competition have been particularly successful.  There is every reason to be-
lieve that,  as co-operation is put on a broader basis,  this process will repeat 
itself with the same satisfactory results. 
The present size of the EEC is clearly not adequate to ensure the 
sort of co-operation the future will demand.  In the absence of Great Britain, 
for example,  the tasks that lie ahead of us in Europe can scarcely be accom-
plished.  Nor do we wish to forgo the co-operation of the Scandinavian and 
other interested countries.  We  are working for a Europe that is larger than 
the EEC.  Further, we want a Europe larger than Western Europe.  Only an 
all-embracing Europe in a setting of peace,  security and co-operation could 
act as a powerful force for stability.  It could play a decisive r6le,  beyond its 
own territory,  in ensuring peace and material welfare at world level. 
I believe that the developed nations of Western and Eastern Europe 
have a common task to perform.  It is the duty of all of us to ensure that the 
future of mankind is not imperilled by the contrast between the 'haves' and the 
1have-nots'.  We should all get together to give the 'have-nots' a chance  to 
improve their lot.  It  would be senseless to go  on frittering away our energies 
in fruitless squabbles.  Rather should we utilize our pooled resources in the 
most rational way possible. 
It is here,  and in grappling with the scientific and technological 
revolution,  that the creative tasks of our age are to be found.  It is this that 
will show whether the European people can tear away their eyes from the past, 
-15-take up the challenge of the future and cope with the tasks ahead.  I hope that 
we shall atter all grasp the meaning of the signs of the times. ' 
On 10 June,  during an official visit to Austria,  Mr.  Brandt gave an 
address before the Austrian Institute for Foreign Affairs in Vienna on the 
theme 'An understanding with Eastern Europe'.  In the course of this he also 
touched on the subject of European co-operation : 
'The European Community of peoples cannot rest content with 
merely neighbourly relations.  The continent's future depends on finding time-
ly formulas for active co-operation - and why should a German foreign minis-
ter not broach the question of active co-existence?  As far as the Federal 
Republic is concerned, I can only again dwell on the lively interest felt in build-
ing up economic,  cultural and other relations with all East European States. 
From the point of view of subsequent development,  we  attach particular im-
portance to the exchange of technological know-how and to co-operation in this 
sphere. We  shall always be ready to take part in discussions where exchanges 
of knowledge and co-operation -and even more so,  freedom of movement and 
information - can be facilitated through agreements between 'States. 
Our trade relations with Eastern Europe are developing on highly 
satisfactory lines.  West European economic union has created for us anum-
ber of difficulties in this respect.  We hope that a European Economic Commu-
nity,  augmented by further accessions and associations,  will be in a better 
position to pursue trade policy  towards the East and therefcn·e to devote 
closer attention to the task of smoothing out differences in the balances of 
trade.  Where such a state of equilibrium is ruled out for structural reasons, 
long-term credits will have to be considered. 
Without pinning exaggerated hopes on co-operation from and with 
individual  undertakings,  we welcome projects of this kind.  They will be of 
particular interest to non-member countries.  Development policy should be 
regat:ded as an all-European responsibility to a far greater extent than in the 
past.  I should like to appeal to the governments of the East European coun-
tries,  and above all to that of the Soviet Union,  to join us in this task in a 
spirit of friendly rivalry. 
''The will to ensure peace and understanding among the peoples," 
runs the programme of the government whose Foreign Minister and Vice 
Chancellor I am,  "is the first principle of German foreign policy".  Our aim 
- 16  -to develop co-operation with our immediate and more distant neighbours m  the 
east of Europe,  in the same way as we have in the west and in the rest of the 
world,  is in no way unrealistic. 
We hope that the policy of detente and co-operation will derive fresh 
impetus from the trends which have set in so noticeably in Europe and lmow no 
frontiers.  This policy should make it possible to banish the state of anxiety 
and mistrust in Europe. 
A sensible policy must spring from realities.  But it would be a bad 
thing for the world and for the  future  of us all if  we were not also to try to 
replace bad realities by better ones.  Only a few political realities are so good 
that they deserve unquestioning and permanent acceptance. ' 
(Die Welt,  7 May,  6,  10 and 11  June 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  4 and 7 May,  6,  10 and 21  June 1968; 
Stuttgarter Zeitung,  1,  10 and 21  June 1968; 
Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  11  June 1968; 
Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,  N°  70, 
5 June 1968 and N°73, 12 June 1968) 
2.  Mr. Schiller's reactions to the outcome of the Monetary Conference 
in Stockholm 
Speaking in Bonn after his return from Stockholm on 1 April1968, 
Mr. Schiller,  Federal Minister for Economic Affairs,  discussed what had 
transpired at the Group of Ten Conference.  Its most important result had 
been that all those involved,  including France,  had realized they must be 
prepared to negotiate in order to try and stabilize international monetary  re-
lations.  There had been no disagreement on this  point.  This also meantthat 
a decision,  such as that taken on 17  March concerning the position of gold and 
the dollar,  could no longer be taken by the issuing banks acting on their own. 
In future,  the Governments as well as the Presidents of the issuing banks 
would be involved in such agreements.  Addressing journalists,  he emphasized 
that although  France had decided not to follow the common line of her five 
EEC partners with respect to their request to America  concerning the utili-
zation of special drawing rights,  these had lost none of their force.  On the 
contrary these requests were more to the point than ever.  The remaining 
EEC States had hereby established the point that because France was 'going 
it alone'  they were no longer in a position to oppose special drawing rights 
being made available;  hence additional safety measures were necessary. 
- 17-Dr. Emminger,  a member of the Governing Board of the Federal 
German Bank said he was pleased at the outcome of the Stockholm Conference. 
Speaking in Frankfurt,  he said that France's opposition had meant that the 
best possible results had not been achieved; the fact remained that during the 
next nine to twelve months all the other IMF member States could be relied 
on to ratify the special drawing rights agreement so that it could come into 
operation in the Spring of 196 9. 
Mr.  Mlinchmeyer,  President of the German Federation of Private 
Banks,  said that the defence of the current monetary system was a prere-
quisite for the operation of international trade and that it was of vital concern 
to the German economy.  In a statement on behalf of the Federation concern -
ing the Stockholm Conference,  Mr. Mlinchmeyer declared that he trusted that 
the assurances he had given would help to  restore calm to the markets. 
Despite the fact that the outcome had not been fully satisfactory,  it had pro-
vided an opportunity to keep the gold-exchange standard operating efficiently. 
Whether this opportunity would be taken advantage of depended on the United 
States and to a lesser extent on France.  He was still not convinced that the 
Washington decisions of 17  March would throw the special drawing rights and 
our whole monetary system onto the dunghill,  as the French Economics Minis-
ter had said.  He believed that this dunghill would act as a fertilizer which 
would help the monetary system to bloom again.  He left no doubt in his state-
ment that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system would have unforeseeable 
consequences for German trade. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  2 April 1968) 
3.  Federal Government statement on foreign and European policy 
During Whitsun 1968 the Federal Government met at Schloss 
Heimerzheim near Bonn to discuss foreign policy in closed session.  The 
Federal Chancellor had called the meeting,  to which German ambassadors 
from all the main capitals were also invited,  to combat the impression that 
German foreign policy had become rigid.  He and the Foreign Minister were 
equally worried about the future of the European Community,  in which dis-
cussions on relations with the United Kingdom and the other applicant States 
were marking time.  They were even more worried about the new Eastern 
bloc policy. 
During the Heimerzheim talks no attempt was made to conceal the 
fact that Dr. Kiesinger's call to Paris for a generous interpretation of the 
- 18  -joint agreements on an arrangement with Great Britain had so far awakened no 
response.  Dr. Kiesinger's use of the word 'generous' was seen as a polite 
hint that the arrangements he had agreed upon with President de Gaulle should 
be respected.  The more convinced the other Community member States be-
came that Paris saw in economic arrangements with Great Britain the final 
means of avoiding that country's  entry into the EEC,  the more difficult be-
came the Federal Government's situation in the EEC and the more certainly 
the internal development of the Community would come to a halt.  It is  believed 
that this subject was discussed more openly in Heimerzheim than has been the 
case in public utterances. 
On 20 June,  at the 180th sitting of the Bundestag,  Foreign Minister 
Brandt replied on behalf of the Federal Government,  in a written statement, 
to a question on foreign policy put by the CDU /CSU group. 
On European unification the statement reads : 
The Federal Government has never left room to doubt that the eco-
nomic and political unification of the countries of Western Europe is one ofits 
principal aims on the road to a peaceful order throughout Europe.  This is a 
question of crucial importance. 
The sheer weight of the super powers makes it essential that the 
European peoples and States pool their efforts.  Only thus can Europe impart 
any influence to her voice and defend her own interests.  Only thus can Europe 
make to the world of tomorrow the contribution expected from her by virtue of 
the abilities and achievements of her peoples and commensurate with her his-
torical importance. 
Modern developments in key sectors of science and technology 
demand a broad and substantial basis of research establishments and industrial 
capacity and capital.  The constricted national framework of European nation-
States is inadequate for this purpose.  Even that of the European Communities 
of the Six is too narrow. 
We realize that the relationship between the industrialized and the 
developing countries makes heavier and heavier demands on us.  There can be 
no doubt that a united Europe could do far more to narrow the gap between 
developed and developing  countries.  But this task too is beyond the capacity 
of individual European States.  It must be performed in common if the gap 
between the haves and the have-nots is not to widen so much as to constitute a 
threat for Europe as well. 
- 19-A yawning gap still exists between what is aimed at and what has 
actually been achieved. Admittedly the last ten years have seen great and 
encouraging progress in the economic sphere.  The drive displayed by the 
Communities- and particularly by the EEC  - and the 'pull' exercised by 
them,  are also reflected in the applications for entry of Great Britain and 
other countries as well as in the requests of other States to enter into a closer 
relationship with the EEC. 
No  one,  however,  can deny that the project for enlarging the Com-
munities is at present  making no headway.  The Federal Government de-
plores the fact.  It has put forward a number of proposals for dealing with this 
situation.  It would recall the carefully-thought-out proposals it made for an 
interim  arrangement  between the EEC and Great Britain and other appli-
cants for admission. 
Among some of the Six new governments are about to be formed. 
Directly they are complete,  negotiations can be resumed.  The Federal 
Government will firmly back any move calculated to carry matters a stage 
further and make its own contribution.  It will do all in its power to urge 
ahead both the enlargement and the external relations and internal development 
of the Communities. 
Whether or not concessions in the Common Market are matched by 
counter-concessions is not only a question of economic statistics.  This also 
holds for the associated countries.  All the same,  the Federal Republic has 
made substantial contributions to European unification,  among them economic 
ones.  Since the EEC was established our exports to the other member States 
have risen by 240 per cent.  Our exports to non-member States, on the other 
hand,  rose by only a little more than 100 per cent.  Exports to Community 
countries from·Italy rose by 450 per cent,  from France by over 300 per cent, 
from the Netherlands by 200 per cent,  and from Belgium-Luxembourg by 
220 per cent.  The fact that the Federal Republic's absolute increase in ex-
ports to Community States was lower than those of France and Italy is ac-
counted for by the circumstance that its exports to its partners at the begin-
ning of the period when intra-Community exports were steadily rising already 
stood  relatively high,  and by the fact that,  during the same period,  its ex-
ports to non-member States increased more rapidly than those of the other 
EEC  member States. 
This pattern of development led to a close interweaving of interests 
among private enterprises,  greater exchanges of technical know-how,  a wider 
variety of products and a higher standard of living.  As far as the continued 
development of the Common Market is concerned,  the Federal Government 
must nevertheless pay the closest attention to the following points : 
- 20-(a)  As the Community's agricultural policy threatens to entail intoler-
able financial burdens which could threaten the existence of the 
Common Market,  we shall fairly soon have to tackle the task of re-
viewing the whol~ policy; 
(b)  Financial burdens - mainly in the agricultural sphere but also as 
regards the Investment Fund for the associated countries - have so 
far been disproportionately shared to our disadvantage.  In the light 
of the basic Community principles,  this situation cannot go on per-
manently; 
(c)  We shall continue to advocate within  the Community an outward-
looking trade policy towards the developing countries and the East 
European States,  and we hope that greater notice will be paid to our 
demand for such a policy. 
The weighing-up of advantages and disadvantages cannot be confined 
to a specific point of time.  The European Community is a long-term insti-
tution which is only now entering on the second stage of its development -
customs union - and which is to culminate in political union.  In the interval 
any discrepancies which have arisen during previous development can be 
smoothed out. This is a dynamic process which warrants certain sacrifices in 
individual transitional stages,  always provided that progress towards ultimate 
European unification continues to be made. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  4 May 1968; 
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,  No  77, 
21  June 1968; 
Deutscher Bundestag,  18 Oth  sitting,  20 June 1968,  pp.  97 02  C and 9764 C) 
4.  German Bundestag adopts the four resolutions of the Action Com-
mittee for the  United States of Europe 
On 13 March 1968 the Bundestag Committee on Industry and Middle-
Class Affairs discussed the inter-group motion tabled on  10 October 1967 on 
the resolutions of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe.  This 
motion requests the Federal Government to take the resolutions contained in 
the joint statement of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe of 
15 June 1967 into account in its future European policy. 
The Committee's discussions were mainly concerned with avoiding, 
in developing a European-type company,  the disadvantages which might result 
- 21-from the workers' right to have a say in management at present in force in  the 
Federal Republic.  The motion of the three Bundestag groups referred to 
above was amplified accordingly. 
The European company should be so organized as to entail no dis-
advantages for the German economy.  With this additional recommendation of 
the Bundestag Committee on Industry and Middle-Class Affairs the Bundestag 
endorsed,  on 3 April1968,  the Action Committee's four resolutions of the 
previous year and urged the Federal Government to take them into account in 
its European policy. 
The Committee on Industry at first felt some misgivings about part 
of the second resolution in which the establishment of European companies is 
made subject to 'respect of the rights granted to workers under the existing 
laws' because some of its members saw it as prejudging,  in political terms, 
the negotiations on workers' participation in European company law.  The 
additional recommendation referred to,  which also received the full backing 
of the responsible Committee on External Affairs,  took these fears into 
account. 
The other recommendations of the Action Committee,  a group of 
leading members of the democratic parties of Europe and of trade-union 
leaders set up by Mr. Jean Monnet in 1955,  relate to British entry of the 
European Economic Community,  technological development in the EEC,  the 
establishment of relations with the United States on an equal footing,  and co-
operation between the EEC and the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. 
In discussing these resolutions,  the Committee on External Affairs 
dwelt on the need to prepare a European programme for technological devel-
opment as soon as possible,  such a programme being essential for the future 
of Europe.  In this connexion Great Britain's co-operation was particularly 
important.  It was not thought advisable,  however,  to set up a fourth Commu-
nity to deal,  jointly with Great Britain,  with these technological development 
problems.  The Committee felt that these tasks had to be performed in close 
liaison with the already existing Communities,  more particularly Euratom. 
As regards relations with the USA,  the suggestion that a liaison committee be 
set up between the EEC Commission and the US  Government was viewed 
favourably.  It was essential, however,  to adopt in each case a common 
European approach to the subjects treated in any negotiations. 
Of particular interest from the external policy angle is item 4 of 
the resolution in which the Government is urged to persuade the EEC insti-
tutions to set up a co-operation committee with the Soviet Union  and the other 
- 22-Eastern bloc countries to hold permanent consultations on economic and cultu-
ral  matters of common interest.  The first aims specified are the adoption 
of a multilateral settlement-of-payements system, possible credit facilities 
and wider exchanges of technical know-how. 
Whether or not a co-operation committee was a suitable means of 
securing closer co-operation between the EEC and Eastern bloc countries was 
disputed as hotly on the Committee on External Affairs as whether it  should be 
set up now or later.  It was doubted whether COMECON,  because of its under-
lying structure, was suited to such a form of co-operation.  Moreover, it was 
noted that to include the 'DDR' among 'countries of Eastern Europe' was con-
trary to the terms of the Treaties, since Eastern Germany is to be regarded 
under the Rome Treaties, as falling within the EEC.  Finally these aims had to 
be made subject to two conditions : enlargement of the European Communities 
and more effective German policy on trade with the Eastern bloc. 
On the other hand,  the Committee on External Affairs itself agreed 
that the basic idea of the resolution on economic co-operation with the Eastern 
bloc countries tied in with the Federal Government's policy of detente and 
would at the same time  enhance  the attraction exercised by the EEC on East 
European countries. 
(Industriekurier,  4 April 1968; 
Le Monde,  4 April1968) 
5.  Members of the Bundestag  demand that European policy measures 
be speeded up 
The Federal Government is now faced in the Bundestag by a consid-
erable majority pressing for vigorous moves in European policy.  In view of 
the trends in Eastern policy,  they obviously wish to arouse interest in West 
European affairs.  By 10 April1968 313 members of all parties had sent in 
postcards backing a statement submitted to the Federal Government by ten 
members that it should take steps to ensure completion of the Common Market 
by the end of 1969,  the abolition of tariff and tax barriers,  and freedom of 
movement of workers.  The statement makes reference to France's 'lock-out' 
policy.  The initiative of this statement goes back to the members of Parlia-
ment Blumenfeld,  Dichgans,  Illerhaus,  Majonica and Lenz of the CDU, Hubert, 
Metzger,  Mommer and Schulz of the SPD and Rutschke of the FDP. Bundes-
tag's President Gerstenmaier,  CSU  of the Land group's president Stlicklen, 
the delegates Birrenbach,  Klepsch and Mrs Brauksiepe of the Union, Schottle, 
- 23  -Apel,  Lohmar, Wienand and Berkhan of the SPD,  Bucher,  Merten and Opitz 
of the FDP,  among others,  signed the statement.  The majority of votes 
comes from the CDU /CSU. 
On 25  June 1968 about half the members of the Bundestag urged the 
Federal Government to take steps with a view to holding a conference of 
Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four applicants for entry to the EEC 
- the United Kingdom,  Denmark,  Norway and Ireland.  The Federal Govern-
ment should aim at such a conference even if all ten countries did not wish 
to take part in it.  131 CDU/CSU,  87  SPD and about 30  FDP  members have 
so far signed a motion calling on the Bundestag to address a request to this 
effect to the Federal Government.  The motion is to be presented after the 
summer recess. 
This initiative follows recommendations made by a conference of 
parliamentarians of the ten States held in Bonn on 3 and 4 May.  Considerable 
weight is attached in Bonn to the fact that more than half the Union group and 
almost half the SPD group have endorsed this new approach to the European 
question - one which in no way corresponds to the ideas entertained by the 
Federal Chancellor. 
Although no one in Bonn expects a change in the French attitude to 
the European question- the general feeling being that it is more likely to 
harden - the supporters of the motion believe that everything will come to a 
halt if every fresh move is to depend on French approval.  The right of veto 
on the final acceptance of new members should not be applied in anticipation. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  3 and 11 April1968,  26  June 1968) 
6.  Franco-German talks in Bonn 
During the visit to Bonn of Mr.  Couve de Murville,  the French 
Foreign Minister,  on 22  April 1968,  Federal Foreign Minister Brandt made a 
fresh attempt to jerk European policy out of its immobility. 
In a radio interview preceding the talks Mr. Brandt said that con-
tinued lack of progress in the question of British entry would have adverse 
effects on the work of the six countries.  .rt was to be feared that 1 a great 
many things are being undone  1• 
- 24-The two foreign ministers discussed the question of French approval 
of the German proposals for closer links between the EEC and Great Britain. 
At the  same time,  the Federal Chancellor launched an urgent appeal at an 
election meeting in Upper Swabia to 'our French friends' to interpret the ar-
rangements agreed with President de Gaulle in generous terms,  and to the 
other four member States to refrain from adopting a dogmatic approach. 
In German eyes the attitude adopted by the French Foreign Minister 
at the last meeting of the EEC Council of Ministers indicated that discussion 
of the 'Paris agreements' between Bonn and Paris could be useful.  In Bonn, 
the Paris statement is considered not to be unconnected with the Federal 
Government's repeatedly expressed wish to enlarge the European Community 
by admitting Great Britain and other applicants. 
The impression in Bonn is that the emphasis laid on existing meas-
ures as stepping-stones to an enlarged Community in the report of the Euro-
pean Commission has stiffened the French attitude.  On the other hand, 
Mr. Brandt left no doubt in Mr. Couve de Murville's mind that,  while recog-
nizing that French agreement to these proposals would in no way affect 
France's subsequent decision on British entry,  the Federal Government was 
in favour of it.  It is clearly difficult to establish common ground under these 
circumstances. 
For this reason the deputy Government spokesman also stressed 
Dr. Kiesinger's appeal before the press.  The German view was that the 
Federal Governmentt-s proposals could serve as the basis of a compromise if 
all member States of the EEC proved to be as ready to come to one.  So far 
no proposal  of a more realistic kind had been put forward,  so that there was 
no point in putting forward new ones. 
Following the talks between  Mr.  Brandt and Mr. Couve de Murville, 
both felt that in May the Council of Ministers of the European Community 
should deal with practical aspects of a trading arrangement between the EEC 
and Great Britain,  Denmark,  Norway and Ireland.  France, however,  did not 
want these discussions to be the prelude to negotiations on enlarging the Com-
munity,  a matter on which Paris reserved full freedom to make its own de-
cision. 
While respecting this attitude,  Bonn considers that the arrangement 
ought  not  be  regarded as a substitute for the entry of Great Britain and the 
other States and as the final settlement of the relations between them and the 
EEC.  In Bonn attention is drawn to the statement made by Mr. Brandt to 
Mr. Couve de Murville to the effect that any further decisions within the EEC 
- 25-would be very d-ifficult if France were to regard tariff cuts as the most that 
could be conceded in relations between the EEC and Great Britain.  Paris 
ought to be highly interested in the expansion of the Community and ought 
therefore to take careful note of these misgivings. 
Until the Council of Ministers meets,  Bonn and Paris intend tohold 
further talks on the practical possibilities of an economic arrangement - the 
magnitude of tariff cuts,  how long they would be in force,  and what exceptions 
would be made to them.  So far full agreement has not been reached on any of 
these matters.  Nor can one speak of a complete understanding as regards 
technological co-operation between the Community and the other countries. 
(Die Welt,  22  April 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  23  and 24 April1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  24 April1968) 
7.  Visit to Bonn of Mr. Baunsgaard,  the Danish Prime Minister 
The Danish Prime Minister,  Mr.  Baunsgaard,  and his Economics 
Minister,  Mr.  Nyboe Andersen,  arrived in Bonn for political talks on 16 May 
1968. 
These centred mainly on the enlargement  of the European Commu-
nities,  the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the German and Berlin 
problem.  The most difficult question between the two countries was that of 
Germany's obligations to import a large number of Danish cattle.  Price dif-
ferences having in the meantime  arisen,  the Federal Government had to 
accommodate the Danes. Although the  latter were on the whole satisfied,  it 
appears that the cattle exports originally envisaged have fallen short of 
Danish expectations.  The Federal Republic's attempts to arrive at an interim 
solution of the problem by way of the cattle market organization,  pending 
Denmark's entry  into the EEC,  have run up against difficulties in Brussels 
with some of the Community member States. 
Shortly before his visit Mr. Nyboe Andersen had pointed out that 
Denmark's export deficit with the Federal Republic was mainly due to  the 
obstacles presented by the EEC to Danish farm products,  which in the past 
year had risen by D. Kr.  300m.  to more than D. Kr.  2, ooom. 
- 26-Dr. Kiesinger welcomed Mr.  Baunsgaard as the -representative of a 
friendly neighbourandallywith whom Federal Germany had close economic, 
cultural and political ties.  He looked forward to the talks with considerable 
interest and felt sure they would draw these ties still closer. 
Mr. Baunsgaard said that Denmark greatly  valued the friendly 
development of relations with the Federal Republic.  Mutual respect and 
understanding were considerable.  A problem common to the Federal Republic 
and Denmark was European security policy.  Each was searching for a policy 
which would also permit the German question to be solved. 
Other problems arose in the economic sector from the fact that 
Denmark and the Federal Republic belonged to separate European market 
blocs.  Mr.  Baunsgaard was convinced of the need for a large-scale European 
Community.  Difficult though this might be to achieve,  it would be wrong  to 
give up hope since it would enable the economic division of Europe to be healed. 
At a press conference in Bonn on 17  May Mr.  Baunsgaard said that 
even after the talks with the Federal Government Danish concern about agri-
cultural exports to the Federal Republic and the problems of European inte-
gration was in no way lessened. 
Denmark - he pointed out - purchased twice as much from the 
Federal Republic as it sold to it.  Danish imports from Germany in the past 
year amounted to D.Kr. 4, 200m.,  its exports to only D.Kr.  2, 200m.  At the 
same time the deficit was widening.  This trend could not be allowed to go on 
indefinitely.  Its main cause was the restrictive agricultural policy which made 
it virtually impossible to export more Danish goods to the Federal Republic, 
while the latter's products could enter Denmark unhindered. 
The Danish Government was also concerned about the serious diffi-
culties surrounding European integration.  Denmark aimed at full membership 
of the EEC with Great Britain and the other Scandinavian countries. 
Mr.  Baunsgaard regretted that negotiations could not be started up.  The 
Danish Government would put forward ideas for an arrangement,  but this 
would have to embody integration. 
Denmark would stay in EFTA.  Agreement existed in EFTA that the 
time had arrived for progress in this sector.  This was why,  at the last meet-
ing of the Council of Ministers,  it had been decided to embark on far-reaching 
co-operation between the Nordic countries.  The aim was not to cut oneself off 
from Europe but rather to help in this way to keep the wheels of European 
integration turning. 
- 27-Asked whether Denmark would,  under certain conditions,  consider 
entering the EE C on its own,  the Danish Prime Minister dwelt on the close 
economic ties existing between his country and Great Britain.  The Federal 
Republic and Great Britain ranked equal as trading partners of Denmark.  In 
the Fedral Republic Denmark bought twice as much as it exported; the Danish 
balance of trade was restored by its transactions with Great Britain,  to which 
Denmark exported more than it imported. It was therefore essential for Danish 
trade to continue working with Great Britain.  To this should be added political 
factors.  The Danish Prime Minister was firmly convinced that without Great 
Britain there could be no real Europe.  'I believe that it will be a matter of 
outstanding political importance for Europe for Britain to be a member of the 
European Community.  My answer to the question of whether Denmark would 
enter the EEC on its own must therefore be "no". ' 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  15,  17 and 18  May  1968; 
Die Welt,  18  May  1968) 
8.  Visit to Bonn of Mr.  Torsten Nilsson,  Swedish Foreign Minister 
On 17 June Mr.  Torsten Nilsson held a lengthy conversation with 
Foreign Minister Brandt,  mainly on East-West policy in Europe and questions 
connected with enlarging the European Communities. 
The absence of  bilateral problems between the two countries accounted, 
said Mr.  Brandt,  for the satisfactory German-Swedish relations. 
Mr. Brandt briefed Mr. Nilsson on the latest developments in West 
Germany's policy towards the East,  as well as on the visit to Belgrade,  the 
talks in the Soviet Union on renouncing the use of force,  Berlin and relations 
with other Eastern bloc countries. He thanked the Swedish Government for its 
support of German East European policy in non-member countries. 
Sweden is keenly interested in the European plans for dismantling 
tariff barriers by means of which the Federal Republic wants to facilitate sub-
sequent entry by Great Britain and other interested countries to the EEC.  In a 
talk with his German colleague,  Mr. Willy Brandt,  Mr.  Torsten Nilsson 
expressed his interest in the German plans at present being investigated by the 
Six.  It is understood that Mr.  Nilsson also said that Sweden would like to attend 
the talks on tariff dismantlement between the EEC and EFTA right from the 
start as soon as the Six had worked out a joint proposal on the basis of the 
Bonn plans. 
- 28-After the Foreign Ministers' talks diplomatic observers in Bonn 
pointed out that Mr.  Brandt had thus received the firmest backing yet for his 
efforts to secure a trade policy arrangement with Great Britain and the other 
intersted EFTA countries.  Sweden,  like Switzerland and Austria,  is one of 
the neutrals which,  although they have not applied for entry,  want closer co-
operation with the Economic Community. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  18  June 1968) 
- 29-Great-Britain 
Mr.  Wilson's appeal to Europe 
In an interview with Raymond Tournoux (of Paris-Match) 
Mr.  Harold Wilson was asked for his  views  on the disengagement of some 
European nations.  Mr.  Wilson replied: 'l do  not agree with those who allege 
that we have become "little Englanders".  We have world-wide contacts.  We 
see world problems on a world scale,  like many of our European friends. 
Our peace establishment  is now concentrated in Europe.  And 
Europe includes Britain.  Our economic policy is entirely directed towards a 
larger,  more powerful and more united Europe.  We are not "little Englanders" 
and we have no intention whatever of becoming "little Europeans". ' 
With regard to Britain's aeronautical co-operation with Europe, 
Mr. Wilson considered that this was just plain common sense: 'The concen-
tration of our military strength and the economic effort which we  intend to 
deploy towards Europe will be found,  as a  result of joint aeronautical design 
and construction,  of mutual advantage.  Joining forces means reducing the cost 
of production,  enlarging the market and developing an industrial basis which 
will enable us all to sell in America and on other world markets. 
Our common interest in Europe is for us to produce more,  the ones 
for the others,  in order to reduce Europe's dependence on American technolo-
gy  .  This also applies to non-military technology: the cost of development has 
become too heavy for a  single country. ' 
Asked for his opinion on the state of Anglo-French relations, 
Mr.  Wilson did not conceal the fact that France's latest veto on Britain's ap-
plication for accession to the European Community had damaged these rela-
tions.  Seen in a larger context,  this had been less of a blow to Anglo-French 
relations than to the real interests of France,  Great Britain and Europe. 
Mr.  Wilson also stated his views on his country's accession to the 
EEC by refuting General de Gaulle's arguments.  He said that he had taken and 
would continue to take these arguments very seriously,  but he  did not agree 
with them.  General de Gaulle's desire to achieve greater independence in re-
gard to the United States was shared by the British Government.  But it would 
- 30-not become a  reality through speeches or through political attitudes.  General 
de Gaulle's craving for independence could be given a  practical form by 
bridging the technological gap between America and Europe: 'In the first 
place,  if we all became less dependent upon American industry in vital indus-
trial sectors.' 
'France today depends on America for its computers,  as well as for 
other important technological sectors.  This is my answer to the question of 
independence. ' 
'Independence means European technological power.  It also means 
a single European market.  Thus,  the logic of General de Gaulle's legitimate 
demand concerning an independent Europe requires Britain's entry into the 
Common Market.  Calling for the one and rejecting the other is a contradiction 
in terms.  The technological gap is becoming wider.  Europe is losing ground 
every year.  Naturally,  a certain amount of time would be needed for negoti-
ating the conditions of our entry. 
Since Britain has unreservedly accepted the Rome Treaty and since 
it has also stated the problems to be investigated,  it would not take long to 
get to the essential stage leading to Europe's political and economic unity -
provided there was the necessary political will.' 
(Paris-Match,  20 April 1968) 
- 31-1.  An  interview with Mr.  Andreotti,  Minister for Industry,  on the 
state of the Italian industry prior to 1 July 1968 
On 12 April 1968 Mr.  Giulio Andreotti,  Italian Minister for Indus-
try,  gave an interview to 'La vie franc;aise' of which the following is an ex-
tract: 
Q.:  'On 1 July 1968 the customs union between the Six will be complete. 
In France,  Gemany and Benelux,  industrialists and governments alike regard 
this date with some misgiving because of the resulting competition and other 
dangers their countries' economies may have to face.  Does Italian industry 
share these fears ? ' 
A.:  'This event cannot cause any surprise among the economies of the 
EEC member States since it was foreseen as long ago as 1957. ·Italian indus-
try, like that of the other EEC countries,  has long been facing stiffer compe-
tition on the international market.  This is proved by the fact that the abolition 
of tariffs within the Community and the adoption of a single customs tariff 
towards non-member countries simply represent the final phase of the  adjust-
ment of European and Italian industry to the Common Market.  Previous cuts 
in duties have had no adverse effects on Italian industry. A common external 
tariff lower than the Italian tariff will expose Italy to fiercer competition from 
non-member countries.  Difficulties might be caused in certain industries 
(aluminium,  ferrous alloys) by the increased competitiveness of other coun-
tries,  particularly the Scandinavian.'  · 
Q. :  'How has Italian industry prepared itself for the target date of 1 July? 
Have there been more concentrations of undertakings?' 
A. :  'The Italian Government,  with a view to making it easier for under-
takings to adjust to the changed market conditions,  has invoked a law of 1965 
which grants tax privileges to companies or firms undergoing conversion, 
merger or concentration.  This caters for the need for greater competitiveness 
of Italian industry,  and is in any case a condition of economic integration and 
technological progress. ' 
- 32-Q.:  'It has often been said that Italian industry enjoys the advantage of 
State aid to exports and that its costs of production are particularly low owing 
to the lowness of Italian wages.  Could you comment on this?' 
A.:  'Some European countries have recently asked the EEC Commission 
to adopt safeguard measures against imports - particularly from Italy - of 
certain industrial products.  Requests have been made by the Netherlands and 
Federal Germany with respect to woollen materials and from France with 
respect to domestic electrical appliances.  The rise in such exports is due 
not to State support but to the high productivity of the Italian industries con-
cerned.  This was borne out by the decision taken by the EEC Commission in 
response to the demand for safeguard measures put forward by the Dutch 
woollen industry and to similar demands from Federal Germany and France'. 
Q. :  'To facilitate increased trade following customs union,  Italian indus-
try needs a simplified customs procedure and appropriate tax regulations. 
What is the Italian administration doing to adapt current legislation to future 
needs?' 
A.:  'The Italian Government is studying how the tax system can best 
facilitate the competitive alignment of undertakings. It will also be necessary 
to work hand in hand with the EEC Commission and the member States to 
prevent Italy from suffering the disadvantages experienced in other countries 
when the new added-value tax system is introduced.' 
(La vie franQaise,  12 April 1968) 
2.  Interview with Mr.  Zagari.  Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs,  on the relations between rich and poor countries and 
European co-operation 
In an interview given to the ADN Kronos Agency,  Mr.  Mario Zagari, 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,  discussed,  among other international 
policy issues,  relations between the 'haves' and 'have-nota' and co-operation 
between the European countries. 
The contrast between the 'haves' and 'have-nota',  between whites 
and coloured people,  between youth and social structures, could be lessened 
at world level only through a global j>eace  policy.  First and foremost,  the 
- 33-problem of underdevelopment had to be tackled.  UNCTAD had shown the need 
for a radical change in the ·system rather than marginal and piecemeal im-
provements.  This was why  an overall scheme for the development of the third 
world was a matter of urgency. 
The last reserves and misunderstandings between East and West 
must also give way to multilateral co-operation so as to set the problems of 
European security and of Germany in a new light.  The moment had come to 
call a pan-European conference to study outstanding problems and lay the 
foundations for effective economic,  scientific and technological collaboration 
between the two parts of Europe. 
Thirdly,  Western Europe would have to cast off the lethargy from 
which it was suffering. Greater Europe,  with Great Britain as a member, 
would have to be established to drive back the tides of nationalism that had 
re-emerged in the various countries.  Then there was disarmament: the path 
of the non-proliferation treaty was not made easier by the excessive number 
of sectarian interests the various countries intended to safeguard. 
Everyone,  and Europeans in particular,  ought to rise above inciden-
tal interests and regard the treaty as the essential prelude to general disar'-
mament.  The European cause could not be identified with nuclear strength. 
Therefore,  rather than leave the door open for every country to acquire nu-
clear arms,  the aim should be joint action by the non-nuclear powers to per-
suade the nuclear powers to take the path leading to total disarmament. Fi-
nally,  UNO  should be strengthened and universalized by admitting China,  so 
as to endow the United Nations with the authoritative character essential to it. 
(Avanti,  23  April 1968) 
- 34-Netherlands 
1.  The Government's NATO policy 
A memorandum on the NATO and defence policies pursued by the 
Dutch Government in 1968  deals in detail with relations within the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.  After dwelling on the obstacles put in NATO's 
path by the French Government and the consequent weakening of the West's 
political and military power, the memorandum raises the principles of democ-
racy,  personal freedom and justice referred to in the preamble to the Treaty  0 
The situation in certain member States was causing concern to the Dutch 
Government.  In considering what steps should be taken - for example sus-
pension or expulsion of one of these States-it should be asked whether refusing 
to co-operate with these countries would help them to become more demo-
cratic.  The Government felt that allies had a duty to do all they could to re-
store democracy in the countries in question,  particularly as under present 
circumstances absolute priority should be given to the security of the Alliance 
as a whole. 
With regard to relations between Europe and the USA,  the memo-
randum briefly outlines the Government's attitude.  On the one hand this left 
plenty of scope for the pursuit of European integration with,  as the ultimate 
goal,  a united Europe which,  in its ideal form,  would be democratic, federal 
and outward-looking; on the other hand,  it set out from the principle that 
European unification could not,  and should not,  be accompanied by any slack-
ening of the close links that had been forged within the Atlantic Alliance,  and 
that a united Europe could do  more to improve the international situation 
within the wider framework of an Atlantic Community in which the US  and 
Europe would be on a strictly equal footing,  politically and economically,  and 
would share responsibilities. 
Pending the advent of a united Europe and an Atlantic Community, 
it was essential to step up co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance; but at the 
same time,  to ensure that relations within the Alliance developed smoothly, 
account should be taken of the requirements of broader-based European unity  o 
Only thus could co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance retain a healthy and 
natural character. 
Such co-operation was equally necessary for the easing of tension be-
tween East and West.  The essential  for a lasting agreement  between East and West 
was not to upset  the  existin~tabil  ity which it  had taken so much effort to establish. 
- 35-As regards the European security conference proposed by Eastern 
Europe,  the allies,  while in principle in favour of it,  felt that it would have an 
adverse effect if it were to come to nothing.  There must therefore be good 
reason to believe it could lead to solutions acceptable to both sides before it 
was embarked upon.  In view of the many disputes still subsisting between 
East and West,  this meant that the countries of Western Europe would first 
have to hold many preparatory talks among themselves and with the countries 
of the Eastern bloc. A final solution of the problems of European security 
could obviously not be expected of a single conference,  and the parties would 
have to get together again and again.  For its part,  the Dutch Government 
would do  all it could to make the talks a success.  This had been the sole ob-
ject of the many bilateral contacts it had established since the beginning of 
1967 with the countries of the Eastern bloc.  The participation of the US  and 
Canada at a  conference of this kind was essential in view of the crucial rOle 
these two countries had to play in European security. 
While an arrangement between the East and West could only be 
reached through multilateral negotiations,  it was still necessary in the mean-
time to try to improve mutual relations. Discussions within the Alliance had 
brought to light a remarkable degree of agreement on the necessity to adopt 
a joint approach aimed at consolidating the existing relations between the 
countries of the East and those of the West and at finding new ferms of co-
operation,  in each case both at bilateral and at multilateral level. 
At bilateral level this implied efforts to improve and step up politi-
cal contacts between statesmen from Eastern and Western Europe,  particu-
larly through official visits,  and to widen the scope of relations in the econom-
ic,  technical,  scientific and cultural fields.  The Dutch Government was deter-
mined to pursue an active policy in this matter and would make the results 
known to the people.  At multilateral level,  co-operation between East and 
West could,  for example, be carried out in appropriate international organi-
zations and institutions such as the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe.  Then there was the Group of Nine - increased to ten with the acces-
sion of the Netherlands -which had been set up in December 1965,  on the 
basis of a UN  resolution proposed by Rumania and unanimously adopted,  to 
help establish better relations between European countries.  The Dutch Gov-
ernment was doing all it could to facilitate informal talks within the Group of 
Ten in the hope of laying the bases for negotiations of a more substantial kind. 
(Memorandum on the NATO and defence policies of the Dutch Government -
1967-68 session,  No.  9635) 
- 36-2,  Mr.  Luns - 'Europe must extend from the Urals to the Rock;y 
Mountains' 
Under the title 'An excessively French vision of Europe has al-
ready caused the downfall of Napoleon',  which sums up in a lapidary way 
Mr.  Luns' opinion on the Gaullist conception of European unity,  Mr.  Raymond 
Tournoux,  published in 'Paris Match' of 23  April,  the answers given by the 
Netherlands Foreign Minister to the questions that were put to him. 
Mr.  Luns observed with regret that Europe's political integr.ation 
did not follow its economic integration. He was in favour of enlarging the 
Europe of the Six which was 'too small to be called a united Europe'. He de-
plored that negotiations were not opened with the United Kingdom for its entry 
into the Common Market.  'On this issue',  Mr.  Luns said,  'France has prob-
ably a complex. It does not realize its true position in Europe. It fails to see 
that,  even with Britain included,  it would have a legitimate preponderance in 
a Europe of seven,  eight,  or even nine member countries. ' 
The Dutch Minister felt that American assistance for the defence of 
Europe remained necessary. To the idea of a European 'third force' between 
East and West,  he preferred that of an Atlantic Community 'including Europe 
and our sons,  brothers and cousins from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean; 
in other words,  Europe from the Urals to the Rocky Mountains.' 
At the end of the interview Mr.  Luns said that in 1958 and in the 
years that followed,  General de Gaulle would undoubtedly  have been the most 
likely candidate for the dignity of first President of the United States of Europe, 
'if France had shown any interest in that idea, ' Mr.  Luns added that France 
was now basing its policy on national sovereignty and nation-States: 'it is not 
prepared to accept supranationality  ..• Napoleon's failing- much more so 
than that of present-day France - was his excessively French vision of 
Europe's future.  He thus provoked the hostility which in the end proved dis-
astrous to him. ' 
(Le Figaro,  23  April 1968) 
3.  Mr.  Luns on an official visit to Indonesia,  Malaysia and Singapore 
At the beginning of July,  Mr.  Luns,  Dutch Foreign Minister,  made 
an official visit to Indonesia to sign an economic and cultural agreement. Mr. 
Adam Malik,  Indonesian Minister,  asked for Dutch support in solving the dif-
ficulties experienced by his country in marketing its products in the European 
Community. 
- 37-In Malaysia,  Mr.  Luns spoke with Mr. Abdul Rasak,  the Vice-
Premier,  concerning the request of the Federation to be associated with the 
European Community. 
In Singapore Mr.  Luns had talks with the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance and suggested the creation of a com-
mon market in south-east Asia along the lines of the EEC.  He said that such 
an economic community could have the interests of the partners more at heart 
in relations with the European market and other economic blocs. Another 
subject of discussion was that of drawing up a list of products from Singapore 
which might be considered for preferential tariffs in the Common Market. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  9 July 1968) 
4.  The First Chamber discusses European policy 
On 11 June,  during a debate in the First Chamber on the 1968 for-
eign affairs estimates,  Mr. Burger (Labour Party) was critical of the policy 
pursued by the Foreign Minister on the Council of the European Communities, 
particularly concerning the question of Britain's accession.  He  dealt in detail 
with the procedure followed by the Council and criticized the way in which it 
took decisions,  reached agreements,  approved resolutions,  outlined policies, 
concluded conventions and adopted provisions. 
He said that resolutions did not derive from the Treaty. Agreements 
were probably disguised forms of Treaties,  whereas conventions were halfway 
house between Council decisions and Treaties. As for procedure which,  apart 
from press releases,  escaped any form of control or public attention,  Mr. 
Burger said that he did not think highly of it. To prove his point,  he quoted a 
Council press release of 29  May 1968,  in which it was said that the latter had 
agreed to confirm the introduction of a levy on vegetable or marine fats in-
tended for use in foodstuffs,  whether produced in or imported into the Com-
munity.  Mr.  Burger took exception to the strange phraseology used whereby 
a collegial body did not 'decide' but 'agreed'; indeed this simply meant that the 
decision relating to the tax on margarine had been decided once and for all. In a 
footnote,  however,  it is pointed out that the German delegation considered that 
it was not committed and that the Dutch delegation would act on this provision 
only provided that the budgetary powers of the European Parliament were 
simultaneously increased. 
- 38  -If two Governments had reservations,  Mr.  Burger asked from what 
legal standpoint had anything really been 'agreed'. It appeared that the major-
ity rule was ignored.  Mr.  Burger asked what sense it made if the Dutch Gov-
ernment had reservations,  when the same press release stated that the Coun-
cil had decided to follow up the statement concerning the consolidation of the 
budgetary powers of the European Parliament,  as was noted in the Council 
minutes of the closed session held on 23  December 1963. 
If the Dutch Government were serious about increasing Parliament's 
powers,  as stated in the press release,  how was one to consider the reply 
given by Mr.  Luns to a written question from Mr.  Vredeling,  in which he felt 
bound to point out that it was not possible at present to make any change in the 
powers of the European Parliament. 
On 8 March,  Mr.  Vredeling had asked if,  with reference to harmo-
nizing taxation systems within the EEC,  the need had emerged to introduce 
control by the European Parliament of the important powers being transferred 
from the national parliaments. On  1 April the Minister replied that,  from the 
Dutch point of view,  the question had not,  as yet,  been placed on the agenda. 
With these examples,  the speaker wished to demonstrate the price 
that parliamentary democracy had to pay to 'enlightened European despotism'. 
The Netherlands thus was not the only country in danger of becoming a sat-
ellite of France.  There was also the prospect that within a decade 80 per cent 
of the fiscal receipts of the member States would be subject to Council deci-
sions and not to any parliamentary control.  The only way of avoiding this 
danger was to induce the Council to replace diplomatic agreements by a real 
Community policy. 
As for the discussion on the Council on the United Kingdom's appli-
cation for membership,  Mr.  Burger criticized the lack of any political plan 
on the part of the Dutch Government.  During the discussion on the Council 
about the British application,  the Dutch Government failed to take into account 
the possibility of a further French veto so that by their disagreement the Five 
played into French hands; the French Government was thus able to pursue its 
own policy without running any risk.  The Council,  for its part,  failed to note 
that there was a majority in favour of the procedure proposed by the Commis-
sion - which asked the Council to authorize discussions with Britain on spe-
cific problems -and thus committed a serious error. Mr.  Burger went on to 
say that the Minister had replied that it had not been possible to establish 
this fact because otherwise it would have been clear that the attitude assumed 
by a given member State was used to conceal ulterior motives.  Mr.  Burger 
criticized the Five for pursuing an ostrich policy in relation to General de 
Gaulle.  They should have taken him seriously when he announced that the 
- 39-Community would be shattered.  They should have let his policy run its course 
and,  instead of acting empirically,  they should have opposed General de 
Gaulle with a policy of their own.  The Five were faced with a choice of two 
things: either France,  like the rest of them,  could not do without the Commu-
nity and this would have demonstrated that the Community could still go  on and 
it would have put an end to the status of French satellites to which they had 
been reduced,  or France could do without the Community and,  in this case, 
it would be hazardous for the Five to weaken and leave the initiative to France. 
Mr.  Burger concluded by thanking the Ministers for stating their 
willingness to keep the Chamber informed about the position adopted by the 
Dutch delegation on the Council of Ministers and he reminded the Government 
of its responsibilities to the Dutch Parliament; he asked it,  after every ses-
sion of the Council,  to inform the Dutch Parliament of the position assumed 
by the Dutch delegation. 
Mr.  Burger further asked if,  owing to the fact that the British 
application was still on the Council agenda,  Mr.  Luns was prepared to ask 
for the procedure proposed by the European Commission to be approved; this 
related to certain problems connected with Britain's application.  Mr. Burger 
also asked the Minister if he was ready and really able to say whether the 
Netherlands would refuse to endorse the Community fiscal measures if there 
were not a simultaneous increase in the budgetary powers of the European 
Parliament. 
Mr.  Luns stated that,  at the Council session of 19 December 1967, 
the five member States in favour of Britain's entry had- for the first time -
taken a firm stand against France's negative attitude.  In this connexion,  it 
was particularly significant that the united front formed by the Five had com-
pelled the French representative to show his own cards,  which previously he 
had carefully avoided doing.  A further point gained by the Five was the fact 
that the British application had remained on the agenda.  If, as a result of a 
vote,  the British application had been removed from the agenda,  this would 
have r~presented an undeserved and undesirable triumph for the French 
Government. 
Mr.  Luns gave a strong assurance that the Dutch Government 
would continue to do everything within its power in order that negotiations may 
be started. 
Finally,  he said that the Dutch Government was currently investi-
gating all the alternatives to the Benelux Memorandum to reach co-operation 
- 40-with the applicant States in all those sectors not specifically covered by the 
Treaty of Rome. 
Referring to Mr.  Burger's request that the Government should not 
endorse the European Community's decision on the harmonization of taxes 
unless agreement were reached on the question of strengthening the powers 
of the European Parliament,  Mr.  De Koster declined to give specific assur-
ances.  The Government would do  its utmost to see that the powers of the 
European Parliament were increased,  but it reserved the right to examine the 
pros and cons in every instance.  Moreover,  there would be further opportu-
nities for achieving this end,  for example whenever Community's own  re-
sources would be discussed in accordance with Article 211,  the matter. would 
be raised.  Mr.  De Koster repeated that the Government would not approve of 
the tax on margarine unless the budgetary powers of the European Parliament 
were increased. 
Mr.  Van Riel (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) joined 
with Mr.  Burger in asking the Government to report to Parliament,  in a 
manner consistent with institutional standards,  on the Council's activities, 
particularly concerning agricultural policy and its financial implications. 
Mr.  De Koster replied that the Minister already gave oral reports to the re-
sponsible Committees and that Mr.  Van Riel's proposal would be discussed 
with Mr.  Luns. 
In reply to a question from Mr.  Van Hulst (Christian Historical 
Union)  concerning the Community's external relations,  Mr.  De Koster said 
that the agreement between the Five and the Commission had obliged France 
to give up its opposition to an association with Kenya,  Uganda and Tanzania. 
As for Austria,  on the other hand,  the French Government had found an ally 
in Italy in opposing the association of that country with the Community. 
Similarly,  the French Government had assumed a minimalistic 
attitude regarding Israel,  arguing that it had obtained sufficient concessions 
as a result of the Kennedy Round.  The Dutch Government did not share this 
view.  Germany and Luxembourg were convinced that the form of association 
best suited to meet Israel's wishes would consist in a free trade area or a 
customs union.  Belgium and Italy,  on the other hand,  were in favour of a 
preferential system. 
As for merging the Treaties, the Dutch Government argued that the 
Governments which had applied for membership ought also to be able to give 
their views on the texts of the new Treaty resulting from merging the three 
- 41-present ones. It was aware that this would once again raise the issue of demo-
cratizing the institutions. 
(Debate in the First Chamber,  1967-1968 Session -
Foreign Affairs,  11  and 12  June 1968) 
5.  Parliamentary Questions 
Attitude of the Netherlands to the harmonization of tax systems 
On 8 March Mr.  Vredeling (Labour Party) put a question  to  the 
Dutch Government on  the position adopted by the Netherlands,  within  the 
Council,  concerning the  European  Commission's  proposals  on  the  harmo-
nization of tax systems  in the  EEC countries.  In particular,  it was asked 
whether the Dutch representative on the Council had raised the political point 
that harmonizing tax systems within the EEC depended on the transfer of the 
essential powers that would be withdrawn from the national Parliaments to the 
European Parliament,  the  only  democratic body  capable  of supervising the 
policy to be followed in the European Communities. 
On 1 April 1968 the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  speaking for him-
self and the  Secretary of State for Finance,  stated that at a recent meeting of 
the EEC Council views had been exchanged on the harmonizationofthevarious 
deductions  at source  applied by  member States  to  dividends and debenture 
interest. 
The Dutch member of the Council had supported the general view 
that  progress would  also have to be made in harmonizing direct taxes.  As 
regards harmonization of  deductions  at source,  it would be necessary  to 
know beforehand the likely effects of the decision to be taken on  the  organi-
zation of a  European capital market and-the functions to be assigned to it.  The 
Commission would in due course report on this question. 
While the Dutch Government realized that the existing system was 
far from satisfactory in regard to the powers of the European Parliament,  it 
could not but accept the impossibility of amending it in the present  circum-
stances. 
-42-In compliance with the motion of the Second Chamber (1),  the Gov-
ernment had decided to consult the Dutch Parliament before final decisions 
were taken by the Council of the European Communities on common provi-
sions relating to the scope and apportionment of the tax charge. 
Support given by the Dutch Government to certain farm,  horticul-
tural and fishery products 
On 14  March Mr.  Vredeling asked the Minister of Agriculture for 
his views on the European Commission's reply to a question by Mr.  Deringer 
(2)  on the incompatibility of support measures taken by the Dutch Government. 
The Netherlands levied a tax both on the national production and on the imports 
of seeds,  various cereals and cereal by-products,  poultry,  fruit,  vegetables, 
fish and fish preserves; support was,  however,  only given to national produc-
tion. 
The Minister of Agriculture replied on 4 April that these charges 
were not of a fiscal nature but ought to be regarded as charges imposed for 
producer federations.  He could not see how it could be concluded from the 
European Commission's reply that these measures were in themselves con-
trary to the Treaty.  The Dutch Government felt that it was for the European 
Commission to judge,  in the light of Articles 92ff.  of the EEC Treaty, whether 
these measures were compatible with the Common Market,  particularly as 
regards the appropriation of the funds in question. 
Decision reached on 25  July 1967 by representatives of the member 
States on special provisions governing oleaginous products from the 
Associated States 
On 24  April,  in reply to a written question by Mr.  Vredeling on 
national procedures for applying the above decision (3),  the Minister for For-
eign Affairs stated that,  under Dutch legislation,  this had to be submitted to 
the States-General for ratification.  Ratification was required because neither 
the EEC Treaty,  nor the Yaounde Convention,  nor the Council's decision on 
the association of overseas countries and territories with the EEC provided a 
legal basis for financing aid to imports into the Community of oleaginous 
(1)  Berg motion of 12  January 1967,  Doc.  8556. 
(2)  Written Question No.  227,  1967-1968,  European Parliament. 
(3)  Official Gazette of the European Communities No.  173,67 
- 43-products from the associated countries and territories. As all the articles of 
this decision related to such financing,  it was the decision as a whole that 
would be submitted for ratification by the States-General. 
Aid to the French iron and steel industry 
On 2 April 1968  Mr.  Nederhorst (Labour Party) asked whether the 
Dutch Government would call upon the European Commission to elicit details 
from the French Government of the aid it was giving to the iron and steel in-
dustry.  Mr.  Nederhorst asked the Dutch Government for an assurance that, 
once it had received this information,  it would (i)  pass it on as rapidly as 
possible to the Dutch Parliament,  and (ii) immediately secure a legal opinion 
as to whether or not the subsidies in question were contrary to Article 4(c) of 
the ECSC Treaty. 
Should the legal opinion justify such a  measure,  Mr.  Nederhorst 
wanted to know whether the Dutch Government was prepared to give an assur-
ance that if,  contrary to the spirit and letter of Article 4(c),  the Commission 
did not prohibit  these subsidies,  it would immediately refer the matter to the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
On  18  April the Minister for Economic Affairs replied that during 
the EEC Council sessions held on 5 and 29 June 1967 the Dutch representatives 
had urged that the High Authority should say whether or not the French meas-
ures were compatible with the ECSC Treaty. 
The Minister thought that account should be taken of the merger of 
the executives and that the members of the new Commission should be given 
time to reach an agreement.  However,  he had recently invited the Commission 
to submit,  at one of the next Council sessions,  a reasoned opinion on French 
support for the iron and steel industry.  The Minister would then study the 
procedure to be followed in the light of the conclusions arrived at in the Coun-
cil's debates.  He was,  of course,  prepared to supply the Dutch Parliament 
with information on this subject as soon as possible. 
Export subsidies 
On 4 April Mr.  Oele (Labour Party) asked the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs what he thought of the French Government's measures in support of 
the footwear industry and what the Dutch Government felt about the difficulties 
of the footwear industry in the Netherlands. 
- 44-The Government shared the European Commission's oft-repeated 
view that export subsidies were incompatible with the Common Market and 
therefore contrary to Article 92  of the Treaty. 
The Minister did not know whether the French Government intended 
taking such measures in support of the French footwear industry,  but an in-
quiry was under way on the possibilities of strengthening the position of that 
industry. 
In the course of the investigation ordered by the Commission and the 
member States into the measures the French Government contemplated taking 
in support of the footwear industry,  the Dutch Government would guard against 
any change in competitive relations at the expense of the Dutch footwear in-
dustry. 
The Minister refused to accept that the procedure laid down in Ar-
ticle 93  would yield negative results in the matter of any support measures 
that might be taken by France.  He therefore thought there was no point in 
commenting on counter-measures to safeguard the Dutch footwear industry in 
the present state of affairs. 
Negotiations between the European Community and the East African 
countries 
On 9 May 1968  Mr.  De Block,  Economics Minister,  replying to a 
written question put by Mr.  Dankert (Labour Party) on 16 April on the nego-
tiations between the Community and certain East African countries concerning 
preferences,  stated that the additional mandate given by the Council to the 
Commission of the European Communities for the purpose of negotiations with 
Kenya,  Uganda and Tanzania had in view a measure of reciprocity on the part 
of the East African countries. 
The Dutch Government had approved this mandate because the ne-
gotiations fell into line with the Council's Declaration of Intent of 1963 which 
opened the door to African countries having an economic structure similar to 
that of the Associated African and Malagasy States to accede to the Yaounde 
Convention,  or to conclude either a special association agreement or a trade 
agreement with the EEC. On the strength of that declaration,  the negotiations 
with the East African countries aimed at concluding an association agreement 
to expire on 1 June 1969,  at the same time as the Yaounde Convention,  as in 
the case of the EEC-Nigeria Agreement. In view of the reference made to the 
Yaounde Convention,  and the close analogy with the Lagos Agreement,  both of 
-45-which provided for a measure of reciprocal preference,  it would not be fair 
to make an exception of the East African countries and exempt them from 
conceding some degree of reciprocal treatment. In adopting this attitude,  the 
Dutch Government was in no way anticipating the general preference system, 
details of which were yet to be laid down.  Moreover,  there was still no iden-
tity of views among the Community countries regarding the problem of recip-
rocal preferences at world level. 
Mr. De Block did not think that the conclusion of an agreement with 
the East African countries providing for reciprocal preference could stand in 
the way of the establishment of a general system based on non-reciprocity. 
There was no chance of the problem of preferences being settled at world level 
before 1 June 1969.  In the event of a prolongation it would be a good thing to 
look into the possibility of including in a general preference system an agree-
ment with the East African countries in question and other regional preference 
arrangements applicable to the developing countries. 
(Second Chamber,  1967-1968 Session,  Annexes 937,  961,  1043,  1093,  1079, 
1209) 
Special trade agreement between the EEC and Great Britain 
On 31 May,  in reply to a written question put on 14  May by Mr. 
Vander Mei (Historical Christian Union),  Mr.  De Block,  Economics Minister, 
stated that a trade agreement between the EEC and the United Kingdom on the 
lines contemplated by some member States would have to comply with the 
provisions of Article XXIV of GATT,  which provides for exceptions to the 
principles of the most-favoured nation and of non-discrimination in the event 
of a customs union or free trade area,  or of the conclusion of commercial 
agreements leading up to a free trade area.  These exceptions were subject to 
a number of conditions. 
Any arrangement which,  according to certain member States,  would 
govern only the first stages of tariff dismantlement would,  in the view of the 
Dutch Government,  have to include a plan and timetable for the elimination of 
obstacles to trade within a reasonable period,  in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article XXIV of GATT.  Apart from the need to comply with GATT 
provisions,  the Dutch Government thought that a trade agreement ought to be 
worked out against the background of ultimate British accession to the Com-
munities. 
- 46-Mr. De  Block considered that the conclusion of an agreement which 
did not comply with the rules of GATT by trading powers as important,  at 
world level,  as the EEC and the United Kingdom would be a real threat to the 
future of world trade. 
The Dutch Government would tll,erefore do its utmost during consul-
tations within the EEC to dissuade its partners from embarking on a course 
whichwould amount to contravening such international undertakings. It would 
continue to guard against the adoption of any arrangement contrary to the pro-
visions of GATT. 
(Second Chamber,  1967-1968 session,  Annex 1369) 
Spain and the European Community 
In reply to a question from Mr.  Den Uyl  (Labour Party) Mr.  Luns, 
Foreign Minister,  said that the Dutch Government had,  in the present situa-
tion,  to refrain from making any promise in connexion with the vote on an 
association between Spain and the European Community.  He rejected the alle-
gation made by the Information Service of the Spanish Foreign Ministry (1)  to 
the effect that the Dutch Government was in favour of Spain's association with 
the Common Market. 
(1)  Espana Semanal,  24  June 1968 
- 47-Scandinavian cotmtries 
Summit conference of Nordic States in Copenhagen 
On 17 April 1968  Mr.  Gunnar Lange,  Swedish Minister of Trade, 
said that Sweden,  Denmark,  Norway and Finland were all determined to 
strengthen their relations with the EEC.  They had agreed to engage in closer 
economic co-operation so long as the problem of entry remained unsolved. 
Mr.  Lange was addressing a meeting of the Scandinavian Ministers of Trade 
in Stockholm at which the basis was laid for the summit conference of Nordic 
Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers to be held in Copenhagen a few days 
later. A Nordic customs union was discussed but,  Norway having raised a 
number of objections of a technical nature,  no decision was reached.  Finally, 
following Mr.  Lange's address,  closer co-operation in agricultural matters 
was also discussed. 
Between 22  and 23  April 1968 the Heads of Government of Denmark, 
Finland,  Norway and Sweden met in Copenhagen,  together with ·their Foreign 
and Trade Ministers,  at the Nordic summit conference,  which had been sug-
gested by the Danish Prime Minister,  Mr.  Baunsgaard.  Iceland was repre-
sented by its Minister of Trade. 
The meeting was held to discuss closer co-operation among the 
Nordic cotmtries on trade policy and economic questions.  A joint committee 
of experts submitted a programme which would substantially strengthen the 
economic integration of the Nordic countries.  The plans included the setting 
up of an economic tmion with common customs tariffs,  and a common agricul-
tural market or some other longer-term arrangement for agriculture and fish-
eries. Industrial legislation would be harmonized and economic policy more 
closely co-ordinated,  always with an eye to approximating to conditions in the 
EEC,. 
On the very first day of the summit conference it became clear 
that Norway's resistance had prevented binding decisions from being taken by 
the Nordic countries on a broader-based economic co-operation. It was how-
ever agreed to get experts to prepare,  by a given date,  draft plans for a 
broader measure of integration,  starting with details of customs harmonization 
or even o.ustoms union.  Both the Swedish and Danish Prime Ministers wanted 
to regard this step as already accepted in principle,  but Mr.  Borten,  the 
Norwegian Prime Minister,  reserved the right either to accept or to reject 
the experts' findings in due course. 
- 48-The summit conference closed on 23  April 1968  with the publication 
of a comprehensive official statement.  In this the members of the Danish, 
Finnish,  Norwegian and Swedish Governments concerned set out their views 
on relations between the Nordic countries and the EEC and EFTA and laid 
down guidelines for a working party which was to prepare concrete proposals 
for closer economic co-operation between the four countries.  These guide-
lines largely correspond to the recommendations of the committee of experts 
whose work had provided the basis of the Copenhagen meeting. 
In the official statement the Nordic countries announce their com-
mon interest in a large European market and in transitional provisions that 
could facilitate the flow of European trade until their admission to the EEC. 
All EFTA countries interested should be permitted from the outset to take 
part in negotiations on an eventual arrangement.  Co-operation between  the 
Nordic countries on the question of integration should be stepped up and the 
approach to new proposals for narrowing or closing the economic gap in 
Europe co-ordinated. 
In the light of the current integration policy situation,  special im-
portance is attached to EFTA co-operation,  which ought to be carried a step 
further. At the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers in London, 
joint Nordic proposals for strengthening the organization are being put for-
ward.  These relate to tariffs,  trade policy,  rules on competition,  agriculture 
and fisheries. 
The official statement deals in detail with Nordic co-operation, 
catalogues achievements to date and describes participation in a European 
market embracing the greatest possible number of countries as the ultimate 
goal.  Closer economic co-operation between the Nordic countries would help 
not only them but also EFTA and other European integration movements; at 
the same time it would strengthen the Nordic countries' trade position.  The 
time had come for a further step forward.  The Prime Ministers agreed that 
this would have to take account of the EFTA obligations of the countries con-
cerned and of Iceland,  which was considering linking up with EFTA.  Foreign 
and defence policies remained beyond the sphere of the co-operation en-
visaged. 
The Governments were to be presented with additional surveys and 
concrete proposals for closer Nordic co-operation in the following fields. 
First,  the setting up of a Nordic customs union whose external tariff would be 
based on the weighted average of the tariffs of the four countries. Where pos-
sible,  tariff rates should be adjusted or approximated to the EEC tariff level. 
Consideration was being given to quotas and suspensions,  as well as to tran-
sitional regulations,  to overcome the difficulties of certain countries. 
- 49-The second field was that of agricultural co-operation. Common 
trade in farm products should be progressively expanded by means of Nordic 
preferences,  price agreements,  anti-dumping measures,  protection against 
subsidized agricultural imports from third countries,  the abolition of the in-
dustrial protection element in duties and charges on industrially processed 
farm products,  and common arrangements such as pricing policy measures 
for agricultural exports to third countries.  To meet difficulties arising in 
individual countries,  steps would be taken to facilitate adaptation by the four 
countries to a common Nordic market and a.  Nordic agricultural policy in har-
mony with agricultural integration in Europe. 
Provisions on competition in the various countries should be brought 
closer into line so as to create freer,  non-discriminatory competitive con-
ditions.  Closer co-operation would be sought also in industry,  in the energy 
sector and in research and development policy.  Institutional systems would be 
set up as appeared necessary. 
Sweden,  Denmark and Norway remain in favour of full membership 
of the European Common Market.  As Mr.  Nils Montan,  Swedish Ambassador 
to the Federal Republic,  pointed out on 24  April 1968  at the opening in 
Frankfurt of a programme of events devoted to Sweden,  organized by the 
Hessische Landesbank and the Deutsche Unionbank,  the Nordic States were 
not demanding any complicated transitional arrangements.  They were pre-
pared to enter into all the obligations,  but also to assume all the rights,  stip-
ulated in the Rome Treaties. 
Sweden's foreign policy - based on freedom of alliance - the NATO 
membership,  under special conditions,  of Denmark,  Norway and Iceland,  and 
Finland's neutrality,  were all easily reconcilable with the spirit and letter of 
the Rome Treaties. 
The recent German move for an interim arrangement for enlarging 
the EEC -said Mr.  Montan- had the backing of the Swedish Government; it 
was essential,  however,  to respect the close co-operation already achieved, 
both at political and at economic level,  by all the Nordic States as a plain fact 
of political development.  Bilateral agreements between the EEC and indivi--
dual Nordic countries had no real prospects of success. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  24  and 25  April 1968; 
Die Welt,  19 April 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  18,  19,  23  and 24 April 1968; 
Industriekurier,  30 April  1968) 
-50-United States 
President Johnson looks for a rapprochement between Europe and 
the United States 
President Johnson received King Olav of Norway in Washington on 
25  April.  In his speech of welcome,  he pledged the continued great interest 
of the United States in the affairs of Europe and repeatedly recalled America's 
efforts during the years of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine to as-
sist in European reconstruction. 
The President said that although today there was no doubt that 
Europe was once again very vital and prosperous there should be no doubt 
that the United States stood as close to Europe as it did immediately after 
World War II.  · 
'The real question today is,  are we still partners?' Mr. Johnson 
asked,  and he replied immediately: 'Of course we are partners. ' 
,·But',  Mr.  Johnson continued,  'the real question is what are we 
partners for?' 
Then Mr.  Johnson said: 'The original concept of the Truman 
Doctrine and of the Marshall Plan is as valid today as we stand here.' 
'There is nothing the United States and Europe together cannot do', 
he went on. 
(Herald Tribune,  26  May 1968) 
-51-II.  PARTIES AND  PROMINENT POLITICIANS 
1.  European policy at the party conference of the German Social Demo-
crats in Nuremberg 
The SPD party conference held in Nuremberg from 18  to 22  March 
1968, in the course of discussing the party's prospects in the late sixties and 
early seventies and its contribution to the solution of current problems of 
German policy,  also dealt with foreign and European policy,  regarding which 
the following observations were made: 
Peace in Europe at present rested mainly on the military balance 
between the two systems of alliances. Its prospects could be improved if the 
harsh contrast between the two blocs were softened by bilateral and multilat-
eral forms of co-operation aimed at establishing a security system for Europe. 
In the process, the balance would have to be preserved and the leading powers 
of the alliances ought not to be released from their responsibility for Europe's 
security. 
In this way conditions could be created to ensure that the division of 
Germany could be healed at the same time as the division of Europe.  German 
moves in this direction not only were in the German interest but were the serv-
ice Germany was called upon to render Europe. 
The production,  acquisition,  ownership and co-ownership of nuclear 
weapons could not be reconciled with such a policy.  This would be made quite 
clear- as already demanded at the party conference in Dortmund- by a  'yes' 
to the non-proliferation treaty. A 'yes' was made easier by the ban contained 
in the present text of the treaty on any ·hindrance to the civil research and ap-
plication of nuclear energy.  The Federal Government ought to ensure that this 
principle was strictly complied with in applying the treaty, and particularly of 
the article governing supervision. 
A policy of detente towards the East called for close co-operation in 
the West.  The Atlantic Alliance therefore had to be kept functioning properly 
until a working security system covering all Europe had been established. 
NATO reforms should not weaken the Alliance but enable it to contribute to the 
easing of East-West tension.  The EEC should therefore be further strength-
ened,  internally by progressive development and externally by allowing the 
EFTA countries,  and particularly Great Britain, to join its ranks.  Time was 
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friendship,  without which German peace policy would be of no avail,  therefore 
had to be deepened. 
There was no question of  choosing between a Western policy and an 
Eastern policy.  Eastern policy called for restraint,  co-operation and co-ordi-
nation in the West.  A constructive Eastern policy strengthened the influence of 
the Federal Republic also in the West.  The two policies were of equal impor-
tance - both served Europe as a whole. 
The SPD party conference then turned to the field of economic policy. 
The Federal Republic,  as the second trading nation of the world,  was closely 
tied up with the world economy.  One of the aims of Social Democrat economic 
policy was therefore to step up co-operation in international and supranational 
institutions. 
The Federal Republic's economy was largely bound up with that of 
the European Economic Community.  Economic and social conditions in the 
Community must therefore be harmonized still further.  It was essential to en-
large the European Community,  to expand trade with the Eastern bloc coun-
tries and to improve conditions for domestic German trade.  This meant estab-
lishing a stable world monetary system and abolishing distortions in competi-
tion between States.  Technological development in Europe should not  be allowed 
to lag behind that of other industrial nations. 
The SPD conference dwelt on a number of other points in European 
policy: 
A Europe that was nothing more than the aggregate of national States 
or alliances could not play a decisive rOle in the world today. 
The need for nuclear equilibrium and their global commitment had 
so far obliged the USA and the Soviet Union to accept the military status quo 
in Europe.  Europe's situation would therefore continue to be determined by the 
balance established between the world powers.  The European States would not 
therefore have to reckon with the threat of a nuclear war in theforeseeablefu-
ture,  although the occurence of grave crisis in Europe could not be entirely 
ruled out. 
This general trend would probably not be upset by the fact that the 
'status quo' policy of the world powers had widened the room for manoeuvre 
of this or that European ally in the Eastern and Western sphere of influence. 
-54-There were signs of a slackening both in the communist and in the Atlantic 
bloc; consciousness of national interests was on the increase throughout Europe 
and even in the communist parties and countries.  This circumstance was help-
ing to make co-operation between the Western and Eastern countries somewhat 
easier. 
In contrast to the success of economic co-operation within the EEC, 
the Soviet Union,  because of its own unsolved economic problems,  had run up 
against difficulties in its co-operation with the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance. This -had led to the appearance of movements for economic policy 
reform in the communist countries. 
All this had created better conditions for future economic and tech-
nological co-operation between the European peoples because European States, 
both in the East and in the West,  were becoming more and more interested in 
trading with each other and in exchanging information on technological and 
economic questions. 
These developments could provide a surer basis for overcoming the 
division of Europe. Welcome though they were,  under certain circumstances 
they might slow down the process of West European unification in the next few 
years. 
Already,  attempts to develop and enlarge the West European Com-
munities set up in the fifties were coming up against one obstacle after the 
other, because supposed national interests were still being put before the in-
terests of the European people as a whole.  The enlargement of the Community 
through the entry of Great Britain,  Ireland and the Scandinavian countries,  and 
the expansion of the European institutions,  remained on the agenda and were 
perfectly consistent with increasing co-operation between all the European 
states. Fresh efforts were needed to establish the highest possible degree of 
co-operation in the political,  economic and cultural fields.  Europe had to be 
organized as a  community of peoples. 
(SPD-Parteitag 1968,  Tatsachen - Argumente,  Nr.  242 u.  243/1968) 
-55 -2.  The Italian European Movement calls on the democratic parties to 
enter into an electoral commitment on European policy 
The European Movement,  in view of the coming elections,  has sent 
to the secretariats of the Italian political parties that favour European unity 
and a democratic and supranational Europe,  a document calling for a joint 
electoral commitment on European policy. 
This stated that the approaching elections faced the Italians with 
responsibilities rendered even graver and more urgent by the international 
situation.  Under the irresistible pressure of technical progress, the world 
was growing smaller and smaller, binding all men together in a  common fate. 
In this world,  always threatened with a disastrous flare-up of the sources of 
conflict,  the European peoples,  once themselves makers of history,  were now 
merely spectators dependent on others for their security. At the same time 
the age-old disputes which had been the main cause of Europe's decline large-
ly remained.  Just as,  in the nineteenth century,  the Risorgimento had led to 
the establishment of a single State in a previously fragmented Italy,  so today 
the renaissance of Europe required the progressive establishment of a federal 
State,  without which the progress made in the technological and economic sec-
tors would only widen the existing gap.  The Community's institutions- which 
significantly,  though only partially, foreshadowed such a federal State - must 
therefore be preserved at all costs and rendered both more authoritative and 
more democratic.  After all,  the process of economic integration set in motion 
with the creation of the Common Market could only be controlled  by institutions 
equipped with the necessary powers.  Moreover,  only by transferring to them 
substantial powers could these institutions be made truly representative.  In 
this respect,  the democratic cause and the federalist cause today coincided in 
Europe. 
Progress towards federalism in the European Communities was 
also essential to enable the European people to serve the interests of peace 
- now indivisible - namely,  to make their contribution to the common economic 
and civil progress which is the surest safeguard of peace. 
The Italian Council of the European Movement invited member par-
ties to enter into a clearly-defined legislative commitment which,  as regards 
the responsibilities falling respectively on the Italian Parliament and Govern-
ment,  could be summed up as follows: 
'(a) renewal,  at the beginning of the next legislative period,  of Italian Par-
liamentary representatives in the various European organizations; 
-56-(b)  immediate legislative measures for the election of members of the 
EO.ropean Parliament by direct universal suffrage; 
(c)  clearly-defined and suitable measures aimed at investing the European 
Parliament with ample real powers; 
(d)  constant action to defend and strengthen the Community Executive's 
powers of initiative and financial autonomy; 
(e)  discharge of the obligations flowing from the European Treaties or as-
sumed by Italy within the Community; 
(f)  constant encouragement, by suitable institutional means,  of parliamen-
tary initiatives and of more effective co-ordination of governmental 
action in the field of European policy,  with a view also to dealing with 
national problems against the background of the prospects of European 
integration; 
(g)  open and systematic support of any initiative likely to facilitate the ad-
mission to the European Economic Community in its present form of 
Great Britain and other interested democratic countries that are ready 
and willing to exercise rights and assume obligations jointly with the 
present member States; 
(h)  tackling problems connected with the merger of the European Communi-
ties and with their geographic enlargement in such a way as to facilitate 
progress towards federal-type institutional structures.' 
(Avanti,  23  March 1968) 
3.  Views of Mr. Mitterrand on Europe 
'Only a united and socialist Europe is likely to be able to meet the 
American challenge on terms of equality. ' This was the argument put forward 
by Mr.  Fran<;ois Mitterrand, President  of the Federation of the Democratic and 
Socialist Left (FGDS),  during a debate on 1 April at the American Cultural 
Centre.  The subject under discussion was 'The American challenge: should it 
be taken up or should it merely be endured?'.  Mr.  Mitterrand considered that 
-57-the 'challenge',  which was recently analyzed in a book by Mr.  Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber,  was not a  concerted plan to dominate. It simply followed 
from the situation of a great power: the United States vis-a-vis the Europe of 
today which was,  he said 'a. mosaic of disorganized States'. 
'Whether in the political,  monetary or technological fields',  he said, 
'the six countries of the Common Market only have partial views and these 
constitute a broken chess-board'. 
Mr. Mitterrandfelt that to choose the liberal Europe,  which had been 
the goal of its founders,  would mean accepting the American Europe; this in 
turn meant meeting the challenge not with success but with failure.  The milk 
problem was the best example of the liberal failure,  he felt,  because milk 
production had not been planned in time. 
A point had been reached where all the EAGGF  credits would be 
employed in the service of an obsolete economy and would not be available for 
agricultural structures. 
'My answer to the American challenge is a Socialist France carry-
ing Europe along with it'  • 
On 8 April, Mr. Mitterrand was the guest on a live television feature 
entitled 'En direct avec ••••• ' 
What would a  socialist France do in a non-socialist Europe? 
Mr. Mitterrand replied  by referring to the milk product crisis in the common 
agricultural market.  He  considered that the liberal Europe had been caught in 
its own trap and that it did not meet the aims of true Europeans.  Planning was 
necessary and the liberal Europe had to change its methods and take the lead 
from France. 
(Combat,! April 1968; 
Le Figaro,  9 April 1968; 
Le Monde,  10 April 1968) 
-58 -4.  Mr.  Pisani appraises French agricultural policy from the European 
standpoint 
Speaking in Angers on 8 April at the first conference held by the 
Economic Training Centre for Farmers (C. I. F. E. A.) of which he is President, 
Mr.  Pisani, the former Minister,  laid emphasis on the growing importance 
of agriculture: 'At the very moment when we are building the economic Europe, 
it already appears to belong to the past.  History may perhaps serve to show 
that the Europe of the Six has been no more than an economic apprenticeship 
in international trade. '  The CIFEA was still taking its first hesitant steps and 
its achievements had been modest.  Mr.  Pisani felt that it had to become both 
a  centre for reflexion - with its windows wide open on the Scandinavian, Anglo-
Saxon,  Socialist and under-developed countries as much as on the established 
West- and it had to be a  means of action 'from the outside',  aimed at the 
young farmers' elite. At a time when the 'intermediate' agricultural policies 
pursued in Paris and in Brussels were on the point of failing and at a time 
when certain East European countries such as Czechoslovakia were seeking a 
new course,  the initiative could be of interest. 
(Le Monde,  9 April 1968) 
5.  For Mr.  Spaak the political progress of Europe is insignificant. 
Addressing on 10 April 1968 the fourth congress of the European 
Teachers' Association,  Mr.  Spaak questioned Europe's progress after twenty 
years of efforts. 
Mr.  Spaak felt that,  with regard to the aim of achieving economic 
integration,  this had been largely fulfilled and countries that were in the past 
hostile to the Community were now asking to join it.  The essential thing,  how-
ever,  was political integration and Mr.  Spaak pointed out that,  in this respect, 
a mistake had been made in assuming that economic integration would lead to 
political integration almost automatically. 
'We find',  he said,  'that political progress so far has been less than 
insignificant'.  It may be asked,  moreover,  whether the idea of a political 
Europe is not losing ground in relation to the original concept.  We are wit-
nessing,  in France above all,  a revival of nationalism at a time when there is 
no longer nowadays a  single European State that is capable of settling its own 
problems alone. It is inevitable for such a feeling,  once aroused in a given 
-59-country,  to spread to others.  'How can we  explain to the Germans',  said Mr. 
Spaak,  'that nationalism is all right for the French, but not for them~ ' 
'It may also be asked if,  even in the field of economic integration, 
we are certain to have reached the point of no return.  For in the absence of 
real European solidarity,  there is the danger of a  collapse,  if a  crisis should 
occur,  of the structures set up so far.  And even if there were no crisis,  can 
one really imagine that further stages in economic integration (fiscal or mone-
tary, for example) could be reached by the Six if they have different foreign 
policies? Will Germany go on subsidizing the agriculture of its partners if 
these do not endorse its foreign policy? What saved us in this respect is the 
common policy pursued within the Atlantic Alliance.' 
(Le Soir,  11 Apri11968) 
6.  Europe in the election programmes of the Italian political parties 
Prior to the elections of 19 and 20  May 1968,  all the Italian political 
parties set out in their programmes the action they felt Italy ought to take in 
the field of foreign policy,  without,  of course, disregarding the principles of 
the Atlantic Alliance and of European integration. 
The Christian Democrats,  while in favour of Italy's presence in the 
Atlantic Alliance,  suggested it should develop the method of 'articulated' asso-
ciation and the model of a  Euro-Atlantic  political society based on the values 
of peace,  democracy and equality implicit in its treaty and in the principle of 
inte  rde  pendenc e. 
As regards European policy,  the Europeist ideal remained the linch-
pin of Christian Democracy which had made to it,  with its statesmen and its 
political tradition,  an indispensable contribution. 
For the Christian Democrats the Europeist ideal ranked as a firm 
commitment which needed to be stressed at a time when it appeared to have 
lost its lustre. It was being relaunched in European political consciousness 
and in the action of the governments as an obligation deserving of priority in 
that 'on it depends our survival in historical terms'. 
- 60-The Europe the Christian Democrats were striving for therefore 
remained that 'outlined in the Treaties of Rome - supranational,  democratic, 
open to new members and capable of ensuring its own defence'. 
The following measures would therefore have to be introduced in 
the next legislative period: 
(a)  renewal,  at the beginning of the next legislative period,  of Italian Par-
liamentary representatives in the various European organizations; 
(b)  immediate legislative measures for the election of members of the 
European Parliament by direct universal suffrage; 
(c)  clearly-defined and suitable measures aimed at investing the European 
Parliament with ample real powers; 
(d)  constant action to defend and strengthen the Community Executive's 
powers of initiative and financial autonomy; 
(e)  discharge of the obligations flowing from the European Treaties or 
assumed by Italy within the Community; 
(f)  constant encouragement,  by suitable institutional means,  of parliamen-
tary initiatives and of more effective co-ordination of governmental 
action in the field of European policy,  with a view also to dealing with 
national·problems against the background of the prospects of European 
integration; 
(g)  open and systematic support of any initiative likely to facilitate the 
admission to the European Economic Community in its present form 
of Great Britain and other interested democratic countries that are 
ready and willing to exercise rights and assume obligations jointly 
with the present member States; 
(h)  tackling problems connected with the merger of the European Communi-
ties and with  their geographic enlargement in such a way as to facili-
t~te progress towards federal-type institutional structures. 
- 61-For the Unified Socialist Party the major task for Italy's interna-
tional economic policy,  which also largely governed its dealings with the devel-
oping countries and its efforts to build up trade with the East,  was the affirma-
tion and progress of the European Communities.  The Socialists were striving 
for European integration not only for political reasons but also because they 
regarded it a  suitable means of achieving specific economic and social ends; 
Italy had taken up the challenge of the Common Market with courage and energy 
despite the fact that,  of the six founder countries,  it had been not only the 
weakest economically but also situated,  geographically and psychologically, to 
the edge of the main streams of European tradition.  Forecasts that Italy would 
be reduced to playing a  minor rene as a marginal producer of agricultural 
products and tourist centre had been belied by the facts,  thanks to the drive 
and energy of the Italian workers. 
The European Community should stay open to the world outside  •.. 
The Kennedy Round had shown that Europeans could negotiate far more effec-
tively on economic,  commercial and financial problems with the United States 
if they could decide on a  common approach.  The same could be said for rela-
tions with Eastern bloc countries.  These had passed from a position of reti-
cence,  accounted for by the climate of the cold war,  to a more relaxed  attitude; 
some,  like Poland and Yugoslavia,  had established trade relatio:p.s with the 
Community.  The European Community should continue to move forward along 
this road and build up its rOle of magnet a:p.d point of departure for the unifica-
tion of Europe as a whole,  pursuing outward-looking and liberal aims by means 
of a non-protectionist commercial policy.  The economic obstacles to British 
entry could not be regarded as insuperable. 
In its turn,  the Executive of the Socialist Party passed a motion on 
the problem of parliamentary representation in the European Parliament.  This 
announced that by 31  October 1968 the Socialist parliamentary groups of Senate 
and Chamber,  having by then established the necessary contacts with the social-
ist groups of the national parliaments of the EEC member States and with the 
corresponding socialist parties,  as well as with the other parliamentary groups 
and national parties of the European Democratic Front and with the political 
groups of the European Parliament,  would table a motion in the two sections of 
the Italian Parliament,  calling for an agreement between the ministers of the 
six governments in the Council of the Community on the election of the Euro-
pean  Parliament by direct universal suffrage,  in accordance with the draft 
submitted to the Council by the European Parliamentary Assembly.  These 
elections were to be held not later than in 1969.  Failing unanimity in the Com-
munity Council of Ministers,  the Italian socialist parliamentary groups would 
promote,  subject to the same time-limit,  direct election by universal suffrage 
of the national delegations to the European Parliament in countries where the 
parties of the European Democratic Front have a parliamentary majority,  and 
therefore - it could then be assumed - in Italy. 
- 62  -On this assumption the Socialist Party undertook to bring up the 
problem of the ordinary renewal - with second-degree election - of the Italian 
delegation to the European Parliament when they started consultations on the 
formation of the new government,  excluding any form of participation in that 
government until such renewal had been decided upon as the first act of the 
new majority. 
The Italian Republican Party,  in an election publication dealing with 
foreign policy,  confirmed its determination to fight for the creation of a large-
scale uniform European political and economic area.  The Italian Government 
ought to make a firm stand against Gaullist France's unceasing attempts to 
establish a hegemony and against the veto which,  since 1963,  it had been con-
stantly opposing to British entry to the Common Market.  To underline Italian 
disapproval of Gaullist attempts to establish ascendancy in Europe,  Italy could 
take effective action during the next legislative period by concluding a perma-
nent pact for political consultation with Great Britain.  The Republican Party's 
views were confirmed by a statement made by its secretary,  Mr.  La Malfa,  in 
an interview granted to the weekly 'Panorama': 'Gaullism,  with its nationalist 
foundation,  has seriously slowed down European unification.  In our view,  Italy 
should take the lead in the anti-Gaullist battle and find points of agreement 
with all countries and forces that oppose the Gaullist vision.  The French veto 
on Great Britain's entry into the Common Market is purely political and is 
governed not by economic but by political objectives. 
As a practical example of Italy's wish to oppose this design,  we 
have suggested a pact for consultation between Italy and Great Britain. This 
idea,  which dates back to 1963 at the time of  General de Gaulle's first veto and 
the inception of the Franco-German pact,  was rejected as at variance with the 
Common Market's policy. But this is the only lever we have with which to 
demonstrate our opposition to the Gaullist design.  As to the pressures France 
is putting on Germany,  the Anglo-Italian consultation pact would serve as a 
pole of resistance to that so doggedly pursued by General de Gaulle.  We are 
therefore for an active policy and not merely one aimed at containing Gaullist 
pretensions.  Moreover,  we are today drawn to Great Britain not only by con-
siderations of European and international policy but also by certain economic 
measures adopted by Mr.  Wilson to raise the technological and social level of 
the British economy. ' 
The Italian Liberal Party stated in its programme that to enable 
each of the European peoples to progress culturally,  economically and socially, 
and to develop their individuality to the utmost in a climate of peace and secu-
rity and contribute to the development of other peoples,  Europe must unite, 
with the participation and in the decisive interest of Italy.  In agreement with 
the other liberal parties, the PLI was striving: 
- 63  -(a)  to overcome Gaullist opposition to Great Britain's admission and to the 
Community's conversion to a democratic political community (United 
States of Europe); 
(b)  for the election of the European Parliament by direct  universal suffrage; 
(c)  for a general system of European security comprising,  on the one hand, 
the European Community and the United States and,  on the other, East-
ern Europe and Soviet Russia. 
For its part, the Italian Communist Party stated that, firmly opposed 
as it was to any form of autarchy,  it demanded the 'suspension' oftheweightier 
Community 'regulations' and the amendment of the treaties establishing the 
Common Market,  with a view to setting up wider forms of economic co-opera-
tion between all the countries of Europe and establishing fresh relations with 
the developing countries - first and foremost in Mrica and in the Middle East 
- so as to help democratic and social forces to progress and resist domination 
by large industrial and financial concentrations and neo-colonialism in whatev-
er form. 
The Italian Socialist Party for Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) lined up 
with the Communist position,  criticizing the Italian Government for wishing to 
wind up the current legislative period by 'reaffirming,  even through formal 
initiatives,  its faith in the Atlantic Alliance and its support for Europeanism'. 
In the economic field,  the shortcomings and contradictions of the 
Italian Government's Atlantic and European policy had been reflected in the 
vicissitudes undergone by the Common Market, the recent devaluation of ster-
ling and the dollar crisis.  The crisis of the reserve currencies had brought to 
the surface a long-standing trend - the progressive indebtedness of the United 
States to Europe and the exercise of a real dictatorship by the debtor over the 
creditor. 
The PSIUP therefore hoped to see a new and independent Italian 
foreign policy which would help to break up the opposing military blocs and to 
create a system of European security. A position of active neutrality could 
enable Italy to serve as a weighty factor for peace in Europe and in the 
Mediterranean. 
The Italian Socialist Movement saw European unity as a  converging 
of culture and interests,  of history and politics,  capable of resisting any 
- 64-attempt to break it up,  whether from the East or from the West.  The Italian 
Socialist 'Movement thought of European unity in terms of nations and peoples, 
but the radicalism so dear to the Centre Left wanted to make it the subject of 
a factious agreement between parties, thus destroying any real prospects of 
its being achieved. 
Finally, the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchical Unity asserted 
its faith in European unity.  It would fight to achieve it because only if all the 
forces of the continent were pooled could the supreme values of Western civi-
lization be saved.  There was no point in repeating the numerous arguments 
put forward by the champions of a united Europe.  Some of these,  however, 
were behaving at this difficult moment as though they wished to defer, rather 
than bring forward,  the achievement of the desired goal. 
(11  Popolo,  13 April;  Avanti,  9-10-11 April; La Voce Repubblicana,  18 April; 
Panorama,  18 April;  Posizione liberale,  9 April; Programma elettorale del 
PSIUP,  Comunita europea,  April) 
7.  A warning to Europe from Mr.  Guy  Mollet 
On 25  April,  Mr. Guy Mollet,  Secretary-General of the SFIO (Social-
ist Party) was the guest of honour at a  diiUler-debate organized  by the European 
Federalist Movement,  of which Mr.  Hirsch is President. 
He outlined the views of the Left and made frequent reference to his 
own opinions on European problems; he accused General de Gaulle of 'killing 
Europe'. 
He said that General de Gaulle had condemned Yalta but that he was 
preparing a second Yalta. If the countries of Europe did not speak with one 
voice,. they would cease to count. 
Mr.  Mollet also stressed that the agreement reached between the 
two political groups was not a programme for governing with the Communists 
as long as they maintained their present attitudes,  particularly on Europe. He 
was,  however,  convinced that the Communist party would evolve and he refer-
red to what had just happened in Czechoslovakia,  a country from which he had 
recently returned: 'This is the most important event of the second part of the 
twentieth  .. century and I think that within six months Czechoslovakia will ask to 
be associated with the Common Market. ' 
(Le Monde,  27 April 1968) 
- 65-8.  Mr.  Mendes-France for 'Europeanization'  of the pound 
Mr.  Mendes-France, former French Prime Minister and at present 
PSU Deputy for Grenoble,  sent to the 'Force Ouvriere' union of chemical in-
dustries,  on the occasion of a  congress in Grenoble,  a message on the subject 
of 'Trade unionism,  Europe and the Left'. 
In that message he recalled his opposition to 'the capitalist and free 
trade policy which had been adopted on setting up the Common Market.' He 
pointed out that priority had only been given to monetary stability considera-
tions.  The Governments concerned had introduced deflationary policies that 
were slowing down salary increases,  sacrificing productive investments and 
inducing,  with regard to social benefits, undesirable 'downward alignments.' 
Limited as it was,  'to meet the wishes of conservative and liberal forces',  to 
the mere opening of frontiers,  the Common Market was running the risk of 
'becoming an instrument for propagating deflation and unemployment', aclosed 
field for fierce competition that did not  take into account 'the human and social 
factors which we have no right to overlook in the twentieth century. ' 
'For men who  claimed to believe in socialism,  Europe must not be 
allowed to surrender to the naturel machinery of the market nor to the omnipo-
tence of cartels and mergers. • •  This is why we affirm the need for member 
countries to co-ordinate their economic activities and for closer co-operation 
that will finally lead to a true European planning system. ' 
Mr.  Mendes-France advocated the creation of a  'European payments 
agency' which would carry out the essential harmonization of credit subscrip-
tions. 
He  then stressed that 'in the new forms of action that must lead to a 
democratic planning system on a European scale,  trade unions have a particu-
larly important part to play. ' 
He  declared that 'without Britain,  it was unrealistic to claim to be 
building a balanced Europe',  and he was convinced that solutions could  be found 
to the difficulties connected with Britain's entry into the Common Market. 
In order to solve the most complex of these difficulties, he suggested 
that sterling should be 'Europeanized',  for as long as Britain continued to 
pursue, because of its monetary situation,  a  deflationist policy,  it would re-
main a bad customer for the countries of the continent,  as well as for the un-
derdeveloped countries. 
(Combat,  28  April 1968; Le Monde,  30 April 1968) 
- 66-9.  The Committee for Europe's independence issues a 'manifesto' against 
'American hegemony' 
The Committee for Europe's independence was founded ten months 
ago with the object of  'creating the necessary political and material conditions 
for grouping together progressive leaders and intellectuals with a view to or-
ganizing co-ordinated action against American hegemony, for the independence 
and modernization of Europe' •••  The Committee issued a  'manifesto for Euro-
pe's independence' which reads,  inter alia ,  as follows:' the progressive union 
of Europe cannot truly be achieved without economic,  political and cultural 
independence.  It is a  matter not only of deciding whether Europe will be re-
sponsible for its own future,  but also of realizing that in accepting to be the 
bridge-head of American hegemony,  Western Europe would become party to a 
policy of world aggression and the target of a universal revolt.  Opposing this 
hegemony implies,  in particular for Europe,  radically refusing the present 
international monetary system and the exorbitant privileges enjoyed by the 
American dollar. • •  The Common Market, founded on the Rome Treaty,  is an 
important instrument of West European unity.  Its development will be decisive 
for Western Europe and,  consequently, for the whole of Europe. Any enlarge-
ment of the Common Market is desirable provided it strengthens European 
independence.  The basic criterion of any enlargement is,  therefore based on 
the degree of economic and political emancipation of the applicant countries in 
relation to the United States •.• Europe's progressive unity must be founded 
- in the economic sector - on modern and strict methods rejecting liberal 
capitalism and the economic,  political and ideological structuresderivingfrom 
it. It is, therefore,  as part of the action against imperialism and within the 
framework of an independent Europe that the problem of changing man's condi-
tion and means of production will lie in future.' 
The first signatories to this manifesto include the following Emmanuel 
d'Astier de la Vigerie,  Rene Capitant,  Jacques DebO.-Bridel,  Jean-Marie 
Domenach,  Frangois Mauriac,  Frangois Perroux,  Philippe de Saint-Robert. 
(Le Monde,  4 May 1968) 
10.  The European policy of the French Unified Socialist Party (PSU) 
Mr.  Michel Rocard,  National Secretary of the PSU,  defined the 
major options facing his party with regard to European questions at a press 
conference in Strasbourg on 3 M&.y. 
- 67-He  explained that the PSU rejected the supranational idea in its 
present form because it would simply culminate in a  consolidation of the capi-
talist structures in Europe,  European co-operation had to be revived starting 
from the basis.  The pressure of the working classes,  he felt,  should be strong 
enough to impose a policy for individual sectors within the framework of the 
Six.  This involved increased intervention by the public authorities,  The PSU 
would be in favour of functional supranationality adjusted to certain quite spe-
cific sectors in which the r8le of the public authorities might be the dominant 
one. 
(Le Monde,  4 May 1968) 
11.  Mr.  Servan-Schreiber's visit to Sweden revives interest in Europe 
At the invitation of the Swedish Government,  Mr. Jean-Jacques 
Servan-Schreiber recently paid a four-day visit to Sweden.  What prompted 
Mr. Erlander to invite the author of 'The American Challenge', was the wish 
to revive Sweden's interest in Europe. 
The Government thus scored against the opposition which had blamed 
it for not taking any initiative on the question of Sweden's entry into the Common 
Market.  In fact,  the Swedish Government had been waiting for over two years 
for the reply of the Six to Britain's application in order to determine its own 
attitude.  In its letter to the Brussels Commission of July last, the Swedish 
Government had not specified the type of admission it was seeking i.e. full 
membership or association. 
The Government had now realized that its approach had been so 
ambiguous that it stood no chance at all of success. The particular wording of 
the Government's letter was due to the need to maintain neutrality,  a basic 
tenet of Sweden's foreign policy. 
Mr.  Servan-Schreiber felt that neutrality, far from being an obstacle 
to Sweden's accession to the Common Market,  was regarded by General de 
Gaulle as an advantage since Sweden was not a member of the Atlantic organi-
zation.  To this argument,  the Swedes replied that their country could act alone, 
having accepted certain joint commitments with Norway and Denmark,  both 
of which are full members of NATO,  For the time being thedeadlockcontinued. 
- 68-Mr. Vickman visited Brussels on 6 May for talks with Mr. Raymond 
Barre, Vice-President of the European Commission. At a recent meeting of 
the EFTA Ministers in London,  Mr. Vickman explained to the British his 
Government's intentions.  Moreover, the General Labour Confederation will 
open a branch in Brussels in order to promote contacts with trade unions in 
the Community countries.  While the majority of trade unionists is still appre-
hensive and reticent with regard to the idea of opening Sweden's frontiers,  the 
leaders are far less so.  Mr.  Geijer, leader of the Labour Confederation, sup-
ports Mr. Erlander's policy in seeking a rapprochement with the EEC. 
Sweden's desire not to follow in Britain's wake,  to have done with 
isolation and to become integrated into a larger Europe is the result of a  slow 
change in the minds of the people.  This evolution has been going on for the 
past two years at Government level and amid employers, trade unions and the 
public. Only the juvenile supporters of the National Liberation Front, the 
Communists and fellow-travellers or even the liberals are very 'sensitive' to 
the problem~ of the developing countries.  They are hostile to Sweden's inte-
gration in a  'capitalist' Europe in which they feel their country would not be 
strong enough to direct its policy towards the socialist community of which 
they are dreaming. 
(Le Monde,  12/13 May 1968) 
12.  Views of Dr. Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor,  on the 
Austrian integration policy 
On 2r May Dr. Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Minister 
for Trade,  made known his views on Austrian foreign policy.  On Austrian 
integration policy,  he observed: 
As regards Austria  1 s neutrality, the conclusion of a treaty with 
Brussels sought by Austria was the main prerequisite for the expansion of the 
Austrian economy and therefore had to be considered also in connexion with 
his country's prosperity and,  therefore,  integrity.  Membership of the EEC 
was incompatible with neutral status, but at the same time Austria had to deal 
on a large-scale West European market if her integration problem was ever to 
be solved.  The only answer, therefore,  was a treaty so framed as to take 
Austria's. special circumstances into account while satisfying the needs of 
integration and not upsetting the inner workings and development of the Euro-
pean Communities.  Concessions would be needed on both sides.  That this was 
possible had been demonstrated by the EEC Commission at the close of the last 
round of negotiations. 
- 69-What significance would such a treaty have for Austrian foreign po-
licy? One had only to consider what would happen if such a treaty was not con-
cluded. Austria,  a  country dependent on a high level of exports,  could not sur-
vive economically unless these were maintained and even expanded.  So impor-
tant was the treaty with the ·European Communities in this respect that,  if it 
failed to materialize,  Austria would have to divert its external trade to a dis-
proportionate degree to the Eastern bloc countries.  This could not,  however, 
but alter Austria's overall foreign policy position. 
Under these circumstances the treaty with Brussels, although strict-
ly speaking intended to serve economic ends,  was in fact one of the bases on 
which the foreign policy pursued by Austria to date could be continued.  This 
was in no way altered by the fact that at the moment,  as a result of the com-
plete standstill in the field of European integration brought about by French 
policy,  no discussions could take place between Austria and the Communities. 
Mention should also be made of the current Italian veto.  Free Europe should 
therefore realize the importance for it too of the treaty sought by Austria. 
Austrian foreign policy was part of overall European policy directed 
at the survival of a  country whose existence was essential to peace in Europe. 
Since Austria was a western country,  the needs of its foreign policy tallied 
with the interests of the free democratic world. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  21  May 1968) 
13.  The National Congress of the Luxembourg Labour Party 
The Socialist Labour Party of Luxembourg held its Ordinary Nation-
al Congress on 12 and 22  May.  With reference to foreign policy,  it passed a 
resolution and the sections concerning the development of the European Com-
munities read as follows: 
'The National Political Congress of the Luxembourg Socialist Labour 
Party considers it regrettable that the accession of further democratic member 
States to the European Community has foundered on the veto of the Government 
of one member State  and that there thus seems to be no real progress towards 
the political and economic unity of the peoples of the Community; it considers 
it desirable that this dangerous paralysis of Community policy should be over-
come (a)  by forging ahead in building the Economic Union (b)  through a pro-
gressive introduction of financial autonomy for the Europ~an Communities 
- 70-and (c)  through an appropriate adaptation of the powers of the European Par-
liament to make them consistent with the significance of Community legislation. 
It advocates an active social policy for the European Communities, particular-
ly as regards offsetting adverse effects which economic redevelopment might 
have for the workers.' 
(Tageblatt,  25  May 1968) 
14.  Professor Hallstein on relations between the USA  and Europe 
In a  speech delivered in Cologne on 28  May 1968 before representa-
tives of the Federal Association of German Wholesalers and Exporters and 
Federal Ministers and Secretaries of State,  Professor Walter Hallstein re-
ported that doubts as to the ability and will of Europeans to unite and to enlarge 
the Community were as widespread as doubts of their readiness to take over, 
jointly with the USA,  a rlHe in international politics. 
General de Gaulle's policy had had devastating effects in the USA. 
If relations between the USA and Europe were to be put on a  realistic bases 
adaptable to future demands,  the concept of partnership elaborated by Presi-
dent Kennedy would have to be extended beyond co-operation in trade and devel-
opment policies. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  29  May 1968) 
15.  Lecture of Mr.  Pescatore,  Judge at the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities on the rights and duties of the European 
citizen 
The 18th Course in the European civic education campaign took place 
in Luxembourg on 4 and 5 June 1968. It was organized by the Centre europeen 
de la Culture in Geneva and was attended by about 40 teachers, from most of 
the west European countries.  During the course,  Mr.  Pierre Pescatore, Judge 
at the Court of Justice of the European Communities,  spoke about problems of 
the rights of man raised by European integration. 
-71-He  considered that the Treaties had brought into being a new organi-
zation of the west European States in the form of European Communities; this 
was firstly an economic organization but was to become a political organization. 
In contrast to national constitutions, this one included no catalogue of funda-
mental rights and made no reference to such rights.  Yet this should not cause 
too much concern because as things stood at present there had been no problem 
to solve concerning the respect of fundamental rights.  None the less, there 
was an element of insecurity and it had to be asked what would happen when in 
due course such problems arose.  Mr.  Pescatore thought that the Community 
constitution included a number of features which could be used to develop ade-
quate safeguards for the fundamental rights,  should the need arise.  The lack 
of safeguards was only apparent.  Indeed the Community constitution officially 
recognized the principle of the paramountcy of Community law and the struc-
ture of the Community included an institution to ensure it was applied,  namely 
the Court of Justice. 
The organization of the Court matched up to the criteria of imparti-
ality and independence of the national courts.  The work it had done  so far 
showed that its methods would not have to be changed to deal with problems of 
human rights.  The European Treaties, furthermore,  contained certain definite 
directions which could be used to advantage. It was a question of making the 
most of the material content of the Treaties and there was at the Court of Jus-
tice a jurisprudence that had to be developed and extended. If, apart from 
Article 3 of the Constitution of the Council of Europe,  nothing practical could 
be found to solve the problems arising,  a number of features could be taken 
from the constitutional laws of the member States where these coincided.  It 
might even be said that for them to coincide completely was not necessary and 
that all that was needed was a reasonable degree of similarity.  Consequently, 
the unity of the Community should not be challenged by theoretical and unprof-
itable speculation; if practical problems arose, the common institutions and 
the Court of Justice would solve them. 
The European Convention on Human Rights was the subject of a 
speech by Mr. Jean Raymond,  Principal Administrator at the Secretariat of 
the European Commission for Human Rights.  He began by showing that the 
Convention included a  catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms and a  sys-
tem for controlling their application.  He recapitulated the history of the Con-
vention in practice,  referring to the private initiative from which it had sprung; 
he also analyzed its political and sociological origins.  Since the end of the war 
the threat of totalitarianism had ceased to be the main concern so that the 
principles of the Declaration today obtained independently.  The Convention had 
become a genuine law which was applied every day in practical cases and it 
constituted a jurisprudence.  In comparison with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, it was more modest.  This could hardly be called a weak point 
because although the United Nations Organization's Declaration simply consti-
tuted an objective to attain - which explained why it had been accepted unani-
mously - the European Convention included formal commitments which had 
- 72-immediate effect. It included the rights of the individual which were not sub-
ject to any reservation and others which might be subject to restriction in 
certain cases.  Those responsible for the Convention had opted for effectiveness 
and they seem to have been right because no  signatory State had yet withdrawn 
and there had not yet been any open conflict with judicial authorities.  The 
number of cases dealt with was indeed small but it was worth considering that 
each case deemed admissible implied questioning a given national institution 
and that the scope of the decisions taken was very far-reaching in view of the 
very large moral authority that this supreme court had acquired.  Thanks,  too, 
to the European Convention,  settlements out of Court had been possible. It had 
also to be pointed out that nations were very sensitive to the moral sanction of 
the Commission and that national courts took its jurisprudence into account 
when reaching decisions and,  again,  that the European Convention had been 
maintained in certain overseas territories where it had been introduced by the 
former colonial power. 
Lastly,  Mr.  Raymond stressed the importance of the European 
Convention in promoting the rights of the individual who had,  as a result,  be:-
come a subject of international law; it was also conducive to the unification of 
Europe because it obliged the signatory States to renounce some measure of 
their national sovereignty. 
(Luxemburger Wort,  6 and 7 June 1968) 
16,  The German Deputy Blumenfeld (CDU)  stresses the importance of 
political and technological integration for Europe's future 
On 10 June,  Mr.  Blumenfeld gave a talk on 'the Europe of tomorrow' 
at the Institute of International Political Studies in Milan. 
The author,  after reviewing the student problem in Europe and in 
the Federal Republic of Germany,  said that Europe was today confronted with 
difficulties which America had already overcome,  while America was already 
concerned with problems of its future generation. America recognized that,  in 
the present technological era,  man must give a social significance to technology, 
a social content that had hitherto only been applied to the field of industry.  In 
future,  the main political problem would no longer be that of the manual work 
of countless individuals but rather the problem of intellectual activity within a 
technological society.  Mr.  Blumenfeld went to say: 'Europe is endeavouring 
to remove the apparent contradiction between action and thought while clinging, 
at the same time,  to antiquated theories. It is paradoxical but,  nevertheless, 
- 73  -true that the so-called scientific socialism of Karl Marx is of no help in this 
age of progressive democratization of science and "scientification" of demo-
cracy. Democratization of science means in practice that Europe,  too,  must 
advance towards what is called on the other side of the Atlantic "big science". 
This implies a reorganizatfon of Europe's ideas in the technological,  economic 
and political fields. ' 
Mr.  Blumenfeld,  therefore,  attaches special importance to the 
American model and to co-operation with that country: 'Co-operation in fact 
is the "currency" of a future European development.  That future can only be 
for a "great" Europe.  It should,  however,  be borne in mind that the United 
States of Europe cannot have a beginning without a history. It is,  therefore, 
necessary to find some instrument that would make it possible to arrive at a 
fair peace-time order for that concomitant phenomenon called European politi-
cal unification.  That instrument is,  in fact,  the "tous azimuts" co-operation, 
without external or internal hegemony.  The future of Europe is a vital problem 
as well for the developing countries. Our world is not only divided by opposing 
political forces East and West but also by the economic gap between North and 
South.  This economic gap demands that Europe should become one of the most 
advanced productive centres of the world. ' 
Referring to the political structure of a united Europe,  the speaker 
came out in favour of a confederation of States which he regarded as the most 
suitable system for achieving common objectives.  'Finally',  Mr.  Blumenfeld 
concluded 'let us not delude ourselves.  The only possible policy for Europe is 
a European policy and this can only mean a policy aiming at a "larger" Europe. 
Only this aim is of a truly political nature. All other aims have,  more or less, 
the character of administrative measures and do not call for the intervention 
of statesmen. However,  great strides have been made in that direction if we 
consider that the previous generation could not even conceive the problem in 
such precise terms.  But this is also a challenge for the European policy of the 
next generation,  and history will tell whether and to what extent our present 
European policy has taken up that challenge. ' 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  15  June 1968) 
17.  On the European policy of Britain 
Two British opinions 
Sir Con O'Neill,  Ambassador to the European Communities in 
Brussels from 1963 to 1965 and leader of the British delegation to negotiate 
- 74  -entry into the Common Market in 1967  sent a letter to the  'Times'  in which 
he declared the following: 
The only conclusion to which this article tends is that the 
best course for the British Government is to wait and see. 
What follows assumes - there is no room to argue the case here -
that it will remain Britain's best policy to join the Communities as a full mem-
ber; and that a  North Atlantic Free Trade Area is not,  and will not become,  a 
realistic or a satisfactory alternative  . 
. . . . .  There have been three French vetoes,  with a depressingly 
regular periodicity: on the Free Trade Area negotiations in 1958; on the first 
negotiations for entry in January 1963; on the second attempt to enter in 
December 1967.  After last December,  one conclusion was obvious.  So long as 
General de Gaulle remains in control of France,  Britain will be kept out  . 
. . . . .  Up till the British application of 1967,  it had been accepted 
in all Community countries,  including France,  that transitional periods would 
have to be granted to any new member.  They would be part,  and no doubt a 
large. part,  of the "conditions of admission" referred to in Article 237,  which 
would "be the subject of the agreement" admitting the applicant state. It had 
been universally assumed that transitional periods would run from membership, 
not precede it.  Transitional periods of this kind were a major topic of the 1962 
negotiations. 
In 1967, the French reacted by standing this assumption on its head. 
They had to,  if they were to avoid a negotiation.  Skilfully exploiting British 
economic weakness,  they developed a new doctrine.  Applicant states must 
qualify for membership by reaching certain standards of economic health,  and 
by adapting their practices to those of the Community.  Then and then ohly could 
negotiation for membership begin; and then of course,  added the French,  they 
could be extremely short,  for neither derogations nor transitional periods 
would be needed.  In other words,  the whole process of adaption and transition 
must precede negotiations,  not follow on from entry as a member  . 
. . . • •  The assumption that Britain should aim to enter the Commu-
nities assumes in turn that they will remain a successful concern  worth  joining. 
I believe they will,  but at present they are in rather poor shape. 
So,  in a  different way,  are we.  Our two attempts to join turned out 
to be badly timed.  In 1967 especially the relationship between our aspirations 
- 75  -and our economic performance was disastrous.  Seen from across the Channel, 
we are not yet a very attractive proposition.  We  must get our economy in better 
shape,  and convince others that it will stay that way,  before we shall succeed. 
That will take time. 
It will take time too before there is any prospect of a reassessment 
by France of her interest,  and a change in her present determination to exclude 
us. Without such a change we shall not succeed-unless through French weak-
ness so great as to be dangerous to all.  France must want us in,  and Germany 
must still want us in.  Of the others we can be more confident.  My  own best 
hope is that the Community as a whole will come to recognize that only its 
enlargement can renew its dynamisJl1.  That will take time,  so we must wait 
and see.' 
Mr.  Stanley Henig,  Labour M. P. for Lancaster wrote an answer to 
this letter,  stating that it 's  'Timely for Britain to make European reappraisal' 
He went on: 
Any arrangements we  make with Community countries must 
include France,  so that the Benelux plan - welcomed by the Foreign Office as 
a  drowning man clutches a straw - must be a non-starter. On the other hand, 
pressure on France to accommodate us is equally unlikely  . 
. . . . .  . . . . .  Equally,  the "all or nothing" tactic is misconceived  . 
. . . . .  A group of Dutch journalists I met recently all insisted that 
the right action for us now was to seek an accommodation with France. 
It is certainly worth considering the likely nature of a compromise 
or intermediate solution.  Granted we cannot regulate our relations with the 
Six through Article 237 of the Rome Treaty (dealing with new members) and 
that Articles 111/3 deal only with nonpreferential tariff agreements in order 
to meet the rules of Gatt,  the remaining possibility must be Article 238  on 
association.  George Brown as Foreign Secretary expressed himself against 
association in such emotive terms that one might have thought Article 238  laid 
down a precise and unacceptable formula.  In fact it is a framework article, 
permitting of any relationship with the Community from one slightly closer 
than that of third country to one just short of full membership. It follows that 
arrangements made under this article for Greece and Turkey need have no 
particular relevance for us.  Moreover,  to argue that it would be undignified 
for us to use the same article as these smaller countries has the same logic 
as suggesting that we cannot join a Community which has members the size 
of Belgium or Luxembourg. 
- 76-In the long run Britain certainly needs full  membership. We want to 
participate in all the political and economic advantages of the Community and 
we need an equal say in its evolution.  In the shorter term, if  full membership 
is unattainable more flexible criteria must apply. Association could be con-
ceived as an interim measure offering an organic link with the Community  . 
. . . . .  In demonstrating to a public,  increasingly bored with the 
European issue,  that something positive had been achieved,  the Government 
would be gaining and giving a guarantee against the kind of loss of interest 
which occurred in Britain between 1963 and 1966. 
Essentially,  such ideas are worth considering if  only because France 
has continually championed an arrangement along these lines. For a long time, 
we in this country have made little effort to acquire a clear appreciation of 
French and Gaullist policy. 
. . . . .  Had Britain during the probe asked de Gaulle his price for 
our membership,  the answer might have been embarrassing, 'but this is no 
excuse for not putting the question.  To France the acid test of our "European" 
sincerity almost certainly lies in our willingness to make common defensive 
arrangements perhaps going as far an Anglo-French nuclear force.  In this 
connexion,  it is pretty futile to expect the next French Government unilaterally 
to renounce its force de  frappe,  in view of the example set by the British 
Labour Government.  While it is difficult to evince real enthusiasm for joint 
nuclear forces and the like,  if they genuinely constitute our entry card into 
Europe,  they must form agenda for that great debate and not be hushed up. 
The tragedy of the contemporary European scene is that at present 
Britain and France in agreement could mould events as they wished.  Their 
failure to agree might result in the future,  as in the past,  in others gaining 
the initiative - to our mutual discomfort. If we are really serious about seek-
ing entry into Europe,  we  place ourselves in a straitjacket by refusing to 
talk to. France about ideas such as Association or nuclear pacts  . 
. • . . .  Certainly,  as soon as a new constellation of political forces 
in France becomes clear,  we  should be ready with a new and relevant bilateral 
approach.' 
(The Times,  4 and 26  June 1968) 
- 77-III.  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  GROUPINGS 
1.  The views of German industry concerning European policy and 
relations between Europe and the United States 
On 27 March 1968,  the Augsburg Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try held its annual general meeting; Dr. Dietrich Wilhelm von Menges thought 
that Europe and particularly the Federal Republic,  still had an economic 
chance in the changing world markets.  Criticizing Mr. Servan-Schreiber's 
'The American Challenge' he argued that the future did not lie in an antithesis 
between Europe and the USA  but in a synthesis of the two.  He said that there 
was a new strain growing up in north-south relations and this had to be over-
come by a definite solidarity between the  USA  and the  USSR.  The stronger 
the European economy became, the better equipped it would be to co-operate 
and solve the problems that the USA  and the USSR no longer appeared able to 
solve on their own. 
The structure of the world's economy had changed fundamentally 
as a result of technological developments and the new economic blocs that 
had come into being- East Europe,  East Asia,  Africa and,  incidentally,  South 
America.  In 1967,  the volume of trade with Eastern Europe had risen by 16 
per cent as a result of the liberalization in progress and this offered Europe 
a whole series of new opportunities both as a supplier and as a customer. 
Europe and indeed the Federal Republic,  had triumphed here where the USA 
had not. 
The Americans would have to reconsider the management of the 
European economy in relation to the East European countries.  We  had to ac-
cept the Eastern partners as industrial nations and attempt with them to make 
available to third countries,  including the developing ones,  the resources of 
their united industrial strength.  Through the new economic areas and the de-
veloping countries,  Europe was in a completely new position of economic 
power. 
The German prospects on the world market depended on an efficient 
international monetary and payments system.  Too much was asked of the dol-
lar, both politically and economically.  The fact that German currency was 
particularly strong and at present not subject to any pressure would serve no 
purpose if German products were no longer able to compete because of the 
devaluation of other currencies.  The idea of external trade security was today 
as much an illusion as was the self-sufficiency doctrine prevalent in the 
- 79-thirties.  The value of a currency was not its gold equivalent but its purchasing 
power.  A European currency was indeed a fine  idea for convinced Europeans 
but it involved the danger of monetary isolation - as opposed to an internation-
al  monetary order that was still wor~h striving for. 
On 2 April 1968,  Mr.  Berg,  President of the Federation of German 
Industry,  spoke in favour of a unilateral,  ahead-of-schedule,  introduction of 
the  customs duty reductions agreed upon at the Kennedy Round.  At a  meeting 
of the German group of the International Chamber of Trade in Nuremberg,  he 
stressed that Europe now had the chance to do something for America,  not 
only with words.  For Europe,  which was at present economically secure,  to 
help America would not only be fulfilling a  debt of gratitude; it would also be 
giving itself a chance. 
He argued that if one did nothing now there was a great danger that 
the Americans would be forced to take refuge in measures that would set off 
a chain reaction of protectionism.  This would threaten all the achievements 
of the last twenty years.  Mr.  Berg trusted that Europeans would,  in their own 
interest,  be ready,  as soon as possible,  to give effect to the customs duty 
reduction proposals.  Making things easier for American exports would make 
it possible for the USA  to refrain from clamping down on imports. 
'If we do not make any appreciable reduction in the customs burden for 
the Americans,  then the American Government might go too far,  under pres-
sure of an increasingly protectionist public opinion,  in taking measures to 
achieve this end.' It was therefore important for the Americans themselves 
to restore confidence in the dollar and,  however impossible it might seem, 
to ask them to pursue a  radical,  deflationary policy.  Such drastic action 
would inevitably affect Europe directly,  given the close ties between all areas 
of world trade. 
Mr.  Berg was critical of the way in which every one was suddenly 
talking too much,  and too hysterically about a  monetary crisis.  'They are 
sawing off the bough of trust on which we are all sitting.' Evidence of this 
lay in the fact that the dollar would,  as was always the case in the context of 
any monetary  policy decision,  'continue to be of decisive importance for the 
whole world because it was the currency of the largest industrial nation. ' He 
strongly warned against talk of monetary or currency policy theories and 
speculations about a  devaluation of the dollar.  'Such a  measure would show us 
what a  real recession looks like and within a very short period.' 
- 80-Mr.  Arthur K,  Watson,  President of the International Chamber of 
Commerce in Paris,  also advocated an early implementation of the Kennedy 
Round.  Speaking at a  meeting of the Board,  he came out strongly against any 
arrangements or regulations that might affect international trade or lead to 
any direct or indirect discrimination.  There was no longer any room for 
protectionism,  The whole world had today to work to remove trade restric-
tions and to promote an expansion of trade. 
With regard to contacts with the East,  he said that the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry represented private enterprise only.  This did not 
mean that exploratory talks could not be held.  Immediately private enterprise 
settled down in this field,  the Eastern States would be accepted as members. 
They had however decided not to accept governmental positions in this context, 
he stressed. 
Contacts with Chambers of the East European countries had so far 
been exceptionally favourable,  added Mr.  Otto Wolff von Amerongen,  Presi-
dent of the German group of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. He sup-
ported the appeal to help the Americans in their measures to make good their 
dollar deficit because 'American worries could quickly become our own. ' If 
the American currency was not restored to health soon,  other countries would 
have to reckon with economic and political difficulties of their own. 
(Industriekurier,  28  March 1968; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  3 April 
1968; Die Welt,  3 April 1968) 
2.  Observations of the secretariat of the CGIL-CGT on the European 
Social  Fund 
The secretariat of the standing committee for co-ordination between 
the COIL and CGT trade unions recently sent to the European Commission a 
memorandum containing proposals concerning the functioning of the European 
Social Fund. 
This stated that the Social Fund had virtually not come into opera-
tion.  Its effectiveness and scope had been severely limited and its initiative 
blighted by its adherence to the logic of monopolistic concentration,  ration-
alization and efficiency. 
- 81-The responsibility lay with the governments,  which refused to sup-
port the Fund (an allegation largely proven) and with the Community institu-
tions,  which were reproached - not,  it seemed,  with justification - for a cer-
tain lack of interest. A major factor was the absence of joint action on the 
part of the national trade unions and the workers. 
The Committee,  while recognizing the contribution of the CGIL-
CGT secretariats,  maintained that the absence of the CGT and CGIL had 
helped to brake,  if not paralyse,  constructive efforts by the workers to ac-
quire new rights at European level. 
The Committee believed,  however,  that the European Social Fund, 
once it had been overhauled and was democratically administered,  would 
prove to be an effective instrument of an active employment policy - subject, 
of course,  to certain conditions,  i.e. within a given social context (employ-
ment policy~ social policy,  democratization of community institutions,  etc.). 
Setting out from these principles,  the Committee defined the true 
rOle,  sphere of ·activity,  structure and basic resources of the Fund: 
- The Fund should work hand in hand with other organizations (European 
Investment Bank,  EAGGF) and within the context of Community  pro-
grammes; 
- It should be administered on democratic lines; 
- It could serve as a  Community extension of trade union action at nation-
al level in respect of an entire series of claims; 
- It should be the European projection of trade union efforts in every coun-
try to ensure full employment,  occupational training and retraining pol-
icies,  social  protection of the free movement of workers etc.  For this 
purpose,  provision could be made for a wide range of action by European 
trade unions; 
- The Fund should function in a practical way so as to contribute to a pro-
gressive policy in the widest variety of sectors specified. 
To this end,  the Fund must have adequate financial resources and 
its machinery would have to be overhauled.  The memorandum also envisaged 
- 82-drawing on independent Community funds on the basis of Article 201 of the 
Treaty. 
(Avanti,  3 April 1968) 
3.  The Boerenbond (Belgian Farmers Union) and the common agricul-
tural policy 
Speaking on the Dutch service of Belgian television on 12 April, 
Mr.  Boon,  President of the Boerenbond,  stated his views on the agricultural 
prices and structures policy of the European Community. 
He said that at a time when there was a growing surplus of butter, 
they found themselves confronted with a structure policy that was still lacking 
in substance; a price policy had been proposed which was designed to bring 
about a reduction in output.  This attitude was one which he found surprising. 
Price policy was required to secure incomes in the immediate and,  in the long 
term,  to give direction to production policy.  The European Commission 
recognized that this had not been achieved through price policy although it 
was proposed to reduce the price of milk; this would further aggravate the 
incomes situation.  To offset this loss reference was made to a vague struc-
ture policy which could obviously only produce results in the long term and 
then only in those regions where improvements were actually possible.  It was 
inconceivable in the society of today that incomes should be reduced by deci-
sions from on high against vague promises concerning the long term future. 
Senior officials of the European Commission had indicated unofficially what 
they thought might be the future structure of agriculture; this involvedachange 
in the traditional approach which might still be current here and there.  Yet 
these views had caused concern to the whole farming community and even 
those who had for a long time qeen working hard to make the necessary ad-
justments in their farm enterprises.  They said that the structure to be aimed 
for was a really large scale farm; if this were the case,  he said,  then all 
their efforts had been in vain because they could never individually achieve the 
size of large scale farms on their own. 
With regard to the size of farms,  Mr.  Boon did not think it was 
necessary to take as a standard those of 1, 000 to 2, 000 hectares with 400/500 
cows and run by about six workers. 
- 83-No  one could deny that it was technologically possible to achieve 
this kind of scale but business economists who had the relevant figures to 
hand knew that this sort of enterprise could contribute to the economy at 
large. It was quite wrong to argue that cheaper products would,  as a  result, 
be offered to the consumer. It was the reverse that was true because,  even 
with this scale of farm enterprise and even  when the calculations were made on a 
yield per active person basis,  this would still be well above the optimal scale 
in the economic context of today.  The optimal scale was not dependent on 
techniques but rather on what could be achieved through labour,  area and 
capital in conjunction. It was here that the farmer realized that he had to rely 
far more on machines - i.e. capital -because of the constant rise in labour 
costs.  This was a gradual process rather than one that came about in defined 
stages,  as was clear from developments in recent years. 
Gradualness was necessary for social reasons.  Until recently the 
expansion of the economy meant that manpower leaving the farms could be 
absorbed elsewhere.  At that time,  however,  industry was in full expansion. 
Now industry was faced,  not only in Belgium but all over Europe,  with an 
urgent need to redevelop and the number of jobs available had fallen sharply 
while the creation of new employment possibilities demanded increasingly 
heavy financial sacrifices. 
As he further stated to a Flemish newspaper,  Mr.  Boon felt that 
the Commission was deliberately holding up any Community solution for dairy 
produce in the hope that prices would collapse. It could then argue it was  jus-
tified in advocating a reduction in milk prices.  In his opinion,  a high guaran-
teed  price for milk might not stimulate an improvement in structures  but 
it did make it possible because it was a question of capital.  Taking a long term 
view of the position,  Mr.  Boon did not share the opinion of those who antici-
pated a continuous increase in milk production,  primarily for reasons of 
stabilization. In Belgium the number of dairy cows per farm had increased 
appreciably.  There were few farms where production was not rationalized. 
With regard to  small farms a  social policy had to be devised whereby indem-
nity allowances could be paid to those that had to close down,  as well as pecu-
niary compensation for the slaughtering of dairy cows.  This policy could be 
applied in all the Community countries,  although perhaps to a lesser extent 
in the Netherlands where the problem was not so acute. 
There was a  second reason for believing that milk production 
would not continue to increase.  Young farmers preferred activities which 
gave them more freedom than milk production,  which involved numerous 
work ties. 
- 84-In any event,  a reduction in the milk price could only induce the 
small farmer to produce more to obtain a  more or less equal income. 
(De Boer,  20 April 1968; De Standaard,  26 April 1968) 
4.  The attitude of the Austrian Federation of Industry to integration 
policy 
On 20 May 1968,  the Federation of Austrian Industrialists called 
for an interim arrangement with the Community because,  after years of effort 
in this direction,  there was practically no prospect of any special arrange-
ment being concluded between Austria and the EEC in the immediate future. 
This was more to the point because such arrangements had been 
aired between the EEC and States that had applied for full membership. Wheth-
er and to what extent there were any prospects of success in this regard was, 
of course,  not clear. As the Federation of Austrian Industrialists pointed out 
in its annual report,  however,  it would be pointless - and it would be to disre-
gard the present situation - to go ahead with interim plans if these necessi-
tated long-drawn-out negotiations.  Similarly Austria should not regard suc-
cessful negotiations in Brussels through such an interim solution as a matter 
to be taken lightly. Trade with such major industrial States of the EEC was 
important to Austria and a closer relationship could make many problems 
easier to solve but it would also raise some quite new ones.  It would there-
fore be wrong to expect that all the difficulties would automatically be over-
come through economic integration.  It was more necessary than ever for 
Austria to put its own house in order. 
The Austrian Federation of Industrialists further pointed out that a 
noteworthy structural change was being carried through in Austrian industry; 
this meant,  inter alia,  that an increasing proportion of its exports were fin-
ished goods.  The existence of a widely-diversified industry,  such as existed 
at present in Austria,  did not,  of course,  make it into an industrial State.  To 
achieve this there had to be an industrial policy and an industrial outlookamong 
the population at large. 
(Industriekurier,  21 May 1968) 
- 85 -5.  The President of Bremen's Landeszentralbank speaks on the prob-
lem of the monetary union in the European Economic Community 
On 20 May 1968,  Dr.  Leonhard Gieske,  President of Bremen's 
Landeszentralbank,  addressed a group from the German Trade and Transport 
School in Bremen and representatives of the European Union in that city on 
'Economic and monetary problems in "Little Europe" and "Large Europe".' 
He said that the transition to a monetary union in the EEC would indeed be an 
important step towards the further stabilization and advancement of the Com-
mon Market; at the same time,  greater integration in other branches of the 
economy,  particularly a budgetary policy common to all member States as 
opposed to the present amalgam of domestic and foreign policy objectives 
would call for political decisions.  Before going to Bremen,  Dr. Gieske was a 
Director for monetary and financial questions in the EEC Commission in 
Brussels and a  member of the ECSC Monetary Committee. 
.  In Dr.  Gieske'~ opinion,  the completion of a monetary union,  in 
which joint decisions would be needed for any change in parity of the member 
States' currencies in relation to each other's or those of third countries, 
would mean the Six would have to give up having independent monetary pol~ 
icies and their being subject to decisions from a Community institution.  It 
was true that the development of the Common Market had,  meanwhile, reached 
the stage where the monetary and financial independence of the member 
States was already severely restricted because of the pressure to integrate; 
but there was still a major difference between whether a State freely took 
into account the resulting implications and hence retained the possibility of 
taking its own decisions and whether it gave up any freedom of decision once 
and for all. 
'The question of monetary integration is one of those issues contin-
gent on closer political integration' he said.  It was obviously why the member 
Governments hesitated to start out towards a monetary union.  Dr.  Gieske 
thought that the material pressure of integration was still not strong enough 
to nec~ssitate a common monetary policy within the EEC.  The objections to 
a standard currency as a further impetus to integration and towards 
strengthening the Community both internally and in its external relations could 
thus only be appraised from the political standpoint.  The question of a stand-
ard or different denominations for the currency units in the individual coun-
tries after finally fixing the exchange rates was,  he felt,  still only of purely 
political and sociological significance. 
(Industriekurier,  21  May 1968) 
- 86-6.  The German Federation of Wholesale Traders and Exporters dis-
cusses EEC policy at its Annual General Meeting 
On 28  May 1968,  Mr.  Barzel,  Chairman of the CDU/CSU Majority, 
made a noteworthy proposal for increased co-operation with the East 
European countries; he was speaking in Bad Godesberg at the Annual General 
Meeting of the German Federation of Wholesale Traders and Exporters. 
'In trade with the Eastern States,  the credit of the West was subject 
to certain limitations both from our standpoint and theirs.  It should the.refore 
be considered through which European institutions this flow of goods and pay-
ments could be freed from the strict bilateralism of the past. '  Mr.  Barzel 
argued that the EEC and the other Western European countries would do well 
to discuss these problems together and to make proposals to the East 
European States.  The model that frequently suggested itself to him was the 
former European Payments Union with whose help- prior to the introduction 
of free oonvertibility of currencies - the flow of payments had been handled 
in the West. 
The widespread concern in the Federal Republic about the EEC's 
agricultural policy was discussed by Mr.  Dietz,  President of the German 
Wholesalers and Exporters.  His criticism was that it was becoming increas-
ingly obvious  that the  common European agricultural market had been very 
dearly purchased. 
Mr.  Dietz spoke with surprising frankness.  Neither had agricul-
tural surpluses been prevented nor was the Brussels agricultural policy con-
tributing to the expansion of world trade.  'We are today faced with the fact 
that the EEC agricultural policy has led us to the very dead-lock against which 
we have'always warned every one.' It could be imagined that a  stage would be 
reached when German exports were seriously threatened.  The countries  im-
porting German goods were no longer in a position to deliver their traditional 
products to the German market because they could not get them over the hurdle 
of the levies system.  With the increasingly dirigiste and protectionist dispen-
sation in the whole agricultural sector,  an outward-looking EEC policy on 
external trade would become increasingly unlikely.  The expansion of German 
exports should not blind us to the fact that the long term view is fraught with 
doubts; trading partners who can no longer supply will,  by the same token,  not 
be in a position to buy. 
It was a pity that one could not rely on the fact that the trade policy 
arguments of third countries have influenced the price policy  decisions of the 
EEC; on the contrary,  further import restrictions were now being devised in 
- 87-Brussels to widen the scope of the market regulations for processed agricul-
tural products.  The proposed market regulation for canned products seriously 
affected imports from the developing countries.  To date,  these countries had 
supplied 44  per cent of these products in the Federal Republic.  Similarly,  the 
EEC,  through its export subsidies,  was to an increasing extent becoming a 
competitor of states which were the traditional suppliers of agricultural prod-
ucts. 
Hence,  the EEC's import policy worked against the interests of the 
small and medium-sized firms because of its lack of clarity.  The large firms 
were almost the only ones able today to keep track of the machinery of con-
stantly changing and additional levies. If the idea of a liberal import policy in 
the agricultural sector were finally abandoned,  it would be in the interests of 
German exports to settle for increased imports of industrial products.  For-
eign trade was no one-way street; any regression to the profiteering of the 
nineteenth century would,  because of the large scale of its external trade, 
mean serious danger to the German economy. 
One of Mr.  Dietz's recommendations was that it should be consid-
ered whether imports of raw materials and semi-finished products could not 
receive fiscal assistance.  On  the .one hand,  people were being encouraged to 
invest in the developing countries and yet,  at the same time,  these invest-
ments were threatened by a trade policy which was hostile to imports. 
Considerable concern was being caused in German foreign trade 
circles because of the Brussels plans for creating product communities and 
common programmes and because of the intentions,  which the Bonn Coalition 
Party was following through concerning a market structure and structure 
fund law. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  22  May 1968; Die Welt,  29  May 1968; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  31  May 1968) 
7.  The Federation of Belgian Industries and the future of European 
integration 
When Mr.  Eyskens and Mr.  Merlot formed the new Government,  the 
Federation of Belgian Industries (FIB) considered it desirable,  on the eve of 
the entry into force of the Customs Union,  to draw their attention to certain 
economic and social problems to which the Federation attached special 
- 88-importance. 
The Fm drew up a memorandum in which it discussed domestic 
issues,  notably the early introduction of the added value tax,  with reference 
to which it wrote: 'Belgian industry strongly urges that the added value tax 
should come into operation soon'. 
The attitude of the Fill was outlined in 'Industry and the added-
value tax'. 
Pending the introduction of the added-value tax,  it would be desir-
able to tighten up the countervailing measures at the frontiers and to draw up 
new lists of fixed-sum export drawbacks so as to reduce fiscal handicaps from 
which Belgian industry was at present suffering because of the introduction of 
the added-value tax or because of countervailing measures taken in the other 
member States. 
With reference to European integration,  the FIB looked into the 
following points: 
I.  Customs Union 
The Customs Union will become operative on 1 July 1968; for it to 
be effective a number of common regulations will have to be taken. 
If regulations,  varying according to country,  remained in force 
concerning imports of sensitive products from third countries,  this would 
restrict the free movement of goods within the Community. 
For this reason,  too,  it would be desirable for the Council,  as soon 
as possible,  to look into the working programme submitted by the Commission 
for eliminating technical obstacles to trade. 
II.  Common agricultural policy 
The full implementation of the common agricultural policy in the 
form of market organizations is coupled with that of the industrial Customs 
Union on 1 July. 
- 89-The Belgian Government should make its approval conditional on the 
practical'application of this policy in some cases and on a respect for the es-
sential conditions for economic and financial equilibrium. 
Ill.  Economic Union 
The Economic Union is the essential complement to the Customs 
Union.  We feel bound here to stress the importance of: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
IV. 
closer co-ordination of the monetary policies of the member States; 
the earliest possible introduction in Belgium of the system of addec! 
value taxation,  system laid down by the Community in February 
1967; 
to give practical expression to the efforts to co-ordinate research 
and development,  pursuant to the decisions taken by the Council of 
Ministers in Luxembourg on 31 October 1967. 
Patent rights 
It would appear highly desirable for the Belgian Government to take 
the necessary steps,  within the framework of an active scientific research 
policy to improve the scientific and technical information systems; this, bear-
ing in mind prospects that emerged from the third ministerial Conference on 
Science which took place under the aegis of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development in March 1968. 
For this purpose,  the Six should prepare to negotiate on the condi-
tions governing the use of patents and licences which are the property of gov-
ernments,  the use of which is subject to their decision,  because the research 
is state-financed. 
The plan for international co-operation on patents,  details of which 
were outlined in a  major document drawn up by the International Patent Offices 
in connexion with the protection of patent rights,  should be actively supported 
by the Government. 
- 90-V.  Bringing the structures of enterprises into line with the Common 
Market 
The legal and fiscal obstacles to bringing the structures of enter-
prises into line with the structures of the Common Market urgently needed 
eliminating. 
At EEC level,  work should be speeded up on a convention,  pursuant 
to Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome,  for international mergers. If mergers 
and participations between enterprises in the Common Market were to be 
encouraged,  a special taxation system would appear to be essential as a first 
stage towards harmonizing direct taxation in the Community.  In addition,  a 
unilateral agreement must be reached between the member States to avoid 
double taxation. 
The EEC Commission should continue its work to achieve early 
harmonization of company law and should do  so by recourse to directives. 
Lastly,  the FIB looked for a conclusion to the studies concerning 
articles of association for 'European-type' company; this should also facili-
tate mergers. 
VI.  Co-operation between enterprises 
The FIB was concerned not only that the Belgian economy should 
swing into line with the continental market; it also attached special importance 
to co-operation agreements. 
There were two major factors which made such a  development 
possible: a concentration of enterprises or a concentration of their resources. 
Among the latter,  pride of place must be given to joint research and special-
ization and rationalization agreements. 
These problems were being given positive attention by the Commis-
sion of the European Communities,  particularly from the competition rules 
angle,  even though economic issues are involved. 
- 91-VII.  Social policy 
As Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome indicates,  the harmonization 
of social systems should come as a result of the operation of the Common 
Market before special procedures were resorted to. 
To promote this harmonization and to preclude recourse to Commu-
nity intervention,  which might be artificial and involve no more than all mem-
ber States' moving into line with the most advanced regulations,  the Belgian 
Government should see to it that social reforms were devised with an eye to 
an approximation with the corresponding regulations in other member States. 
VIII.  A geographic enlargement of the Community 
With reference to the countries which requested accession in 1967, 
the FIB could only approve the interim arrangements envisaged,  provided they 
were conducive to an increasingly close union culminating in economic inte-
gration. 
(Bulletin de la Federation des Industries belges,  No.  17 of 10 July 1968) 
- 92-AT  THE  COMMUNITY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LEVEL 
I.  COMMUNITY'S  EXECUTIVE 
1.  Mr.  Jean Rey on the clash of views among Europeans 
On 25  April Mr.  Jean Rey,  President of the Commission of the 
European Communities,  stated in Paris,  at the congress of the European 
Centre of Public Undertakings,  that it was for the present generation,  not the 
next,  to construct the European edifice. 
The European Executive could be expected one day to assume a dif-
ferent political complexion; the European Parliament,  today appointed,  would 
then be elected and the Executive would be answerable to it. 
Mr.  Rey was surprised at the objections being put up to enlarging 
the Community since the member governments had unanimously accepted 
the need in 1961.  Since then Britain had moved much closer to the Commu-
nities,  which were much stronger than in 1963 at the time the first negotia-
tions between the Community and Great Britain were suspended. 
This was the fourth disagreement splitting the Community.  The first 
had occurred in 1954 with the rejection of the European Defence Community; 
the second in 1963 with the breakdown of the negotiations between the Commu-
nity and Great Britain; the third,  in 1965,  had been caused by the crisis over 
the powers of the Commission and Parliament.  Today the Community was 
faced with a fourth disagreement but it would surmount it as it had done the 
three earlier ones. 
(Combat,  25  April 1968; Le Monde,  26 April 1968) 
- 93  -2,  Mr.  Mansholt suggests greatly increased expenditure on modern-
izing the agriculture of the Six 
In an interview given to 'Jeunes Agriculteurs ',  the farming journal, 
Mr.  Sicco Mansholt,  Vice-President of the Commission of the European 
Communities,  explained why he had courted unpopularity by advocating the 
introduction of curbs on milk production at the beginning of March. 
He wanted to see a measure of balance established between produc-
tion and available outlets.  No  answer had yet been found.  That was why the 
milk price had been restricted to 38  Pfennigs.  Even at that price it  was expect-
ed that there would be annual surpluses of 80, 000 tons of butter,  which would 
go up by_40, 000 tons a year.  He could not see how such quantities could be 
disposed of. 
It might of course be said, ·as had been said in the European 
Parliament,  that the price of milk ought not to be reduced.  But no solution 
was offered.  Mr.  Mans  holt feared that if minor steps were not immediately 
taken (and to refrain from increasing the milk price was in itself a minor 
step),  there would be enormous waste in the next two or three years.  This 
would mean limiting the support of agriculture.  There would have to be a 
ceiling such as already existed for the Guidance Section of the EAGGF.  That 
was what Mr.  Mansholt feared. 
His measures were not popular.  But sometimes it was necessary 
to do what was unpopular. 
A tax on margarine might be suggested.  But such a tax,  high though 
it might be,  would not solve the problem of milk surpluses.  Moreover,  the 
consumer would not accept it.  What,  then,  was the answer? Mr.  Mansholt 
could not yet think of one.  No  doubt it would lie in improving structures,  in 
effecting a radical change in the pattern of agricultural production.  Work had 
been going on for years on this question.  The Commission would make pro-
posals in this connexion,  as promised to the Council of Ministers. 
These proposals would be aimed at the situation of farmers around 
1990,  that is,  in a society quite different from ours. When Mr.  Mansholt had 
spoken of them in public,  he had been greeted with: 'But this is revolutionary'. 
To which he had replied that it was the only way to ensure,  in the future,  a 
heal  thy agriculture and happy farmers.  Unless production and marketing struc-
tures were radically altered,  the problem would never be  solved. 
- 94-Mr.  Mansholt wanted farmers to enjoy not only a financial  and 
material living standard comparable to that of other workers,  but also,  at 
social level,  an equivalent way of life.  Why should not farmers take holidays? 
Why should those who look ~fter pigs and cows have to work seven days  out 
of seven? At the moment,  farmers had no chance of living as others did.  They 
worked more and gained less,  and even then with no security. And it was the 
small farmers who were the worst off and found themselves at the greatest 
social disadvantage. It was this that had to be changed. 
Immense financial efforts would be required of the Community mem-
ber States and the entire European population.  The necessary structur:;tl  re-
forms would call for sums five,  even ten,  times greater than at present dis-
bursed. And agricultural workers would have to be faced with these measures. 
But,  as these would be so costly,  some caution would be necessary; it  would 
be necessary to bring home to them,  at the time the price of milk or butter is 
fixed,  that it was desired to solve the problem. 
This meant cutting down support for the markets,  but presenting 
the bill in the structural sphere.  Evidence must be put forward of a desire to 
limit the guarantee funds of the EAGGF,  but the Commission might still pro-
pose an orientation fund ten times greater than that which at present exists. 
(Jeunes Agriculteurs,  April 1968) 
3.  The Community's position at the eve of July 1,  as reflected in an 
interview with Mr. Barre, Vice-President of the European Com-
munity Executive 
Mr.  Raymond Barre, Vice-President of the European Community 
Executive was interviewed by the 'Corriere della Sera' on some of the prob-
lems with which the Common Market was faced following recent events in 
France and the first of July date Limit for the customs union. 
In answer to the question whether the Common Market was endan-
gered by the situation in France,  Mr. Barre said that it was too early to make 
any forecast: 'At any rate it is important for all the countries of Europe,  even 
when faced with serious difficulties,  not to renounce a policy which for the 
past ten years has made it possible to liberalize intra-Community trade as 
well as international trade and has contributed to the expansion of commerce. 
- 95-Protectionism remains,  of all the possible remedies,  the most dangerous one 
for the countries of Europe.' 
Turning next to the problems that would be raised by the 1 July 
deadline,  Mr. Barre pointed out that if the elimination of customs dues were 
restricted to the six member countries there would be no undue difficulties. 
In fact what now remained to be removed was the 15  per cent initial customs 
duty which had been in force in 1957 i.e. before the Rome Treaty came into 
being.  The real problem was that of lowering the Community's external tariff, 
which derived from commitments under the Kennedy Round.  Two Community 
countries,  France and Italy,  would have to make an additional effort because 
they have the highest tariffs to start with.  'From the first of July next',  Mr. 
Barre pointed out,  'European enterprises will be confronted with international 
competition from industrialized countries and from those developing countries 
that are now exporting at competitive conditions for very much lower produc-
tion costs than ours,  lower wages and a fairly good technological standard.  To 
meet the challenge of international competition,  European industry must spe-
cialize in those sectors where it enjoys the most favourable position,  that is 
to say,  in industrial activities which presuppose large capital,  sophisticated 
technology and considerable industrial management capacity.  It is in activities 
of that sort that the countries of the Common Market can compete with outside 
markets and meet increasingly keener competition. ' 
Referring in particular to the Italian economy,  Mr. Barre observed 
that Italy had prepared itself for foreign competition in a selected number of 
sectors in which it had concentrated investment and research.  Italian indus-
trial development had not taken place in width but in depth.  The most typical 
example is that of Italy's domestic appliances industry,  as well as its engi-
neering and electrical industries. 
Italy had derived the benefits of extensive post-war industrialization, 
that is at a time when the greatest technological strides were made.  On  the 
whole,  Italy's industrial policy had proved both efficient and bold. 
(Corriere della Sera,  6 June 1968) 
4.  EEC's financial and monetary problems seen by Mr. Barre and 
Mr.  Coppe. 
In an address delivered in New York in June 1968  Mr.  Raymond 
Barre, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities, 
- 96-stated that the events that would take place in Great Britain and in the United 
States in the coming months would be of crucial importance for international 
monetary stability. 
Even after sterling devaluation England's monetary situation re-
mained precarious.  Since the beginning of 1968  the Commission had under-
lined the gravity of the problem of sterling balances and advocated its speed-
iest possible international solution. 
As to the dollar,  Mr.  Barre said that the stringent Federal Reserve 
monetary policy had been welcomed in Europe,  but that the crucial factor for 
restoring confidence would be the adoption by the Federal Government of ap-
propriate tax and budget measures.  Europeans could not understand why the 
United States had still not taken steps to settle its balance of payments prob-
lem. While they were aware of the political difficulties,  they felt that after 
the recent crisis any further delay would be extremely dangerous. 
As regards France's economic situation,  Mr.  Barre saw little 
reason to take a gloomy view.  The economic and financial cost of current 
events in France was high.  But while it was only to be expected that the com-
petitiveness of the French economy would suffer,  a number of favourable fac-
tors suggested that the economy would be able to absorb the effects of the 
higher production costs and finance the probable balance of payments deficits 
out of the considerable monetary reserves. 
As to the rumours of a  devaluation of the franc,  Mr. Barre  re-
garded such a step as absurd in the present situation. Devaluation on the 
heels of a general rise in wages was difficult to entertain for political reasons. 
It would also be bad economics to fix a new parity for the franc without know-
ing the likely future pattern of wages and prices not only in France but also in 
the other industrial countries.  In the longer term,  the problem of the franc 
could not be dissociated from that of the entire international monetary system. 
Mr.  Barre went on to point out that although the main responsibility 
for improving the international monetary situation lay with the US,  the coun-
tries of the European Economic Community had helped to steady the position 
by making a substantial commercial,  economic and financial contribution, 
thus showing the value they attached to international co-operation.  Under-
lining the importance of the Community's offer to speed up the Kennedy Round, 
he said that everyone in the Community was convinced that further protec-
tionist legislation by the USA  would lead to retaliatory measures by many 
other countries,  particularly coming as they would from the most powerful 
economy in the world.  With a view to combating all protectionist forces and 
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had made a political gesture to the United States,  despite the sacrifices which 
new concessions would entail for some Community countries,  in particular 
France and Italy.  Mr. Barre insisted that it was not easy to alter the condi-
tions of the Kennedy Round without arousing strong reactions from European 
industries,  particularly when the American Selling Price - a symbol,  as it 
were,  of American protectionism - was strongly and .successfully defended in 
the US,  and when the introduction of new protectionist measures was being 
considered there.  He  hoped that the United States would see its way to accept-
ing the offer to accelerate the Kennedy Round. 
A round table was organized in Bogota in April 1968  by the Inter-
American Development Bank and Mr.  Coppe,  a member of the European Com-
mission discussed some of the problems of the Community's financial policy. 
Referring to foreign and notably American investments in Western 
Europe,  Mr.  Coppe stated: 'With the growth of our Customs Union there has 
been a concomitant and considerable increase in foreign investment; this has 
occasioned some concern. People have been surprised by the unexpectedly 
large scale of these investments which have raised issues affecting our eco-
nomic independence and the European way of life.  Without wishing to dispute 
that this concern is justified,  I think that the solution to these problems should 
be within the grasp of a stronger community.  For this should enable us to find 
our own sources of capital,  taking over from outside sources as they dry up. 
As regards respect for the European way of life I am deeply convinced that it 
should not make us reject what technology can do for us. It should rather en-
courage us to rethink our traditional system of values so that we  may,  once 
again in our history,  achieve a synthesis between man and technology.  This 
is the true meaning of the American challenge.' 
Mr.  Coppe discussed the experience gained by the European Coal 
and Steel Community in the field of investments:  ''To  begin  with we were 
obliged to devise methods and find means of achieving a common financial 
policy, The High Authority was able to harmonize the investments made be-
tween competing ECSC enterprises by means of its provisional estimates con-
cerning investment capabilities and possibilities.  Such a  method could also be 
applied outside the strict limits of the coal and steel sector. ' 
(L'Echo de laBourse, 14  June 1968; La Libre Belgique,  26 April 1968; 
De Standaard,  27/28 April 1968) 
- 98  -5.  Statement on European policy by Mr.  von der Groeben 
A growing apathy about Europe now prevalent in the member States 
could only be overcome,  M·r.  von der Groeben felt,  by a new thrust forward 
and this meant re-defining the economic and political aims of European in-
tegration.  Mr.  von der Groeben was speaking at the Munich Export Club on 
24  June.  The answers of the nation States to the political and economic changes 
that had occurred since 1958  - and there had been particularly pronounced 
changes in recent months -had fallen short of the mark and had,  frankly, 
been lacking in credibility. 
The whole of Europe must find an answer to the new situation that 
had come into being.  The EEC today involved not only the everyday economic 
and technical issues but also the basic issues of European company law which 
could not be satisfactorily discussed and solved in the nation State context. 
There were certain points that should be raised at the Community level: 
(a)  the distribution of income; 
(b)  the formation of capital; 
(c)  joint decision-taking; 
(d)  the law on the constitution of businesses; 
(e)  capital structures; 
(f)  the mobilization of capital reserves now lying fallow. 
Even deliberations on reforms to the national constitution should 
not overlook the European involvement out of account and should preserve a 
measure of consistency with a democratic and federal community constitution. 
Europe, which also appealed to the younger generation as a poli-
tical objective,  could only be achieved provided that we did not stop at the 
Customs Union now operating.  The reality of the Common Market,  stripped of 
frontier controls or formalities,  was still not clearly in sight and,  indeed it 
had to expand into the Economic Union,  with its common currency,  common 
economic and social policies,  common trade policy and its common policy on 
development assistance. A full-scale political union was also part of the Eco-
nomic Union,  with democratic institutions,  a common foreign policy,  a com-
mon defence and common science and education policies.  The Common Mar-
ket,  with its fully developed economic potential,  gave a basic guarantee for 
European security and hence for a solution to the German problem. 
(lndustriekurier,  25  June 1968) 
- 99-6.  Mr.  Coppe calls for a summit meeting of  the  Six 
In an interview given to a Belgian journal,  Mr.  Coppe,  member of 
the Commission of the European Communities,  outlined the position of eco-
nomic and political integration at 1 July 1968. 
It would - he said - be an over-simplification to think that the mem-
ber States had so far not engaged in politics but had merely been content to 
lower customs tariffs.  This was why 1 July 1968  was at once a goal reached 
and a stage.  During the last ten years the Community had kept to,  and even 
brought forward,  the timetable for tariff cuts. At the same time it had tried 
to prepare the ground for the ensuing stage by searching for common policies. 
Today no one attempted to gloss over the accumulated backlog. 
While,  in a broad sense,  the Six had an agricultural policy (and certain points 
were still in dispute) they had not made any noticeable progress in the social 
and transport sectors. 
The most urgent need was undoubtedly a  monetary policy.  The core 
of the problem lay in the increasing dearth of means of payment which were 
falling further and further below the level of international trade. At the same 
time,  the EEC remained the largest trading bloc in the world.  Two approach-
es were possible.  France was for increasing the gold price. Although this 
would increase the volume of currency in circulation,  it would reduce its 
value.  On the other hand the European Commission- and particularly its 
Vice-President,  Mr.  Barre,  a Frenchman -wanted to increase liquidity by 
creating a single currency (a project which had also been put forward by 
Luxembourg).  The two proposals clashed but,  in any case,  whether or not a 
general devaluation of currency was carried out,  solidarity in the monetary 
field demanded a more stable solution than the emergency measures taken, 
for example,  to help Great Britain each time its creditors drained its banks 
of sterling. 
Turning to the decision-making procedure of the Communities,  Mr. 
Coppe said that the principle of unanimity belonged to cartel practice.  This 
method of voting had produced but mediocre results. 
Technological policy was hopelessly bogged down because member 
States,  instead of freely pooling their resources,  only extended a hand to take 
with the other,  following a barren policy of 'a fair return'.  The Community, 
though now spending as much on nuclear energy as the USA,  was achieving 
only a tenth of the results (Euratom's setback had been a case in point). It 
- 100-would be impossible to get out of the rut by means of the methods so far ap-
plied,  i.e. agreements between governments (witness the setbacks suffered 
by European space technology in ELDO and ESRO)  or Community decisions 
which,  because they have to be unanimous,  slow down the convoy to the speed 
of the slowest truck. 
The blocking of British entry also showed that unanimity not having 
been reached on this point,  the problem threatened to fester and harm not only 
the British but,  in the long run,  the Six themselves. 
The way a  Community took decisions served as a  touchstone.  Una-
nimity was usually reached only by eliminating the snags attaching to a deci-
sion and leaving them to be borne by third parties.  The recent Community 
sugar agreements had,  for example,  merely resulted in the Community's ex-
panding its production and exports at the expense of developing countries that 
produced that commodity. 
On the other hand,  the majority rule,  which ought already to have 
won the day,  whatever the percentage of votes required,  forced the parties to 
make concessions and joint sacrifices in order to arrive at decisions fair to 
all. 
Mr.  Coppe then replied to a question concerning the problems of 
students and other young people in whose eyes the Community institutions 
appeared to be an integral part of the consumer society they so violently re-
jected. 
The university had - said Mr.  Coppe - remained an aristocratic 
institution,  as it had been before 1789.  Students had been sent there in their 
thousands without giving a thought to the need for adjustments,  let alone for 
far-reaching reforms.  The statistics spoke for themselves: the numbers at-
tending university and si-rni.lar  establishments had increased between 1961-62 
and 1966-67 as follows:  Belgium 53%,  Germany 21. 3%,  France 121%,  Italy 
48%,  Luxembourg (which sent its students to foreign universities) 145%, 
Netherlands 64. 5%.  The increase for the EEC as a whole had been 70. 67%  in 
five years. 
It was said that young persons had not grasped the true nature of 
Europe and the political idea underlying it.  But the older generation too had 
sinned with its jubilant cries of 'victory!' when,  for example,  the guaranteed 
price of pork to producers was raised. 
- 101-Europe offered to young people its outward-looking spirit.  The free 
movement of consumer goods or capital would be a mockery unless it was 
accompanied by the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
among them students and members of the teaching profession.  This was the 
very pith of an education policy programme,  the main feature of which was the 
equivalence of degrees  and diplomas.  Europe could offer its young people 
immense openings,  and these would have to be systematically planned. 
As the Community had been designed as an open-ended affair by its 
founders,  the Europe of the Six carried special responsibilities towards the 
developing countries,  particularly those that had entered into association. 
These countries lacked teachers,  doctors,  farming experts and engineers of 
all kinds.  Two or three years spent abroad,  in lieu of military service,  pro-
vided useful experience and enabled the most to be made of a degree.  Special 
measures would have to be taken to ensure the young persons concerned se-
cured employment on their return. 
The political aspect of development aid took two forms: bilateral 
relations and multilateral relations.  The first had had a bad press,  it having 
been alleged,  rightly or wrongly,  that they were tainted with neo-colonialism. 
A wonderful opportunity presented itself for the Community to 'europeanize' 
its relations with the developing countries. 
Finally,  Mr.  Coppe said that 1 July 1968 could prove to be an ideal 
moment for a general high-level reappraisal of the situation by members of 
the Community.  A summit meeting,  at which the chances of real unification 
would be discussed,  was essential if Europe was to meet all the existing 
challenges,  whether from the United States,  the Soviet Union or the have-nots. 
(Le Soir,  28  June 1968) 
- 102-II.  MOVEMENTS,  ORGANIZATIONS  AND  PROMINENT  FIGURES 
1.  The ninth Franco-German Conference in Bad Godesberg 
The ninth Franco-German Conference took place in Bad Godesberg 
from 22  to 24  March 1968; it was attended by parliamentarians, representa-
tives of the European Movement, professors and journalists; the subject under 
discussion was  'The future of Europe seen in relation to developments in the 
East and the West' • 
Nearly four years had elapsed between the eighth and the ninth of 
these conferences which shows that relations between France and Germany 
since the signing of the Treaty had not been entirely free from strains. 
In 1968 the Franco-German Conference considered that close and 
friendly co-operation between the two countries went without saying and that 
it could not be called into  question by any fundamental disagreement on mat-
ters of principle.  With similar unanimity, those taking part emphasized the 
need for European co-operation even though there might still be conflict on 
points of form and phasing. 
This confident statement should not, however, blind one to the fact 
that there were one or two weak points in the Bad Godesberg meeting and in 
Franco-German relations.  The French delegation was unfortunately not very 
representative; the Federation of the Left was not present.  The two former 
Socialist Ministers,  Mr.  Jules Moch and Mr.  Alain Savary  spoke  only in 
their own names and not as representatives of France's opposition of the Left. 
Even Mr.  Lecanuet and Mr.  Duhamel of France's opposition of the Centre did 
not appear to be convinced of the priority of Franco-German discussions at 
this juncture. 
Even in the Gaullist delegation there were no really authorized 
spokesmen.  Mr.  Terrenoire, a former Minister, had a rather devious speech 
.read for him in his absence.  A second former Minister,  Mr.  Habib Deloncle, 
who is responsible, within the party organization, for looking after European 
relations, also failed to attend the Conference.  There is no doubt that Mr. Leo 
Hamon expressed the Gaullist views with great perseverance, intelligence, 
skill and tactfulness but, because of his leaning to the left, he found himself 
in a difficult position and he did depart quite appreciably from the line of his 
Government on one or two important points,  such as East European policy. 
- 103  -The major coalition of the Federal Republic presented a united 
front even though it may have evinced certain tensions elsewhere. 
With certain reservations, its spokesman said that Parliament and 
public opinion were far more in disagreement about French policy than the 
CDU/SPD Government which was ready for reasonable compromises. 
Dr. Karl Mommer, Vice-President of the Bundestag, was the most 
forthright spokesman of the German delegation; whilst generally praising 
Franco-German friendship, he,  none the less, summed up the Conference as 
follows  : there were, between German and French policies, more points of 
disagreement than of agreement.  This drawback should in reality be ignored 
to some extent. If he were right, then Franco-German friendship had no solid 
foundation. If  however one examined things more closely, one would find that 
there was agreement over the major issues of the future such as the policy 
vis-d-vis Eastern Europe, trends in European development,  relations with 
the United States (bearing in mind its attempts to achieve a  rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union); current problems, however,  stemmed from friction 
and disagreements on routine points in Brussels, on German' support for the 
United States and on Britain's accession to the Common Market. 
It would of course be too easy to explain the present strains as 
being due simply to various tactical considerations or simply to the indepen-
dent line taken by de Gaulle.  Yet what lay behind it was a difference of 
approach which was, to some extent, due to the bonds of the past. 
Franco-German friendly relations were and remained the heart and 
the abiding crux of a new organization of the European continent.  Mr.  Karl 
Ackermann, Social Democrat member of the Bundestag,  said in his opening 
speech that the text of the Franco-German Treaty compelled a  continuous ap-
proximation of the aims of both States.  Both sides had more earnestly than 
ever before to learn to accept the basis of common political realities if they 
were to avoid a paralysis of their relations and if they wished to contribute 
towards a  growing understanding of all that they had in cortlmon. 
The aim of Germany's policy on Europe was to maintain, consoli-
date and enlarge the EEC.  Here,  a free trade area between the EEC and the 
four applicant States was essential.  At the end of any transitional phase, the 
applicants had to become members with full rights and obligations.  He conced-
ed that th,e procedure concerning the application question involved serious 
differences between Germany and France. 
- 104 -German sympathy for France's reservations about enlarging the 
Community would be greater if France had not opposed the complete implemen-
tation of the Rome Treaties. In this connexion he advocated an enlargement 
of the powers of the Europ~an Parliament and the direct election of its mem-
bers. An enlargement of the European Community to embrace common econo-
mic, trade, taxation, transport, defence and foreign policies was also neces-
sary. 
(Europ~ische Gemeinschaft, 4/1968; 
lnformationen der Sozialdemokratischen Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 
Wochenbericht 12/68, 29 March 1968) 
2.  Conference in Milan on Energy Sources in the EEC 
The Italian Society for International Organization held a seminar in 
Milan on European Community studies. 
Professor Giulio Cesoni, who is responsible for the 'G.  Agnelli' 
nuclear engineering course at the Turin Polytechnic, addressed the conference 
on 'the execution of the European Community programme for raw materials 
and energy sources  1• 
He pointed out that the 461 million coal equivalent tons of 1960 had 
in 197 5 to become 84 8 million. In other words, the total energy consumption 
of the EEC would double in a period of 15 years. Community reserves of 
energy represented from 5 to 6 per cent of the world total whereas EEC con-
sumption was equal to 10 per cent of this same total.  Hence the Community 
was to a large extent dependent on outside sources for its energy supplies. 
In 1965, Communlty energy production represented 52.9 per cent 
of total consumption; the remaining 4 7. 1 per cent was imported.  Despite the 
flow of nuclear energy, imports would represent nearly two thirds of the 
complete supplies in 1975. 
With regard to supplies of nuclear raw materials, practical expe-
rience had shown a marked trend towards the use of enriched uranium reac-
tors.  Hence, serious consideration had been given to the plan for a European 
enrichment  plant which would make the Europe of  the Six independent of the USA, 
the UK and the USSR.Such a plant  would cost Europe not less than 500, OOOm.lire. 
- 105  -Professor Cesoni concluded by recalling the immediate objectives 
of the common energy policy which were : 
(a)  increasing the security of the Community hydro-carbon supplies; 
(b)  strengthening the competitive position of Community enterprises to 
enable them to meet the challenge of the major international oil com-
panies; 
(c)  ensuring that a certain level of raw materials and energy continued to 
be produced in the Community. 
(ll Sole,  24  Ore,  4 April 1968) 
3.  Conclusions reached by the European Teachers' Association 
(A. E. D. E.) 
Following the fourth congress of the A. E. D. E.  (European Teachers' 
Association),  its President,  Mr.  Alers,  answered a number of questions put 
to him by the press. 
The Association had been set up in view of the setbacks and delays 
suffered by European unification.  It had been felt desirable to form a direct 
body of opinion by bringing together champions of Community Europe who 
were members of the teaching profession.  The A. E. D. E.  worked in co-opera-
tion with government and inter-governmental bodies and private associations. 
It received substantial moral and material backing from the Ministry of Na-
tional Education, the Ministry for Cultural Affairs and the Federation  for Free 
Educatimi. 
Mr. Alers told the press that work was in hand to bring study sylla-
buses into line so as to prepare the ground for the equivalence of degrees and 
diplomas. As regards history, no work existed which,  without neglecting na-
tional history, had been planned on a  European scale so as to present a pic-
ture of a civilization on the march to which wars were accidents encountered 
en route. In the literary sphere, a series of works would shortly come out 
showing that trends had existed at different periods of European history to-
wards unification. 
- 106-Mr.  Alers went on to summarize the conclusions reached by the 
congress. It had succeeded in drawing up a  European Charter for Education. 
This catalogued a number of joint achievements and indicated the requirements 
to be satisfied by the school of the future against a  European setting display-
ing two main features : (i)  the emphasis placed on the social aspect (group 
work instead of individual effort) and (ii) the balance established between 
technological progress and the preservation of humanist values.  The Associa-
tion also urged that a  European science institute be set up to co-ordinate re-
search carried out in this field by the various countries. It hoped to stimulate 
European civic consciousness by bringing together young people of various 
nationalities to discuss various aspects of the European movement and the at-
tendant obligations. It wanted to avoid the growth of European nationalism 
and was trying to interest young people in the problems of other continents, 
particularly those of the developing countries. 
(Le Soir, 13 April 1968) 
4.  Conference of the Club  'Europe 2000'  on Britain's entry into the 
Common Market 
On 24 April 1968 the Club 'Europe 2000', in conjunction with the 
European Federalist Movement and the France-Great Britain Association, 
organized a  conference on 'Britain's entry into the Common Market'.  The 
opening address was delivered in French by Mr.  Robert MacLennan,  Labour 
M.P. for Caithness and Sutherland.  For Mr  •. MacLennan it is not so much 
Britain's geographical position as historical events that have delayed its con-
version to the European concept.  Now,  however,  Britain is firmly resolved 
to join the EEC as a full member; 'The snub we have suffered from the Pre-
sident of the French Republic has not changed in the least the determination 
of the British people. ' 
The speaker then stressed the efforts made by the various Govern-
ments for closer ties with the Community.  He dwelt on the measures taken by 
Mr.  Wilson's Government to restore Britain's economic and financial situation. 
He pointed out that Britain's economy and industry were very much stronger 
than people generally assumed.  Mr.  MacLennan added : 'The Government and 
the people of Britain are deeply convinced that our country could give the Com-
munity fresh impetus towards unity and a new commercial and industrial 
. strength. ' Referring to the need for technical co-operation between the coun-
tries of Europe, the British MP made it clear that Britain's motives were 
primarily political : Britain wanted to enable Europe to play its full part in 
- 107-the world.  The speaker optimistically concluded : 'The day is not far off when 
Britain will be a member of the EEC.' 
(Dernieres Nouvelles d'Alsace,  26 April 1968) 
5.  European scientific research discussed at the 21st Economic Con-
gress of the Benelux countries 
Science policy was the main theme of the Benelux Economic Con-
gress which was held in Amsterdam on .26  April.  The opening addresses were 
delivered by Professor B~ttcher, Chairman of the Dutch  Science Policy 
Council,  and Mr.  Theo Lef~vre, Belgian Minister of State.  Professor 
B~ttcher thought that European integration had to solve the problems deriving 
from the fact that the member States had structures ,  institutions and internal 
organizations which were still not properly adjusted to the radically changed 
situation resulting from the rapid advances in the natural sciences and tech-
nology and the massive science-based industrializa.tion.  Even ~fter this kind 
of adjustment has been achieved the countries of Europe will still have to go 
on co-operating with each other. In the world today there were more than 
three million people engaged in research and in the development work stem-
ming from it.  The social application of the results of this research represent-
ed a tremendous challenge to mankind.  At the same time, however, there 
were more difficult problems than ever to be faced : the greatest being the 
rapid increase in the world population in relation to the attainable increase in 
foodstuffs production over the next twenty years.  World-wide co-operation 
and, above all, European co-operation in systematically harnessing the con-
tinuous flow of research results was becoming increasingly urgent. 
All these problems made it necessary for the Benelux countries to con-
tinue to work together towards European integration.  Regular consultations 
concetning the attitude of the Benelux countries to the whole range of science 
policy problems, at both national and international levels, were also desirable. 
After Professor BOttcher's outline of scientific research in the Nether  lands, 
Mr.  Theo Lef~vre discussed science policy in Belgium.  He advocated a fur-
ther democratization of the university system through a larger-scale award 
of scholarships. 
- 108  -He also advocated a new approach to European co-operation in re-
search.  Too little had so far been done in connexion with nuclear power and 
space research in Europe.  There was a lack of political perseverance and no 
programme for making common industrial use of the results achieved.  The 
major States wished to keep economic advantages gained from common re-
search to themselves.  In other words, there was co-operation in the field 
of research but not in the industrial applications of research.  Mr.  Lef~vre 
concluded by saying that in this way Europe would never be able to meet the 
American challenge. 
(Handels Transport Courant,  27  and 29 April 1968) 
6.  The Young European Federalists hold their Eighteenth Congress in 
Bad Godes  berg 
The Young European Federalists held their 18th Congress in Bad 
Godesberg on 28 April 1968.  About a hundred members were present.  The 
Young Federalists are the junior branch of Germany's European Union.  The 
subject under discussion was 'The future of the European Communities'. 
Dr.  Hans von der Groeben, a member of the European Commission, 
warned against what he called 'a growing irritability about integration'.  He 
said that now was the time to devise new ideas for the unity of Europe instead 
of simply formally fulfilling the existing Treaties.  He criticized the program-
me of the CDU and the SPD.  Their advance financial planning on discussions 
on co-management in business left the impression that a Community Europe 
was 'no longer a point for discussion'.  He  came out strongly in favour of the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC.  For the United Kingdom this 
step was 'almost vital'. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  27 April 1968) 
(Die Welt,  29 April 1968) 
7.  Conference of European Parliamentarians in Bonn 
A conference was held in the Bundeshaus in Bonn on 3 and 4 May 
1968; 80  parliamentarians from the Six, the United Kingdom,  Ireland, 
- 109  -Denmark,  Norway, Sweden and Austria were present} the subject was 'To-
wards a greater Europe'; the discussion turned on what steps to enlarge the 
Community could be taken simultaneously in the individual countries.  The 
conference was held at the invitation of the German Council of the European 
Movement and individual-working parties discussed 1 Economics,  monetary 
matters and technology' and 1 Foreign policy and defence'.  Speakers included: 
Mr.  Brandt, German Foreign Minister,  Lord Chalfont, British Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Professor Walter Hallstein,  Mr.  Gaston Defferre, 
the French Socialist leader and Mr. Theo Lefevre, former Belgian Prime 
Minister.  Mr.  Duncan Sandys from the U. K.  ,  Mr.  Olin from Sweden,  and 
Mr.  Pittermann were present, as were Mr.  Jahn and Mr.  Lahr, German 
Secretaries of State and the Ambassadors of all those countries taking part. 
In his capacity as president Mr.  Ernst Majonica,  M.P., opened the 
conference by proposing that it should assume the form of an institution. It 
should meet at regular intervals and a least once a year; it should have a 
liaison bureau to co-ordinate parliamentary initiatives.  'If the work we do 
here is worthwhile, then the greater Europe will become a reality at the par-
liamentary level even before governments sign treaties  to this effect. ' 
He described the meeting as a'  Conference of dissatisfaction' at the 
present state of European development. It was not directed against anyone and 
it was pursuing a positive objective: the greater Europe.  The alternative to 
the greater Europe was its final exit from the world political stage.  He de-
plored the 'return to nationalism' in Europe, which had led to greater powers 
for the Council of Ministers in Brussels and to correspondingly lesser powers 
for the European Commission. 
He referred to the European action of the German Bundestag; more 
than 320 of its members had endorsed a declaration urging the Federal Govern-
ment to take new European initiatives.  'The largest coalition in the Bundestag 
is the European one' he said. 
Speaking in Bonn on 3 May,  Lord Chalfont,  British Minister for 
European Affairs, said that the United Kingdom was ready at once to take 
part in a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four appli-
cant States.  Speaking for his Government, he repeated Britain's resolve to 
enter into the EEC as a full member and to take part in creating a  European 
political union. 
'Our application for membership is still on the table and our word 
remains good' he said.  The United Kingdom not only wanted economic integra-
tion but also political integration and was determined to play its part in part-
- 110-nership with the countries of continental Europe.  He  gave an assurance that 
Britain desired no hegemony in Europe.  The idea of a hegemony being wielded 
in Europe was alien to the British mind, he said.  British public opinion did 
not expect Britain to take '.the' leading r~le but only 'a' leading rOle in the 
Common Market.  The United Kingdom could best play its part in the world 
from within a United Europe. 
Lord Chalfont also took up the idea mentioned in a resolution that 
there should be a summit conference of the Heads of Government of the ten 
countries.  He thought however that this step should not be taken precipitately. 
He expressed the British Government's satisfaction at this joint conference 
of parliamentarians of the Six  and the applicant States, their first meeting 
since the French veto on Britain's entry. 
With references to the compromise proposals put forward by the 
Benelux countries, Italy and the Federal Republic, he said that Britain would 
examine these proposals to see how far they might take  his country towards 
full  membership of the Community. It was quite wrong to argue that Britain 
wanted all or nothing. It  would be paradoxical if those who at one time were 
asking Britain to assume the obligations of full membership were now to ask 
his country to accept less. Partial solutions that did not clearly lead to mem-
bership would lead to  deadlock.  Any interim proposal from the Community 
had to fulfil one condition i. e.  it had to lead to the objective we had all set 
ourselves : a united, democratic,  economically sound Europe. 
Lord Chalfont said that  his country was ready to take part in close 
political consultations with the Six on foreign policy and to  participate in a 
'European programme' for economic and technological co-operation.  He pro-
posed that there should be co-operation in the fields of nuclear energy, aero-
nautical engineering and the manufacture of computers in Europe.  He repeat-
ed Mr. Wilson's proposal for setting up a  European Technological Centre. 
Britain was ready to take part in a  joint action in this key area, he said. It 
was now up to the European countries to say whether they wished to pursue 
this course with Britain. 
Extending the welcome of the Federal Government Mr.  Gerhard 
Jahn, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that his Government heart-
ily endorsed the idea of a greater Europe. Achieving it, however, depended 
not only on the governments but also on parliamentarians, who were expected 
to help in overcoming the difficulties. 
Mr.  Walter Hallstein,  President of the European Movement,  said 
in his analysis of the state of Europe 'If we fail to incorporate the positive 
- 111-national values in our large  -area arrangements ,  then we shall fail'.  He warn-
ed against alternative solutions and against establishing the wrong time sched-
ules.  It would be wrong to say; either a West or an East policy or first reuni-
fication and then an easing of tension or either the small Europe or the large 
Europe. 
The former President of the EEC Commission said it was a mistake 
to say that the USA  no longer had any interests in Europe.  The concept of an 
Atlantic partnership still had political currency in the United States.  The 
defence policy had not been abandoned; it had,  on the contrary, been enlarged 
with a policy for easing tension which was directed at securing peace structur-
ally.  He  emphasized that without a  European defence, there could be no suc-
cessful policy vis-:1-vis the East European countries. 
European integration had greatly impressed the young technocrats 
in East Europe. A move towards democratization was in progress there.  The 
West had to reflect on the consequences that might follow from this develop-
ment. 
Mr.  Willy Brandt, German Foreign Minister, said he agreed with 
the idea of a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Six and of the four 
applicant States. At the close of the conference he said that the Six had first 
to agree on the content of a trade policy arrangement and on technological 
co-operation with the United Kingdom.  The day before Lord Chalfont had 
advocated a  conference of the ten foreign ministers. 
In a seven-point programme, to release European policy from the 
deadlock which had obtained since France vetoed negotiations with Britain, 
the European parliamentarians also advocated a  conference of the ten foreign 
ministers.  The programme was to  be submitted to all the Governments, 
Parliaments and political groupings of the ten European countries taking part. 
Similarly, the neutral States which were interested in Association would 
receive the Bonn programme. 
It emerged from Mr.  Brandt's speech that the German Government 
stood by its earlier proposals for customs duty cuts despite the diffident re-
actions of the United Kingdom and of the other member States.  He described 
these as a reasonable way of ushering in a rapprochement and of ensuring that 
the economies of the Six and the applicant States expanded together.  The 
German proposals were clearly devised to facilitate and prepare accession. 
He said, however, that he was ready to look into all forms of consultation 
between the EEC and the applicant States provided these were not prejudicial 
to the internal life of the Community. 
- 112-The Federal Government had not lost sight of the aim of enlarging 
the Community, he said.  Yet it wished to work for the accession of the United 
Kingdom and the other applicant States patiently and perseveringly rather 
than impatiently or by taking a  'tough' line, for the latter might have unfortu-
nate repercussions.  'We Germans are ready to use our offices, where applica-
ble, to help in the search for solutions' he said. 
Mr.  Brandt listed six points on which the Federal Government 
would concentrate : 
1.  the internal completion of the Community up to the stage of a final 
Economic Union; 
2.  merging the Treaties; 
3.  making the applications for membership a subject for consultations at 
every meeting of the Council; 
4.  for the EEC Commission to state its position concerning the readiness 
for membership of the applicant States; 
5.  standing consultations with the applicant States on points of common 
interest; 
6.  co-operation between the EEC and the applicant States through interim 
trade policy arrangements and in the field of advanced technology. 
In a resolution passed unanimously, the conference decided to 
assume the form of an institution.  The parliamentarians of the Six and the 
European countries that had applied for membership or other forms of close 
association, wanted to meet at least once a year to talk over the unresolved 
issues of integration. A 'liaison committee' having a  'permanent secretariat' 
was to be set up.  The conference would co-operate with the European Parlia-
ment, the Assembly of Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the Euro-
pean Movement and with the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. 
In a closing speech,  Mr.  Gaston Defferre, the French Socialist and 
Vice-President of the European Movement,  described the German Foreign 
Minister's statement as encouraging.  Germany could set a new European poli-
cy in motion,  he said. If there were opposition from the French Government, 
it had to be remembered that France could not separate itself from Germany 
now that it had separated itself from other countries by vetoing their applicat-
ions for membership. 
(Die Welt,  4 and 6 May 1968) 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  3,  4 and 6 May 1968) 
(Industriekurier,  4 May  1968) 
(Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  5 June 1968) 
- 113-8.  Problems of European integration discussed at the Sixth Conference 
of European Buyers in Zurich 
The Sixth European Buyers' Conference was held in Zurich from 
16  to 18 May 196 8.  It opened with three noteworthy speeches concerning 
Europe and its future.  Mr.  R.  Bonvin,  a Federal Councillor, was the first 
of a series of prominent political speakers and he discussed international 
financial and monetary problems. 
Mr.  Bonvin gave a brief outline of the main monetary policy events 
of recent months, the most important being the introduction of the two-tier 
gold price. In monetary terms, there had been a shift in the international 
balance of power and this was highly relevant to what was happening; this had 
come about slowly since the end of the war.  The proof of this, Mr.  Bonvin 
said, was the simple fact that in 1948, the United States still held over 70 per 
cent of the world gold reserves whereas in 1960, the ten leading industrial 
States together held reserves totalling almost as much as those held by the 
United States.  The growing American balance of payments deficit - the real 
cause of the present international monetary difficulties - could not simply be 
made to disappear overnight. 
It was clear, added Mr.  Bonvin, that the measures taken by the 
United States would,  whatever their nature, affect Europe economically.  He 
said it was simply nonsensical to ask the Americans to take strong action and, 
at the same time, to criticize them for actually doing so.  There were two 
sides to the balance of payments problem and this meant that not only the 
country with a deficit but also the countries with surpluses should help to 
solve it.  The solution of course should not be paid for with a regression to 
protectionism.  Purely expansive and stimulating measures could lead to a 
situation where-he would like to see the European contribution primarily as a 
greaterwillingness to introduce customs duty reductions.  In any case, restor-
ing the equilibrium of the American balance of payments should be regarded 
as a collective duty. 
The second speaker, Professor Erhard, former Federal German 
Chancellor, discussed the objectives of the European idea which, he felt,  had 
recently lost a good deal of its impact. Although the European idea was quite 
clearly in the throes of a crisis, which was detectable primarily as a reaction 
to a 'deliberately engendered feeling of euphoria', Europe had by no means lost. 
'An escape from the impasse would only be successful if we approached our 
responsibilities with greater realism and did not dissipate our energies over 
technical issues. ' 
- 114-Professor Erhard came out ·quite decisively against the inclination 
to wait until new conditions concerning personalities obtained so that the paths 
now closed would open up again on their own.  Without directly saying whom 
he was attacking he strongly condemned the trend towards a  'hegemonially 
administered' Europe.  'We· would sooner agree to some measure of economic 
co-operation with the Communist-dominated economies than lend ourselves to 
subjection to any form of hegemonial power or agree_ to any ill-conceived 
nationalism in Europe.' 
Integration developments to date clearly showed that wherever large 
economic areas had failed to free themselves from national ties, they were on 
'shaky foundations'; there was no  'historical evidence' to prove that States had 
achieved this on the basis of economic interests alone but it was clear that the 
'awareness of belonging together to aState' madeitpossibletouniteeconornies. 
The oft-quoted example of the German Zollvereins had been misunderstood in 
that the German rise to political statehood had derived its impetus not from 
economic causes, as was always argued; the operative force had been 'a de-
sire and longing for unity'. 
He felt that the European Community would remain a 'purely tech-
nical instrument' for dealing with economic responsibilities until the desire 
for unity took cogent shape. What had been achieved so far towards a greater 
supranationality appeared to him worthy of only very limited recognition.  The 
pursuit of economic objectives, which were not simultaneously coupled with 
a full political agreement, were thus ...  and he had the vision of political unity 
constantly before his eyes - no serviceable basis for a real, closer, economic 
unity let alone a political merger.  He found it commendable that the larger 
economic area was in itself consistent with the liberal idea; on the other hand, 
he warned that even these could for 'nationalistic, egotistical or protectionist' 
reasons very easily assume the character of economic blocs. 
Perhaps, Professor Erhard went on to say, we must start again at 
the beginning; for to wait until new conditions concerning personalities ob-
tained would be a wholly unworthy political attitude involving as it did the fate 
of our peoples.  The rejection of the United Kingdom twice over had been a 
severe blow to the credibility of the EEC.  To show that the supranational idea 
was lacking in power, he quoted the failure of the ECSC States to amend the 
Treaty to deal with the ten year old coal crisis in Europe. 
At the close of his speech, in which he expressed great concern 
about the future of Europe, Professor Erhard again appealed urgently for the 
will 'to solve and heal'; only this could bring an end to the 'anachronistic and 
unnaturally depressing state' of a divided Europe.  The greatest danger for 
- 115-Europe, he said in conclusion, was in the 'technological and technocratic per-
fectionism' of this part of the world which must inevitably lead to collectivi-
zation. 
The European problem was tackled from an entirely different stand-
point, by the third speaker, Dr.  F.  Bock, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor. 
In contrast to Dr.  Erhard, he spoke only about economic integration, the 
only option open to a neutral State. Austria had, for reasons of State, refrain-
ed from moves towards political integration; this was of course easier to bear 
because there was nothing in European policy today which even showed what 
the outlines of political integration might be. 
After outlining Austria's integration endeavours, which had begun 
hopefully, Dr.  Bock said that these had led to a dead-end in the autumn of 
1967 because of the French volte-face.  He then suggested how Europe -
looking at it from the economic standpoint - should in fact go foreward. Of the 
two alternatives for enlargement referred to in the Treaties  of Rome, i.e. 
membership or association, the latter was 'blocked off' because it was now 
being interpreted too narrowly.  The fact that the term 'association' used in 
the EEC Treaties was not more clearly defined,  constituted a  challenge to 
the Community to be flexible in its foreign relations.  The thing lacking in 
Brussels was a  'pragmatic policy'.  The interim and transitional solutions 
which were arousing widespread hopes were no substitute here. Close co-
operation in the field of nuclear research, aeronautical engineering, the 
standardization of industrial property laws and co-operation in trade policy 
on third country markets, were 'all very fine aims' but they only related mar-
ginally to integration. A true alternative solution could be a reciprocal linear 
or sector reduction in customs duties which came under GATT preference; 
such measures would,  however, lead to a genuine integration treaty. Here too, 
the French veto was in evidence. 
Dr.  Bock said that real progress could not be expected, at least at 
present; of course this did not mean that one should now give up.  On the con-
trary, now was the time to work out a design that - in accordance with the 
new French ideas - did not restrict the problem to one country but offered a 
general solution for all applicant States. A multilateral solution could, he 
felt, be effected by recourse to the following programme : 
(a)  phasing out international customs duties within four or five years in  the 
industrial sector; 
(b)  harmonization of industrial policies in so far as this is necessary to 
overcome competitive distortions; 
(c)  approximation of external tariffs vis  -~-vis third countries by reference 
to an average rate and 
(d)  harmonization by sectors of the agricultural market regulations. 
- 116-Such a plan would also be consistent with GATT and - this appeared 
to be equally important - a running-in period would not affect a further inter -
nal development of the European Communities because in each of its stages, 
the advantages and disadvantages of this plan would be the same for the EEC 
and the EFTA States and lastly, it left the possibility open to all States wishing 
to accede to the Communities to give to their integration policies the scale and 
scope which seemed best to suit their purpose. 
<Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 May 1968) 
{lndustriekurier, 18 May 196 8) 
(Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung, 18 May 1968) 
9.  The Europe of the Left Movement holds a conference in London 
At the invitation of the Labour Committee for Europe an international 
conference of the European Left Movement was held in London on 24 and 25 
May 1968.  The Social Democrat organizations of the following countries were 
represented : Belgium, Germany,  France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Dr. Karl Mommer (SPD),  Vice-President of the Bundestag, thought 
that the time had come for a new offensive to enlarge the European Economic 
Community.  He told journalists that the events in France had shown that 
General de Gaulle was in a weak position.  He thought that it would be 'truly 
astounding' if he were allowed in future to impose his will on other European 
countries. 
De Gaulle's prestige had been so weakened that his position at the 
conference table would no longer be the same as it was.  Dr.  Mommer felt 
that advantage should be taken of the present situation which was more favour-
able than ever before. It was for the United Kingdom to uphold its application 
for membership until the door opened. 
Lord Chalfont, British Minister for European Affairs, said that his Go-
vernment did not rule out the possibility that  the present unrest in France might 
lead  to changes in France's EEC policy. Opening the conference, he said  that he 
was not one of those who felt that the French attitude was immutable.In  fact recent 
events in France had shown that changes were possible E)ven when they were least 
expected. Lord Chalfont said that the British  application would continue to remain . 
on the table but he rejected the alternative idea of a North Atlantic free trade area 
as being unrealistic. 
- 117-At the close of the conference, the following resolution on European 
policy was passed : 
'The conference of the European Left, which represents the social 
democrat organizations of nine countries,  considers that the enlargement of 
the EEC through the accession of the United Kingdom is the main aim of its 
policy and a prerequisite for the development of a democratic and politically 
united Europe. At the same time negotiations should be initiated with the other 
applicant States and with the neutral countries which have applied for associat-
ion. 
The main challenge facing our movement is the development of the 
EEC and its striving towards democratic institutions. It is today a fact that 
the enlargement of the Community would constitute an important factor in its 
development. 
As Social Democrats, we must together convince the Governments 
of the member States that they should start negotiations for the accession of 
the United Kingdom and a general enlargement of the Community.  In the mean-
time, we must work actively for the practical application of all· proposals for 
co-operation between as many European States as possible -in such fields as 
technology and foreign policy - and bring pressure to bear on our Governments 
to call a ministerial conference for this purpose. 
We must show Europe's disillusioned younger generation that the 
ideal of European unity opens new prospects for the future and that it is the 
best contribution that can be made to a world of peace, freedom and social 
justice.' 
(Sozialdemokratische Europa-Korrespondenz,  May 1968) 
10.  Atlantic Conference in Rome on technological development 
A conference on the strategy of technological development in the 
Atlantic Community was organized by the Atlantic Institute in Rome from 24 to 
26  May. 
- 118  -Mr.  David Rockefeller,  President of the Chase Manhattan Bank of 
New York, took the chair. 
Those taking part were received at the Quirinale by Mr. Saragat, 
President of the Italian Republic; Italy, he said, had been aware of its econo-
mic weakness and had experienced a feeling of diffidence because of this; but 
it had overcome this diffidence and it had become one of the leading exponents 
of free trade. 
'We pursued this course', he said, 'bearing in mind that our 
country' s  greatest moments were coincidental with and contingent on the high-
water marks of  international  trade and the flow of ideas.  We  also see a con-
nexion between the considerable increase in earnings over the last 18 years 
and the sound judgment and far-sightedness thanks to which we acted boldly 
and in good faith in opening up our market and faced up to competition from 
countries whose economic position was stronger than our own. 1 
He stressed the danger to the world of turning back and the danger 
of one or more countries' surrendering to the illusion that they could solve 
their own problems by reference to an historical concept of power; this today 
did not solve anything for anybody.  President Saragat them emphasized the 
need to bridge the technological gap between Europe and the United States as 
soon as possible. 
In conclusion he said that in Europe, Britain was the countrywhich 
devoted the greatest volume of its resources to scientific research. It was, 
as a result, leading the world in some sectors of advanced technology.  The 
strength of the United Kingdom,  as compared with that of other European 
countries -not only in research but also in its industrial applications -could 
impart a valuable stimulus to the various countries' national programmes and 
strengthen the position of the whole of Europe, safeguarding it against the risk 
of being overtaken by other countries. 
At the close of the conference, the following recommendations were 
approved: 
This conference considers that there are what have been described 
as technological gaps between developed countries but considers that they are 
not decisive.  The fundamental differences between North America,  Europe and 
Japan are due rather to the differences in their respective systems of attitudes 
and values, their management techniques, their institutions, the availability 
of capital and in the order of priorities drawn up as between the various regions 
- 119-and nations.  Technological information flowed fast round the scientific world 
through the agency of international companies and other channels so that 
wherever gaps occurred in this field,  they did not usually last long. 
The discussion of this problem in recent years had acted as a sti-
mulus in narrowing technological gaps, especially in Europe.  Thus existing 
differences were not a threat to economic co-operation in the Atlantic Com-
munity, provided they were suitably tackled and even though they represented 
a  constant challenge. 
The quickening pace of technical progress stemmed from improve-
ments in a whole series of social fields.  But rapid solutions did not exist. 
Hand in hand with research into new technological advances, there should be 
an attempt to look into their probable social consequences and to find ways of 
dealing with these satisfactorily. 
The areas in which improvements were needed were : 
(a)  the educational system 
(b)  management 
(c)  the diffusion of technical information 
(d)  the capital markets 
(e)  market conditions, including effective competition. 
Europe should give special priority to economic and technical pro-
gress.  To this end, it should review its own educational system, particularly 
the training of y-oung people for careers in industry.  This review should be 
undertaken in co-operation with the economic operators in every country.  The 
reform should embrace 
a)  extending and improving the school and university systems and 
b)  training for management. 
To facilitate the dissemination of knowledge in the applied sciences, it was to 
be hoped that there would be greater mobility between the spheres of govern-
ments, universities and economic operators and that there would be an inter-
national education and exchanges in the world of business. 
Financial power, the first requisite of which was to operate profita-
bly, was an important factor in technological competition.  Hence attention was 
drawn to the importance of efficiently-operating capital markets, especially 
for businesses that were being redeveloped.  Europe's capital markets had 
- 120-greatly improved in recent years, but they needed to be further consolidated 
to extend the capital structure and to provide adequate funds to finance re-
search and development. It was, therefore, to be hoped that the capital mar-
kets in the United States would be re-opened as soon as possible. 
The best way to disseminate knowledge was through free markets, 
through trade and the free movement of capital in the Atlantic Community. 
Governments should open the way  to  international  investment and eliminate 
any barriers. 
Encouragement ought to be given to the operations of international 
companies which facilitated the diffusion of technology.  The efforts made to 
create international companies should be intensified especially those between 
European companies. Any legal and financial obstacles to setting up such 
companies should be eliminated. 
Of late, Atlantic co-operation, particularly in the private sector, 
had helped appreciably towards bridging the technological gap.  This co-ope-
ration had to be kept up and accelerated not only in the private sector, but 
also between Governments and such inter-governmental organizations as the 
OECD.  The Atlantic Community and Japan had at all times to be aware of their 
responsibility of reducing the technological and economic gap between them-
selves and the developing countries. 
To maintain the enthusiasm generated by this and other conferen-
ces, the Atlantic Institute was asked by the conference to study the specific 
proposals put forward during the discussions relating to : 
(a)  the sociological implications of technology, 
(b)  European company law, 
(c)  current problems of European economic integration, 
(d)  the desirability of creating an Atlantic research centre and of making 
the necessary documentation available. 
The Institute was also asked to establish which proposals and pro-
grammes deserved both to be supported and executed and the form this should 
take. 
(Corriera della Sera,  26  May 1968) 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  1 June 1968) 
- 121-11.  European farmers (C. 0. P. A.) and the common policies for the 
milk and beef and veal sectors 
The Decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 29  May 1968, 
concerning the common policy for the milk sector and the final settlement for 
beef and veal were discussed by the executive of the Confederation of Agricul-
tural Producers Organizations (COPA) meeting under the chairmanship of 
Mr.  Dumont de Chassart. 
1.  The executive noted that the Council had taken decisions on the 
milk and beef and veal regulations.  These were necessary to the implementa-
tion of the common agricultural policy. 
With reference to the milk sector, however, the executive deplored 
the fact that the Council decision, laying down levels of support which varied 
from one country to another, had not established any real single market even 
though this had been agreed on in July 1966. 
It urged that the market should become a common one as soon as 
possible so that Community milk producers might obtain the target price 
without discrimination and so as to eliminate obstacles to trade. 
It considered that the present difficulties in the milk market were 
no reasons for challenging the principles underlying the common agricultural 
policy or the basis upon which it had originally been constructed. 
2.  It noted with satisfaction that the Council had agreed to look into 
all the problems affecting the future of agriculture in the Community, parti-
cularly the structural ones; the latter were to be considered from the econo-
mic, social and regional standpoints by reference to an annual report on agri-
culture and the agricultural market in the Community and to a Commission 
memorandum to serve as a basis for working out a common viewpoint and for 
the necessary measures in the matter of agricultural structure policy. 
It again stressed that there should be close co-operation with COPA 
and the farming organizations in the member States in establishing the objec-
tives to be attained and resources to be used. 
It stressed however that price policy was still the essential feature 
of the common agricultural policy. 
- 122-3.  The executive recalled that the Community had to have adequate 
financial resources to ensure the operation of the common agricultural policy. 
Although the principle of making a charge on fats of vegetable and 
marine origin consumed in the Community had been endorsed, the executive 
found it regrettable that the rate decided upon was lower than the minimum 
proposed by COPA (o. 50  DM/kg -with the exception of olive oil). 
4.  As regards beef and veal, the executive noted with satisfaction  that 
the Council's decision was broadly in line with what COPA had asked for. 
5.  It pointed out however that the effectiveness of some of the regu-
lations would be largely dependent on the implementing decisions to follow. 
The executive therefore asked that COPA should be associated in their elabo-
ration and execution. 
6.  Lastly the executive expressed its heartiest congratulations to the 
members of the agricultural associations who had come from every region of 
the Community and who had shown solidarity in supporting the requests made 
by COPA. 
(L'Agriculteur,  8 June 1968) 
12.  European Space Conference in Munich 
From 18 to 21 June 1968 the members of the Eurospace organization 
attended the third USA-Europe Space Conference in Munich to discuss current 
problems connected with setting up  European space travel facilities.  The con-
ference,  unlike the previous one held in Philadelphia, was also attended not 
only by Eurospace industrialists but also by numerous official representatives 
from many countries. 
At the opening of the Conference Mr.  Stoltenberg,  Federal Science 
Minister, deplored the fact that almost every European government had so far 
failed to accord to space research the place it deserved. In many countries the 
industry had hesitated to set up undertakings of the size needed to satisfy the 
large-scale requirements of modern air and space travel. Such difficulties had 
certainly encouraged the doubts entertained about major projects of European 
- 123-space reeearch reflected, for example,  in Italy's negative attitude to impor-
tant new European projects and Britain's refusal to accept concrete proposals 
for the development of telecommunication satellites and a future launcher pro-
gramme. 
Mr.  Stoltenberg described the situation as serious.  The complete 
abandonment of joint European work on satellites for practical applications 
and of launcher development would also affect existing co-operation in research 
and thus call any significant supranational contribution of Europe into question. 
That would be a cardinal error, an irrevocable decision against a substantial 
level of achievement by Europe, which ought to keep pace with developments 
in the major powers in clearly defined and selected fields.  Fortunately,  in 
the last eighteen months a development had been set in motion,  both at natio-
nal level and in the sphere of international co-operation, which could lead to 
the removal of a number of errors and weaknesses. 
Mr.  Stoltenberg described the goal as an organizational merger of 
the European space organizations ELDO and ESRO.  A loose co-ordination of 
programmes would not suffice.  In the interest of the smaller countries, 
member States should be free to decide whether to participate in one or two or 
all three sections of the programme : research satellites, satellites for prac-
tical applications and launcher development. Co-operation with the United 
States would be desirable.  Mr.  Stoltenberg went on to point ont that since 
1965 the Federal Republic of Germany had increased credits for space research 
from DM.150m.  to DM. 325m.  The plan was to bring this up to nearly 
DM. 500m.  by 1970,  a level to be regarded as an upper limit.  The State orga-
nization was being modified,  the technical capacity of research institutes had 
been increased this summer and, after lengthy negotiations, important deci-
sions on mergers had at last been taken in the industry. 
The total contribution of the European States to space researchand 
technology amounted for the current year to about DM. 1, 200m.  The program-
me committee had proposed that this should be raised by 10 per cent each 
year -a realistic goal.  'We must, however', added Mr.  Stoltenberg,  'display 
a real political determination to unite and to find constructive solutio~s. Other-
wise we will fall behind irrevocably. ' It was not enough for each European 
country to have its own priorities for scientific and technical co-operation. 
Mr.  Delorme, President of Eurospace, stated that it was only in 
friendly co-operation between Europe and the United States in this field that 
the devel<>pment of both continents could be achieved.  The president of the 
Federal Association of the German Air and Space Travel Industry, Claudius 
Dornier Jr. remarked that in the last few years substantial progress had been 
made in the sphere of co-operation. It was to be expected from the present 
- 124 -conference that it too would make a contribution towards achieving a truly 
European space travel programme. 
Dr.  Burckhardt summed up the results of the four-day conference. 
All the problems of future space travel had been discussed.  The need was for 
a European space travel programme to be promoted by a European company 
to be set up for the purpose.  Plans should first be worked out for an effective 
publicity campaign aimed at arousing general understanding of the problems 
involved.  These werenot to be confused, for example, with manned space-
flights to the moon or neighbouring planets.  What was of vital importance to 
all Europeans was that progress be made in space travel techniques and prac-
tical fields such as telecommunications, air safety etc.  The projected central 
organization, for which the name 'Eurosat' had been proposed,  could be either 
a private or a semi-public undertaking. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung, 26 June 1968; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  19 June 1968; 
Le Soir, 19 and 23/24 June 1968; 
Agence Europe,  7 June 1968) 
13.  Brussels Conference on Europe and Space 
On 24  June 1968,  Mr.  Radoux,  a member of the Belgian Chamber 
of Representatives and delegate to the European Parliament, gave a press con-
ference in the Palais des Congr~s at which he outlined the conclusions drawn 
during a 'Europe and Space' conference held at the Cha.teau Karreveld (Brus-
sels).  This conference was organized by the Belgian 'Centre International du 
Dialogue', whose aim is to foster an international spirit by submitting inter-
national issues to experts for them to discuss. 
Those taking part in the conference made several points.  A viable 
programme had to be kept in motion in the field of science. It was of real in-
terest to make use of telecommunication satellites, particularly for the pur-
poses of television, navigation,  meteorology and the study of the world's re-
sources both internationally and in the European context. 
The conference recommended early decisions regarding telecommu-
nications to meet the needs of Eurovision. 
- 125-With reference to launchers, the conference recommended a care-
fu1  study be made of how Europe cou1d become independent, while bearing in 
mind that if it were not independent, its opportunities in the field of satellites 
wou1d be limited. 
Lastly, the conference recognized that the problems of space had 
b~en seen against the wider background of advanced technology. 
With reference to setting up a  European technological centre, the 
conference listened with close attention to the proposal made by Mr.  Brown 
(the British MP) which it found particu1arly interesting and which deserved to 
be examined at a later date; it felt, however,  that more immediate problems 
arising in the context of Europe and space, had to be tackled as a matter of 
urgency. 
Mr.  Bondi (Director-General of ESRO)  drew attention to the im-
portance of co-operation between Governments and advocated a wide-ranging 
organization to promote research; there had to be an adequate willingness to 
look for two-way benefits. 
Mr.  Rubinacci (Italian Minister for Scientific Research) stated that 
although no very precise conclusions had emerged, the conference had been 
very usefu1.  He stressed the need for a merger of space agencies and for 
Europe to progress with launchers.  The viability of such projects had to be 
carefu1ly assessed so that they might be helpfu1 to the economies of the various 
countries. 
(Le Soir, 25 June 1968) 
14.  The 'Ibero-America' Society urges world-wide preference system 
At a meeting held in Hamburg on 26  June the lbero-Amerika Verein 
e. V.  expressed the view that the forthcoming association of the East African 
States of Kenya,  Uganda and Tanzania with the EEC was having serious psy-
chological effects in the developing countries of Latin America.  Favoured 
treatment of these countries cou1d moreover lend fresh impetus to attempts to 
secure u.s. preferences for Latin America. 
- 126-The advantages flowing from the association would be greatly out-
weighed by these adverse effects.  The Society therefore urged that the pre-
ferential tariffs for the Associated African countries, coming up for review on 
30  June 1969,  should not be renewed,  and that the EEC's preference policy 
should tie in with the world wide preference system approved in principle in 
UNCTAD. 
(Die Welt,  27  June 1968) 
15.  Roman Seminar on 'Latin America, Italy and the EEC' 
In the latter part of June a seminar on 'Latin America, Italy and 
the EEC', organized by the Italo-Latin American Institute, was held in Rome. 
The many speakers included Mr.  Fanfani,  President of the Senate, 
who stated that the enterprise of the Italians and the hospitality of a continent 
named America after a  Florentine, accounted for the close relations now 
being established in every sector between the peoples of the Italian peninsula 
and of the American subcontinent. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that 
a wish had been repeatedly expressed in high places in the Italian Republic 
during the·· last decade that Latin America should occupy a place in the world 
commensurate with its size and population,  its natural and political situation, 
its present capacities and its immense future potential. 
Mr.  Fanfani then recalled that following the Italo-Mexican meeting 
of May 1965 and President Saragat's visit to Latin America that year, the. 
Italian Government had suggested to the friendly Republics that a new and 
special instrument be put at the service of co-operation between Italy and La-
tin America, and -through Italy- between Latin America and Europe.  The. 
suggestion was accepted and on 1 June 1966 the Treaty of Rome was signed. 
This had made it possible to set up the Italo-Latin American Institute a year 
later. 
. Mr.  Fanfani expressed the hope that the seminar would bring to 
light the best means of enabling Latin America to develop in freedom and in 
accordance with the ideals of justice which no one was now prepared to forgo. 
Italy would,  he was sure, not only offer prudent advice but also 
make considerable efforts to ensure that Latin America shared in the free 
- 127-and peaceful development of the world, so that it could assume among the 
community of peoples the special place that belonged to it. 
At the end of the seminar a report was approved in which reference 
was made to the prospects of setting up a common market in Latin America. 
This stressed the similarity between present conditions in Latin America and 
those that existed in Europe before the signing of the Rome Treaty. 
Italy's participation in the EEC, taken as an example of a relative-
ly developed country, appears to be a model that could hardly apply to Latin 
America because Italy had specific characteristics deriving from historical 
and economic conditions, such as the advanced stage of development of indus-
try in the North of the country, as well as its trade liberalization policy and 
the expansion of demand, which were all prior to the integration process. 
There was no doubt that Europe's economic integration could be 
regarded as a positive factor for the equilibrium of world relations and par-
ticularly for those with the Latin American continent.  It had, however, been 
found that it would be necessary to revise the whole of the EEC's economic 
co-operation policy with regard to Latin-America in respect of commerce, 
finance and technical co-operation.  Technical co-operation or association 
agreements would not exclude the possibility of three-cornered operations 
between Europe, the United States and Latin America, on the understanding 
that these relations should be as flexible as possible in order to take into ac-
count the particular internal conditions of the various countries concerned. 
For Latin America, the Community's farming policy, with its high 
prices and its protectionist system, was a source of deep concern.  Latin 
America was in particular uneasy about the association agreement between 
the Community and the AAMS.  This consolidated a preferential area in contra-
diction with a general and non-discriminatory liberalization policy in respect 
of exports from developing countries. 
The report concluded by referring to various aspects of financial 
co-operation between Europe and Latin America. These aspects clearly brought 
out the following facts: 
1.  Co-operation between Europe and Latin America was at present 
rather limited in relation to both Europe's e.conomic capacity and the volume 
of capital transferred from that area to the rest of the world; 
- 128  -2.  The favourable experience of private Italian investments in Latin 
America and existing possibilities of increasing such investments; these 
would promote closer trade relations  and technological progress; 
3.  The major part of European capital transfers to Latin America was 
in the form of supply credits, the terms of which were not always consonant 
with development requirements. It was, therefore, hoped that means would 
be found of substantially increasing Europe's financial assistance to Latin 
America, not only with regard to the nature of investments but also with a 
view to improving the terms; 
4.  The need to find s1,1itable  methods of achieving financial co-operation 
as suggested in a report presented by the International Development Bank to 
the EEC; among the various specific possibilities outlined in that report, 
there was the necessity to promote an effective opening of private capital mar-
kets, of regarding the International Development Bank as similar to other 
world financial organizations and of making use of all these organizations to 
initiate a multilateral European financial policy for Latin America. The report 
also dwelt on the need to find a suitable way of making use of the European In-
vestment Bank for increasing the flow of financial investments in Latin Ame-
rica. 
In this context, the Italo-Latin-American Institute, within the 
framework of the commitments assigned to it by the constituent agreement, 
was requested by the seminar to follow the progress of Community policy and, 
in particular, the forthcoming negotiations for renewing the Association 
Agreement between the EEC and the AAMS.  It was also requested to formu-
late in due course, through the appropriate channels, the most suitable pro-
posals for an eventual common action. 
(11  Popolo,  25 June 1968; 
Relazioni Internazionali, 13 July 1968) 
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